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Summary of the thesis 
 
This thesis analyses and models the vulnerability of the electricity power supply under 
extreme weather conditions.  The system under study is the electric supply system that includes 
major power plants to main load centers.  Extreme weather conditions can cause common mode 
contingencies (CMCs) of overhead power lines, which endanger the security of electricity 
supply.  Planning and operation of transmission systems are subject to N-1 criterion, which 
requires that all single failures of network elements do not cause a breach of safety limits.  This 
criterion does not guarantee the security of electricity supply at the time of extreme weather 
conditions.  The objective of this research is to identify critical and plausible CMCs, taking into 
account space-time correlations of extreme weather conditions and possible states of the 
network.  The most vulnerable zones are focused on to determine appropriate countermeasures 
for reducing vulnerability.  
In the past, extreme weather events have caused major disruptions.  For example, the 
blackout in New York in 1977 was initiated by three impacts of lightning on high voltage lines.  
In 1999, hurricane Lothar caused damage to power grids in several countries, leaving hundreds 
of thousands of people in darkness.  These examples demonstrate the vulnerability of power 
systems to CMCs. Current transmission networks are expected to undergo significant changes 
in response to developments such as increases in consumption and newly installed capacity.  
These changes provide an opportunity to strengthen the security of electricity supply in the 
perspective of extreme weather conditions and even improve the resilience of electric supply 
systems. 
The use of the proposed methodology allows reducing the level of vulnerability by 
reinforcing only few points or change of the topology of the network.  Faced with uncertainties 
about the evolution of networks and plausible extreme weather conditions, a methodology 
based on scenarios has been selected.  The methodology allows the modeler to reproduce the 
complexity of the problem while still encouraging the learning process.  
The core of the methodology is founded on a scenario of electric supply systems and a 
scenario of extreme weather events.  The first scenario includes three models: electric, 
geographic, and reliability.  The electric model comprises components of the network 
compatible with load flow calculations.  The geographic model contains a representation of 
each power line in a geographic information system, and each of these lines is divided into 
segments that are associated with a reliability model.  The reliability model evaluates failure 
rates related to exposure to extreme weather conditions.  Scenarios of extreme weather events 
are built on data from weather stations or by numerical simulations implemented in a 
geographic information system.  
A vulnerability level index is calculated on the basis of probability and severity indices of a 
priori possible CMCs.  These probabilities are evaluated by a simulation of the interaction 
between the scenario of transmission network and scenario of extreme weather event.  They are 
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a subjective and temporal measure of plausibility of CMCs stemming from interactions in 
space and time of the two systems previously mentioned.  The severity index of CMCs is 
calculated by a contingency analysis that involves the evaluation of security limit violations.  A 
matrix of vulnerability is constructed as a projection of the vulnerability level in two 
dimensions, including the lines involved in overload and those being overloaded.  This matrix 
allows the identification of the infrastructures involved in the vulnerability and the 
determination of major zones of vulnerability.  Countermeasures are then proposed to reduce 
the vulnerability of these zones, and these measures may include additions or retirement of 
lines or other network topology changes.  
 
This methodology is applied to the Swiss transmission network in 2018 subject to summer 
thunderstorms.  A reference case from 2006 is compared in terms of vulnerability to a plausible 
scenario of transmission network 2018.   The latter includes an increased consumption of 20%, 
around 3 GW of pumped-storage power plants, and network changes proposed by the 
electricity sector plan supported by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy.   
 
On another level, two scenarios of extreme weather events were constructed.  The first is an 
intense thunderstorm occurring in the past, where lightning strikes were recorded by a tracking 
system.  The second case stems from a simulation of a thunderstorm event composed of six 
cells passing over the Swiss territory.  The vulnerability of both scenarios of electric supply 
system impacted by both scenarios of extreme weather events was evaluated.  
 
Two major zones of vulnerability were detected both in the reference case 2006 and the 
plausible scenario 2018.  They are in mountainous regions near major centers of production.  
The network changes between 2006 and 2018 did not decrease the vulnerability.  This is due to 
the installation of large generation capacity and the difficulty of building lines as a result of the 
topography in these regions.  
To reduce vulnerability, the addition of a 380 kV overhead line is proposed for the plausible 
scenario 2018.  This line allows draining off the new hydro generation by offering a new route 
to major consumption centers and drastically reduces the vulnerability of the two zones 
mentioned.  This measure illustrates the methodology’s ability to identify areas of vulnerability 
and propose actions to increase network resilience. 
One of the major contributions and innovative points of this research is the consideration of 
the spatiotemporal correlations of extreme weather conditions for the geographical distribution 
and structural resistance of transmission lines.  In the application of the Swiss 2018 scenario of 
transmission network, the concept of major zones of vulnerability was useful in identifying the 
weakest zones and in finding a measure capable of increasing network resilience.  
Keywords: Vulnerability analysis, extreme weather conditions, electricity power supply, 
contingency analysis, geographic information system 
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Résumé de la thèse 
 
Cette thèse est consacrée à l’évaluation de la vulnérabilité de l’approvisionnement en 
électricité dans des conditions météorologiques extrêmes (CME). Le système étudié est le 
système d’approvisionnement en énergie électrique. Les CME peuvent engendrer des 
contingences en mode commun (CMC) des lignes aériennes de transport qui influencent 
négativement la sécurité d’approvisionnement en électricité. En effet, la planification et 
l’opération des réseaux de transport sont soumises au critère N-1 qui impose que toute 
défaillance unique d’élément du réseau ne provoque pas de violation des limites de sécurité. Ce 
critère n’assure donc pas la sécurité d’approvisionnement lors de CME. Cette recherche vise à 
identifier des CMC plausibles et critiques en tenant compte des corrélations spatiotemporelles 
ainsi que des états possibles du réseau. Les zones les plus vulnérables sont mises en évidence 
pour déterminer des contre-mesures aptes à réduire la vulnérabilité.  
Par le passé, les CME ont provoqué des perturbations importantes. Par exemple, le blackout 
de New York en 1977 a été initié par trois impacts de foudre sur des lignes à très haute tension. 
Plus récemment en 1999, l’ouragan Lothar a causé des dégâts aux réseaux électriques de 
plusieurs pays plongeant dans le noir des centaines de milliers de personnes. Ces deux 
exemples montrent que la vulnérabilité des réseaux électriques aux CME est réelle. D’autre 
part, les réseaux de transport actuels vont subir des modifications importantes pour répondre à 
de profonds changements comme la hausse de la consommation ou des nouvelles capacités de 
productions envisagées. Ces changements sont une opportunité à saisir pour renforcer la 
sécurité d’approvisionnement lors de CME. Une meilleure résilience des réseaux de transport 
vis-à-vis des CME est non seulement possible mais souhaitable. 
La méthodologie proposée permet de diminuer le niveau de vulnérabilité en prenant en 
compte les infrastructures existantes et leurs possibles alternatives de développement. Face aux 
incertitudes concernant l’évolution des réseaux et des CME plausibles, une méthodologie sur 
base de scenarios a été retenue. Elle permet au modélisateur de restituer la complexité du 
problème tout en encourageant les processus d’apprentissage. Le cœur de la méthodologie a 
donc pour fondement un scénario du réseau électrique de transport et un scenario d’événement 
météorologique extrême. Le scenario du réseau comprend un modèle électrique, un modèle 
géographique et un modèle de défaillance. Le modèle électrique contient les composants du 
réseau compatible avec un calcul de load flow. Le modèle géographique contient une 
représentation de chaque ligne électrique dans un système d’information géographique. 
Chacune de ces lignes est divisée en segments qui sont associés à un modèle de défaillance. 
Celui-ci permet d’évaluer son taux de défaillance à la suite d’une exposition à des CME. Quant 
au scenario météorologique, il est construit sur la base d’informations fournies par des stations 
météorologiques ou à partir de simulations numériques implémentées sous un système 
d’information géographique. 
Un indice de niveau de vulnérabilité est calculé sur la base des probabilités et des indices de 
sévérité des CMC a priori possibles. Ces probabilités sont évaluées par une simulation de 
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l’interaction entre le scenario de réseau et le scénario météorologique. Elles sont une mesure 
subjective et temporelle de la plausibilité de CMC engendrés par les interactions dans l’espace 
et le temps de deux scenarios mentionnés. L’indice de sévérité des CMC est calculé à la suite 
d’une analyse de contingence qui consiste à évaluer des violations de limites de sécurité. 
D’autre part, une matrice de vulnérabilité est construite comme projection du niveau de 
vulnérabilité sur deux dimensions, les lignes impliquées dans des surcharges et celles qui sont 
surchargées. Cette matrice permet l’identification des infrastructures participant à la 
vulnérabilité afin définir des zones de vulnérabilité. Des contre-mesures sont ensuite proposées 
pour en diminuer la vulnérabilité. Ces mesures peuvent comprendre des ajouts ou suppressions 
de lignes ou d’autres modifications topologiques du réseau.  
Cette méthodologie est appliquée au réseau de transport suisse d’électricité de 2018 soumis 
à des orages estivaux. Un cas de référence de 2006 est comparé à un scenario du réseau 
plausible pour 2018. Ce dernier comprend une augmentation de la consommation de 20%, 
l’installation de 3 GW de centrales de pompage-turbinage et des modifications du réseau 
proposées par le plan sectoriel d’électricité soutenu par l’office fédéral de l’énergie. Sur un 
autre plan, deux scenarios météorologiques ont été constitués. Le premier reprend un cas 
d’orages passés très intenses dont les impacts de foudre ont été enregistrés par un système de 
localisation. Le deuxième cas provient d’une simulation d’un passage de six cellules orageuses 
sur le territoire suisse. La vulnérabilité des deux scenarios du réseau impactés par les deux 
scenarios d’orage a été évaluée.  
Deux mêmes zones majeures de vulnérabilité ont été détectées pour les scenarios réseaux de 
2006 et 2018. Elles se situent dans des régions montagneuses proches de grands centres de 
production d’électricité. Les modifications apportées au réseau entre 2006 et 2018 n’ont pas 
diminué la vulnérabilité certainement en raison des nouvelles capacités de production installées 
et de la difficulté de construction de lignes dues à la topographie accidentée de ces régions.  
Afin de réduire la vulnérabilité, l’ajout d’une ligne aérienne de 380 kV a été proposé pour le 
scenario 2018. Cette ligne permet un drainage de la nouvelle production hydraulique en offrant 
un nouveau passage vers les grands centres de consommation d’électricité. Cette ligne diminue 
drastiquement la vulnérabilité des deux zones mentionnées. Cette mesure doit être considérée 
comme une illustration de l’aptitude de la méthodologie à identifier des zones de vulnérabilité 
puis de proposer des actions visant à augmenter la résilience du réseau.    
La prise en compte des corrélations spatiotemporelles des CME, de la distribution 
géographique des lignes de transport, ainsi que de leur résistance aux CME par les probabilités 
de CMC est une contribution majeure et novatrice de cette recherche. Lors de l’application à un 
scénario du réseau Suisse en 2018, le concept de zones majeures de vulnérabilité s’est révélé 
utile pour identifier les zones les plus faibles et pour trouver une mesure capable d’augmenter 
la résilience du réseau.  
Mots clés : Analyse de vulnérabilité, conditions météorologiques extrêmes, système 
d’approvisionnement en électricité, analyse de contingence, système d’information 
géographique  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
1.1.1 How do extreme weather events affect the security of the electricity 
supply? 
 
Extreme weather events are considered to be major threats, even for our modern society.  
Despite the high level of protection procured by sophisticated engineering techniques, 
extreme weather conditions are still able to disturb the smooth running of vital energy 
infrastructures.  In particular, the electricity system, including production and transmission, 
has failed numerous times in the past because of natural hazards.  Extreme weather conditions 
are the strong expressions of variability of the atmospheric system.  According to Beniston 
(2004) , no single definition is found in the literature.  However, the following two definitions 
are most often encountered: 
 
• Their frequency of occurrence is low.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
agrees in its third assessment report (IPCC, 2001) that extreme weather conditions are 
referred to as occurring above the 90th percentile of a statistical distribution of 
precipitation, wind speed, and other key characteristics. 
• They are intense and able to cause large human losses and/or significant economic costs 
The intensity of extreme weather conditions is one factor that accounts for their capacity to 
cause disruptions in electric power systems.  Their rarity and variability are other factors that 
impede a total protection of energy infrastructures.  Failures of elements of those systems are 
more likely during extreme weather conditions than during normal weather conditions. 
Therefore, extreme weather conditions are threats to the security of the electricity supply.  
The working group of the security of the electricity supply of Eurelectric proposes a relevant 
definition for this research: 
"The ability of the electrical power system to provide electricity to end-users with a specified 
level of continuity and quality in a sustainable manner." (Eurelectric, 2004) 
 
In a secure power system, the demand of electricity is continuously and sustainably assured 
by the appropriate level of production.  Moreover, the transfer of energy from power plants to 
end-users is also and sustainably assured by transmission and distribution networks.  
Transmission networks are characterized by their large transport capacity of very high voltage 
overhead power lines connecting large power plants to main centers of electrical 
consumption.  These networks are meshed to assure minimal resilience in case of components 
failures.   
Distribution networks connect transmission networks and power plants of smaller capacity 
to end-users.  These networks are composed of overhead power lines and buried cables with a 
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decreasing redundancy as their voltage diminishes.  
Extreme weather conditions are able to unbalance production and consumption or impede 
electricity transmission in both types of networks.  This research focuses exclusively on 
transmission networks, which have been the source of large disturbances during past extreme 
weather conditions.  
Large electricity disruptions or blackouts are often consequences of successive minor 
failures.  According to Makarov et al. (2005), it generally starts with initial overhead power 
line breakdowns due to extreme weather conditions .  Most of the time, these breakdowns are 
contained because of the natural resilience of meshed network.  In certain unpredictable 
conditions, initial breakdowns are amplified by hidden failures in protective systems or 
accident-prone operations, which lead to cascading failures and blackouts.  The following two 
examples give more insight into these phenomena.  
The New York blackout of 1977 plunged 9 million people into darkness for up to 26 hours 
(Corwin and Miles, 1979).  Lightning struck three overhead transmission lines during a 
thunderstorm event. Several power lines tripped off in less than an hour leading to the slow 
islanding of New York.  Power generation had to be reduced to alleviate the overload of 
power lines while consumption was still high.  The system finally collapsed because of the 
inadequacy of production and consumption.   
This example shows the phenomenon of cascading failures.  When preconditions are 
present such as high load or power line maintenance, a few power line failures can precipitate 
a whole system to ground.  A sequence of unpredictable and highly unlikely failures can lead 
to a blackout.  Once a blackout sequence is initiated, a dramatic outcome is generally 
unavoidable. This thunderstorm event was not considered extreme in intensity, but it was 
intense enough to trigger three simultaneous outages of transmission lines.  In this example, 
the space-time patterns of the thunderstorm cells played a great role in the dangerousness of 
this event.  
In December 1999 in Western Europe, hurricanes Lothar and Martin caused billion of euro 
in damages.  The French electric power system in particular suffered from these two intense 
winter storms. Accoring to Piketty et al. (2000), the cost of damages for Electricité de France 
was estimated at around 1.5 billion euro.  The costs stemmed primarily from repair and 
reconstruction at the distribution network level (86%), the transmission network (11%) and 
generation (3%).  Around 415 million kWh were not supplied in time, mostly by the 
distribution network (73%). The cost of the energy not supplied for the consumers was 
estimated at 4.1 billion euro.   
The distribution network was responsible for the majority of the damage costs and for the 
energy not supplied.  Most of the French distribution network was composed of overhead 
power lines, which are less resistant than transmission lines, and their limited height fosters 
hazardous interactions with vegetation.  
At the transmission network level, most of the damage was recorded in eight circuits.  The 
foundations of the pylons were responsible for the majority of the outages. The under sizing 
of these infrastructures has been deemed as the main cause of failure.  It is mentioned in 
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Piketty’s reports that the transmission network would have been responsible for a large 
proportion of the energy not served if the load was higher at the time of the two hurricanes.  
Indeed, thousands of fugitive failures were recorded. They could have triggered cascading 
failures in a more heavily loaded system.  These two hurricanes are perfect examples of 
extreme weather events because their return period is estimated at around 100 years and they 
provoked billions of euros of losses for society. 
They are representative of the capability of extreme weather conditions to endanger the 
security of the electricity supply.  They demonstrate that most of the costs stem from energy 
not supplied in time, not from physical damages to infrastructures.  Although distribution 
networks are vulnerable in case of widespread extreme weather conditions such as hurricanes, 
transmission networks are prone to cascading failures having the capacity to propagate to a 
large portion of the system.  Distribution networks can be extensively cabled while 
transmission networks cannot at reasonable costs.  These networks are resilient up to a critical 
point where they exhibit chaotic behaviors (Dobson, 2002).  Even, two simultaneous and 
fugitive outages can lead to huge blackouts.  
Simultaneous outages triggered by the same cause are named common mode contingencies 
(CMCs).  Initial outages can cause violation of security limits, such as overloads or 
inadmissible voltage deviations, turning into an uncontrolled series of disconnections.  This 
phenomenon of cascading failures is responsible for the biggest blackouts recorded in the past 
50 years (Carreras et al., 2004).  Because cascading failures are highly unpredictable, 
everything should be made to avoid entering these hazardous sequences of disruptive events.  
It is worth mentioning that extreme weather conditions are not the only factor which 
endangers the security of the electricity supply.  The cause of vulnerability is multifactorial 
including, but not limited to, such issues as high consumption, ageing infrastructures, and 
disrespect of operational rules (Novosel et al., 2004).  
In conclusion, extreme weather conditions may endanger the security of the electricity 
supply at the level of transmission networks by means of cascading failures.  Once they are 
unleashed, they are difficult, if not impossible, to stop.  Therefore, it is important to 
thoroughly plan transmission networks to reduce the likelihood of violation of security limits 
in case of plausible CMCs. Especially at the planning stage, it may be preferable to build 
more resilient transmission networks. 
 
1.1.2 The Swiss transmission network 
 
Understanding the context of the electric power systems under investigation is essential to 
assessing why they are vulnerable and what measures can reasonably be undertaken to reduce 
vulnerability.  Since the methodology of vulnerability assessment is applied to the Swiss case, 
the focus is given specifically to the Swiss transmission network interconnected to the 
European Transmission Network.  Factual information is presented in the next paragraphs as 
well as possible future developments relating to those two transmission networks.  
The European transmission network spread across 34 countries and was managed by 42 
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transmission system operators integrated in 2008 in the association named European network 
of transmission system operators for electricity.  This network is divided into several regions, 
and the most important is the continental Europe region, formerly named UCTE.  For the year 
2008, the statistical year book for the continental Europe region mentions that the net 
electricity generation reached 2643 TWh after a long increasing trend of more than 25 years 
(ENTSO-E, 2008). 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the net electricity generation for continental Europe 
 
 
Generation is constantly rising from 1975 to 2008 to meet ever growing demand. The 
sudden raise in 1998 and 2003 is due to the integration of former Eastern European countries 
in the continental Europe region.  As seen in Figure 1, the other resources category has been 
rising since 2005.  It is primarily constituted of renewable energies such as wind power, 
which was counted in the fossil fuels category.  From the beginning, generation adequacy has 
been essentially met by thermal nuclear and fossil fuels energy sources.  This fact will 
certainly remain true in coming years, even if the installed capacity of renewable energy is 
augmented.  Green energy is one of the priorities of the European energy policy along with 
competitiveness and security of supply of the electricity sector (CEC, 2006). 
Growing concerns regarding greenhouse gases and their potential effects on climate 
change positively influence the share of renewable energy in the generation mix.  According 
to the report on system adequacy forecast from 2010 to 2025 (ENTSO-E, 2009b), the installed 
capacity of wind farms could reach in 2020 about 21% of a total of 878 GW net generating 
capacity.  After 2020, the expected wind power capacity in Europe is likely to foster cross-
border exchanges, and thus, exacerbate the current zones of congestion (Van Hulle, 2009). 
Indeed, much of the present transmission infrastructure was built in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Silvast and Kaplinsky, 2007).  At this time, national monopolies were the rule of thumb 
where each country had a primary objective to supply its own load by conventional 
productions.  Interconnection power lines were used to guarantee the security of supply in 
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case of shortages or generation breakdowns.  Since the EU liberalization of electricity, 
exchange between countries has raised and is even encouraged by the European Council 
(CEC, 2007).  Major investments in the European transmission network will take place in 
coming years to help ensure the security of the electricity supply, international energy 
exchanges and the integration of renewable intermittent energy sources. 
Switzerland shows similar trends regarding its ageing transmission infrastructures and rise 
in consumption.  However, its topography enables hydro energy instead of wind energy.  In 
2008, 55% of Swiss generation stemmed from hydro power, the rest being generated by 
thermal nuclear power plants (40%) and conventional thermal power plants (5%) (OFEN, 
2009c).  On an annual basis, Switzerland exports more electricity than it imports.  In general, 
Switzerland imports electricity during off-peak hours and exports during peak hours because 
of its high hydro power capacity.  According to the Swiss association of electricity, the 
constant rise in consumption combined with the difficulty of building new power plants of 
large capacity in the territory could lead to electricity shortages beginning in the winter of 
2020 (AES-VSE, 2006).  Nevertheless, this potential shortage is unlikely to happen because 
of several projects of gas-fired power plants in the short term, and the possible construction or 
renovation of nuclear power plants.  Therefore, generation adequacy appears to be secure, at 
least for the next decade. 
By contrast, the network adequacy is certainly more at risk.  The Swiss transmission 
network has not been significantly upgraded over the past decades.  However, consumption 
has doubled in less than forty years, and power transits through Switzerland have also 
increased (OFEN, 2009c).  Importantly, around 3.6 GW of pumped-storage power plants are 
under construction or will be commissioned between 2010 and 2020.  Information regarding 
these new power plants has been gathered from experts and other sources, but the actual 
realization of these projects is not yet certain. 
 
Table 1: Potential projects of hydroelectricity in Switzerland 
 
Name Type Installed capacity [MW] Total 
Bieudron Hydro-turbine 1200  
Handeck Hydro-turbine 90  
Innertkirchen Hydro-turbine 170 1460 
Nant de Drance Pumped-storage 600  
Nestil Pumped-storage 140  
Grimsel Pumped-storage 400  
Linthal Pumped-storage 1000 2140 
Total 3600 
 
These installations will not significantly augment the generation adequacy level.  Their 
main purpose is the trade of electricity with neighboring countries during peak hours.  Equally 
important, they could store the surplus of intermittent European production such as wind 
energy. However, the Swiss transmission network has to be developed to withstand additional 
electricity generation and transit.  The transmission lines and supply security workgroup 
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proposed the implementation of 39 modifications prior to 2015 (TLSSW, 2007).  It has 
acknowledged the necessity of upgrading the network to its future environment.  Existing 
overhead power lines of voltages over 220 kV are considered a strategic interest for the 
country.   Important financial resources will be committed in development projects assuring 
the following objectives: 
• Adaptation to the global rise in consumption and changes of load patterns 
• Connection of new or upgraded power plants or better connection with lower voltages 
network 
• Reduction of bottlenecks  
• Respect of the N-1 security criteria in normal conditions (also in case of maintenance and 
outages) 
• Interconnection to the European transmission network 
• Modification of overhead power line paths aged more than 50 years 
 
All these modification are integrated within the frame of the transmission lines sectoral 
plan.  It sets out “demand and corridor variations for transmission line projects, identify 
conflicts and find solutions for resolving them, and determine the most suitable corridor for 
planned transmission line construction projects” (OFEN and ARE, 2001).  Therefore, this 
plan sets the milestones for the development of the Swiss transmission network, and supports 
its improvements through the approval process.  
To conclude, massive investments supporting major network changes are expected to 
follow the growing demand, integrate intermittent renewable energies, and allow increasing 
energy exchanges while guarantying an appropriate level of security of the electricity supply.  
This situation is ideal for the integration of measures aiming to reduce the vulnerability during 
extreme weather conditions.  Since the development plan of the Swiss transmission network is 
still under construction, resilient alternatives could be suggested based on a novel 
vulnerability assessment methodology.  Alternative scenarios of this network would meet the 
objectives mentioned here above with low level of vulnerability during extreme weather 
conditions. 
 
1.2 Problem definition: Vulnerability assessment and reduction 
 
Extreme weather conditions can endanger the security of the electricity supply by leading 
electric power systems to disturbed states.  One of the most fragile subsystems is transmission 
networks, which are directly exposed to adverse and extreme meteorological conditions.  
Although overhead power lines are designed according to strict standards, failures are still 
possible.  A particular type of failure, namely CMCs, is more likely than under clement 
weather.  Electric power systems are prone to large disturbances in case of CMCs at the 
transmission systems level.  They are planned and operated to withstand single contingencies 
according to the N-1 criterion. Cascading failures triggered by initial CMCs related to 
extreme weather conditions cause large disturbances.  Lasting CMCs can also impede 
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electricity supply at regional scales by cutting vital electricity paths.  At the planning stage, 
appropriate counter-measures have to be identified to reduce the vulnerability of weak zones 
in the network.  
Suitable countermeasures should assist in alleviating plausible violation of security limits 
caused by CMCs.  Plausible and severe CMCs have to be identified to efficiently reduce 
vulnerability.  Plausibility is a function of the space-time correlations of extreme weather 
events, the geographic distribution of transmission lines and their physical resistance.  
Severity is a function of violation of security limits stemming from the limited ability of 
transmission networks to transfer power in degraded states.  All underlying features of CMCs 
are very dependent on the states of the electric power system and on particularly of extreme 
weather events under investigation.  
The problem is addressed by the following points: 
• What are the relevant models of power transmission systems impacted by extreme 
weather events in the context of the vulnerability analysis? 
• How are plausible and severe CMCs identified? 
• How to assess vulnerability and locate the weak zones of the network? 
• What countermeasures can be proposed to reduce vulnerability? 
 
A novel methodology of vulnerability assessment combining space-time models of electric 
power systems and extreme weather conditions is required in order to answer these questions.  
This methodology should first be able to model the two studied systems and their interactions. 
Numerous models exist for power transmission systems from full dynamic simulations to 
linearized static analysis (Tleis, 2008).  For planning purposes, AC power flow supporting 
contingency analyses is an appropriate model to determine CMCs severity (Stott et al., 1987).  
It allows taking into account all major network components such as generation, loads, 
transformers and power lines.  Any past or future transmission systems can be simulated 
taking into account their possible components failures.  
Nevertheless, AC power flow model is not designed to integrate space-time extreme 
weather event models and their plausible CMCs. GISs are able to store and process 
spatiotemporal information related to extreme weather events and geography of the 
transmission lines path (Snaider, 2005).  The space-time interactions between extreme 
weather events and transmission lines strongly influence the plausibility of CMCs.  The 
mechanical resistance of overhead power lines is also an important factor in determining 
plausibility.  Fortunately, reliability theory contains the appropriate concepts to derive 
probability of component failures from their exposure to forces of nature.  In summary, 
theories and tools exist to tackle all the sub-problems for identifying plausible and severe 
CMCs.  However, they have not been integrated in a single coherent framework, which is one 
of the main challenges of this research. 
Vulnerability analyses aim at finding weak infrastructures or critical situations in order to 
propose possible actions to decision makers for diminishing weaknesses and criticality.  
Consequently, vulnerability gauges have to be established to assist decision makers.  An 
overall vulnerability index is necessary to compare different cases of transmission networks 
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or extreme weather events.  More importantly, weak zones of the network have to be located 
to propose countermeasures to reduce the vulnerability.  
To conclude, this vulnerability assessment taking into account space-time correlations of 
extreme weather events entails integration of existing concepts into a single framework.  They 
have to be adapted, developed or created to handle interacting systems that have not been 
explicitly coupled previously.  This systemic approach aims at a better understanding of the 
mechanisms jeopardizing the security of the electricity supply face to extreme weather events.    
 
1.3 Objectives and scope of the research 
 
This research aims at establishing a methodology of vulnerability assessment for power 
transmission systems impacted by extreme weather events.  The interactions of these two 
systems induce specific sets of plausible and severe CMCs, which are located in well 
demarcated areas.  Few of them account for most of the vulnerability, which define the 
concept of major zones of vulnerability.  Finally, countermeasures are proposed to reduce the 
vulnerability of these zones.  The four main objectives of this research are detailed below. 
• Determine the plausibility of CMCs 
• Evaluate the severity of CMCs 
• Locate major zones of vulnerability of power transmission systems 
• Propose countermeasures for major zones of vulnerability 
The development of the methodology undergoes several sub-objectives and constraints to 
assure coherence and originality.  
First, power transmission systems and extreme weather events are modeled as scenarios. 
They take into account the complexities and uncertainties inherent in complex systems.  
Scenario-based modeling is a technique fostering discovery processes regarding the systems 
under investigation as well as non-linear thinking.  It enables modifications and 
improvements when new information is available, and is a recommended technique, 
particularly when anticipating the possible future states of a system.  However, scenario 
building is a time-consuming procedure limiting their number to a few.    
Second, the evaluation of the plausibility of CMCs has to take into account the space-time 
correlations of extreme weather conditions, the geographic distribution of transmission lines 
and their physical resistance to weather exposure.  This is a key sub-objective since most of 
the existing methodologies oversimplify spatiotemporal dimensions.  The depth of modeling 
has to be associated with the final objective of proposing countermeasures for major zones of 
vulnerability. A model that is too simple would not correctly handle the spatiotemporal 
dynamics of CMCs.  On the other hand, a model that is too complex would be intractable 
regarding available data and computational time.  
Then, the vulnerability is assumed static or structural stemming from direct violation of 
security limits.  It entails that dynamic phenomena of power transmission systems are not 
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taken into account.  It is assumed, after CMCs, that the transmission system converges to a 
steady state functioning without further component disconnections regardless of the possible 
violation of security limits.  Therefore, protection systems, operator maneuvers or subsequent 
cascading failures are not taking into account in the vulnerability.  
Finally, countermeasures are proposed to improve the structural resilience of power 
transmission systems without explicitly considering other forms of constraints such as cost, 
acceptability or feasibility.  Nevertheless, countermeasures have to follow guidelines which 
assure that they are not unrealistic.  This research aims at offering possible countermeasures 
to decisions makers who are entitled to evaluate their suitability.  
 
1.4 Conceptual framework of the methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the main theories on which the vulnerability assessment 
methodology is based.  First, the relationship between vulnerability and the security of the 
electricity supply is clarified and some standard analysis tools are presented.  Second, the way 
of handling uncertainties inherent to interacting power transmission systems and extreme 
weather events is explained.  Finally, light is shed on the added value of GIS for space-time 
vulnerability assessments.  
 
1.4.1 Vulnerability, security of supply and related analysis methods 
 
The concepts of vulnerability and the security of the electricity supply are closely related 
since they can be considered in a broad sense as antonyms.  Put another way, the security of 
supply is not guaranteed in vulnerable electric power systems.  For a more thorough 
comprehension, these terms need to be more precisely defined.  Their definitions are manifold 
in the literature, though they have a common basis.  The report on the vulnerability of the 
Nordic power system provides a pertinent statement (Doorman et al., 2004).  
Vulnerability: “The vulnerability is an expression of the system’s lack of ability or reduced 
ability to withstand an unwanted situation, limit the consequences, and to recover and 
stabilize after the occurrence of the situation.” 
On the other hand, the security of the electricity supply is guaranteed if it respects two 
principal criteria, the system adequacy and security.  The North American electric reliability 
corporation proposes suitable definitions of these two criteria in (NERC, 2008).  
Adequacy:  “The ability of the bulk power system to supply the aggregate electrical 
demand and energy requirements of the customers at all times, taking into account scheduled 
and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements.” 
Security:  “The ability of the bulk power system to withstand sudden disturbances such as 
electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements from creditable contingencies.” 
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The adequacy can be understood as the ability of the bulk power system to continuously 
supply energy to users in normal conditions.  Therefore, the access to primary fuels and a 
sufficient installed generation capacity is ensured to meet demand.  Normal conditions also 
include overhauls and likely outages which can be encountered on a regular basis.  The 
adequacy criterion is not relevant to this research since it involves extreme weather 
conditions.  
The security is related to the ability of the bulk power system to minimize the 
consequences of unpredicted loss of several power plants or transmission lines.  These 
situations are rare and have potentially disastrous results.  Outages can be correlated by 
common causes such as droughts for reduced hydro generation or storms for overhead line 
outages.  A total immunity to unpredicted losses is conceivable, but not likely to be 
achievable at a reasonable cost. A list of outages that a system should withstand without 
violating the security criterion is usually defined by official standards.  Among international 
standards, the North American reliability standards (NERC, 2010) and the operation 
handbook  of the ENTSO are two examples (ENTSO-E, 2009a).  According to these 
definitions and in the context of extreme weather events, the security of the electricity supply 
is not guaranteed when weather-related disturbances are not withstood by the power system.  
In this case, the system is considered vulnerable.  The first step of a vulnerability assessment 
consists of finding the conditions in which the security of the electricity supply is endangered.  
If the system under investigation is a power transmission system, plausible CMCs are those 
sought conditions.  The next step is to understand how CMCs endanger the security of supply 
which lead to the appropriate methods to assess vulnerability.  The concept of four system 
operating states proposed by Fink and Carlsen (1978) is a good start to answer this question, 
and the following schema is inspired by his work. 
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Figure 2: System operating states related to outages location 
 
The schema shows the operation system states related to the location of outages in the 
power transmission systems caused by extreme weather events.  Examples of barriers 
impeding outages are detailed on the right.  Component malfunctions or damages entail an 
alert state, which signals a precursor for potential larger problems.  If temporary malfunctions 
caused the disconnection of power lines, auto-reclosing circuit breakers are usually able to 
stop the creeping outages.  On the contrary, lasting power lines unavailability can potentially 
trigger other outages in the network.  It is worth mentioning that these states should be 
considered with fuzzy rather than strict borders.  The meshed structure of power transmission 
systems has a limited resilience which can be overcome by a sufficiently high number of 
simultaneous outages.  The electric power system is thus in an emergency state, which is the 
step just prior to power disruptions.  
This bottom-up vision of outages creeping through the system allows illustrating the 
different analysis methods available.  At the components and power line levels, classical 
reliability theory is able to cope with the modeling of outages mechanisms.  From the network 
level, electric models of the system are necessary.  These models are numerous as well as 
their ability to account for dynamical phenomena taking place in alert and emergency states.  
The task force for understanding, predicting, mitigating and restoring cascading failures gives 
a comprehensive review of the existing techniques in Baldick et al. (2009).  Since the 
objective of this research aims at studying the static vulnerability, a steady-state modeling 
such as an AC power flow model used by contingency analysis is satisfactory.  It computes 
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the state of the system in terms of the power flows and voltages provoked by single failures of 
elements, or CMCs as well.  Therefore, transients or other dynamic phenomena are excluded 
from this steady state analysis.  More sophisticated methods have been developed to take into 
account cascading failures and possible mitigation measures such as implemented in 
TRELSS, which is an industrial tool (Zhang, 2003).  
Contingency analysis is a suitable method for quantifying static or structural vulnerability 
of power transmission systems.  This leads to the identification of zones of vulnerability, 
which are very important in order to locate proper countermeasures.  However, contingency 
analysis requires a list of CMCs triggered by extreme weather events, which has to be 
provided by other methods.  Reliability theory allows identification of likely component 
failures exposed to extreme weather conditions, which can be modeled under GIS.  
To conclude, structural vulnerability is only one component jeopardizing the security of 
the electricity supply.  The elimination or reduction of zones of vulnerability is a way of 
improving the security of the electricity supply during extreme weather conditions.  Structural 
resilience, the opposite of structural vulnerability, is a planning topic, which can prevent 
hazardous dynamical phenomena such as cascading failures.  
 
1.4.2 Handling of uncertainties 
 
Electric power systems are wide-scale complex infrastructures.  They encompass hundreds 
of kilometers of power lines, thousands of power plants and consumers interacting together.  
The future development of these systems involves uncertainties.  For example, the rise in 
consumption, new production infrastructures, and regulatory framework are not yet known. 
Complexity and uncertainty challenge any attempt of complete modeling.  At the time of 
vulnerability analysis, these two features have to be addressed with the appropriate methods.  
Uncertainty can be separated in two fundamental categories (PateCornell, 1996).  The first 
one is the subjective or epistemic uncertainty, which stem from incomplete knowledge of the 
modeler (Ferson and Ginzburg, 1996).  This uncertainty stemming from ignorance can usually 
be reduced by additional studies.  In contrast, aleatory uncertainty arises from variability of 
underlying processes.  This uncertainty is labeled objective since this variability is considered 
as a property of the object under study. In this case, no further investigation can reduce 
uncertainty.  This taxonomy can be further expanded, such as in Klir and Smith (2001).  The 
body of literature on the uncertainty modeling subject is important and still growing in 
complexity.  However, the key point is to recognize these two different types of uncertainty 
occurring at the time of system modeling. 
A priori, these two types of uncertainty are present in the modeling of electric power 
systems and extreme weather conditions.  These uncertainties induce a tremendous number of 
plausible futures or states.  The right methods have to be selected to cope with these 
difficulties without oversimplifying the problem.  In this research, it is assumed that 
ignorance about the studied systems is far more prevalent than variability uncertainty.  
Indeed, the problem in the vulnerability assessment of present or future power transmission 
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systems impacted by extreme weather events encompasses an overwhelming interacting 
number of elements, which limits the possibility for a modeler to totally know these systems.  
Two approaches are preferred to deal with epistemic uncertainties related to this vulnerability 
analysis.  
The first approach is constituted by scenario-based thinking or scenario-based planning 
dealing with plausible descriptions of prospective systems.  This method allows building 
credible models of the world under conditions of uncertainty.  Scenario-based thinking allows 
the structuring of flexible and complex long term plans, where scenarios are crafted based on 
a combination of many factors, which are likely to influence the system under scrutiny.  
Scenario-based thinking consists of the construction of scenarios, which are a consistent view 
of what the future might be, knowing it is not a prediction but only one possible future.  This 
method copes with vague and fragmentary knowledge of reality (i.e a form of epistemic 
uncertainty).  Scenario-based thinking has been used for decades for military intelligence, by 
experts in business strategies and in many scientific fields (Varum and Melo, 2010).  The 
general methodology of scenario-based thinking is exposed, among other sources, in 
(Ringland, 2006).  Adapted to this vulnerability analysis, the overall process can be 
summarized in the following points. 
1. Define the objectives of the analysis  
2. Identify relevant drivers for change and issues to address regarding the objectives 
3. Establish a coherent framework for generating plausible and pertinent scenarios 
4. Analyze scenarios and interpretations of outcomes  
 
Two types of scenarios generated in this study are for power transmission systems and 
extreme weather events.  The former contains all relevant parameters of the vulnerability 
analysis such as load flow models, spatial traces of overhead power lines, or mechanical 
resistance under weather related loads.  This information is collected from electrical utilities 
or from grid operators. Scenarios of extreme weather events are spatiotemporal 
representations based on past events as measured by meteorological stations or computer-
based simulations.  By their way of construction, these scenarios are considered plausible.  
They are built based on available information found during a collecting stage, expert’s 
knowledge or simply reasoning.  The following table details some issues to address before the 
construction of power transmission systems and extreme weather events scenarios. 
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Table 2: Issues to address before scenario creation
 
Power transmission systems Extreme weather events 
Rise in consumption, new infrastructures of 
transmission, limit of the electric power sys-
tem, new power plants, market liberalization, 
renewable and intermittent source of energy, 
ageing of infrastructures, regulatory frame-
work, planning and operational rules,… 
Which hazardous conditions to consider, ef-
fect of climate change, season/time of the 
analysis, number of scenarios, past or simu-
lated events, source of data,… 
 
 
The second approach relates to the subjective probability or Bayesian interpretation of the 
concept of probability.  Subjective probability measures the state of knowledge (Jaynes, 2003) 
as opposed to the objective probability measuring a frequency.  Subjective probability is used 
to quantify the degree of belief one has with respect to assumptions or statements, in our case, 
the probability of CMC occurrence.  Indeed, they are not included in the power transmission 
systems scenarios. Space-time simulations evaluating their subjective probability to occur at a 
given time identify plausible CMCs.  The evaluation of the probability of CMCs is based on 
reliability theory, which is a branch of statics.  This theory has been successfully applied for 
decades in many engineering areas such as risk analysis, quality management or optimization 
of maintenance and operation.  Reliability analysis provides a strong conceptual basis and 
decades of development in the power system field (Stanton, 1969).   
In the rest of this document, subjective probability is mentioned as probability to simplify 
the writing. In the same way, plausible is used interchangeably with probable.  Nevertheless, 
one has to keep in mind that plausibility has several other definitions (Van der Helm, 2006).  
In particular, one has to differentiate the meaning of plausibility given here to the one related 
to Dempster–Shafer theory a mathematical theory of evidence (Shafer, 2009).  
In conclusion, epistemic and aleatory uncertainties should be recognized.  The latter is due 
to the lack of knowledge or ignorance of the modeler, and the former is considered an 
inherent property of the system.  This classification is not unique, although some argue that 
this distinction is pointless and only epistemic uncertainties should be considered (Winkler, 
1996).  In this research, the latter type is omnipresent.  Consequently, two approaches dealing 
suitably with the lack of knowledge are used in this vulnerability analysis.  A method based 
on scenarios is employed to model power transmission systems and extreme weather events. 
It allows non-linear thinking, modeling of plausible and prospective systems, readable 
updating of parameters and fostering of the learning process.  However, plausible CMCs of 
transmission lines are derived from scenarios by simulations mostly based on reliability 
theory.  Subjective probability quantifies the belief that a CMC occurs at a given time. It is 
worth mentioning that subjective probabilities respect the axioms of the classical objective 
probability theory.  The former interprets randomness in nature into lack of knowledge for the 
modeler. 
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1.4.3 Geographic information systems 
 
This chapter aims at succinctly presenting relevant concepts of GIS for this research.  An 
introduction to this large field of studies and applications is exposed in many publication such 
as in (Harvey, 2008).  GIS is designed to store, analyze, manage, and present spatial data. It is 
extensively used in numerous domains such as cartography, geography or territory planning.  
The potential applications are tremendous with the continuous rise in computing capabilities.  
The “S” of GIS refers to systems or sometimes to science depending on the context and 
authors.  GIS does not refer directly to specific software as often thought. A paper map could 
be considered a GIS.  Chrisman gives the following definition of GIS as well as how GIS is 
currently defined in scientific literature. 
“Organized activity by which people measure and represent geographic phenomena then 
transform these representations into other forms while interacting with social structures.” 
(Chrisman, 1999) 
From a more practical point a view, most of the current GIS are constituted by maps and 
databases implemented on computers.  Maps are composed of layers, which represent 
different types of spatial data defined in a coordinate system.  There are essentially three types 
of layer features including points, lines and areas.  These geographic features are linked to 
their attributes containing relevant information.  For example, a house can be modeled by a 
polygon linked to its ground surface and number of stories.   
Topology is also an important characteristic of GIS.  Topology describes how geographic 
features are related, such as a river and its banks.  All this information is stored in 
(geo)databases.  Data management systems control the consistency of the geodatabases to 
assure proper functioning even for large systems and frequently updated multi-users 
platforms.  One of the key capabilities of GIS is the ability to perform analyses on geographic 
data.  The list of analyses is long, but an overview is detailed below. 
• Map retrieval, generalization, abstraction   
• Layers overlay  
• Data querying taking into account spatial information 
• Measurements of length, surface and angle 
• Digital terrain and network analyses 
Standard analyses are built-in functionalities grouped in toolboxes as in the software used 
in this research, which is ArcInfo (ESRI, 2010a). For a brief but complete overview of GIS, 
the article of Cox and Grifford (1997) is appropriate.  GIS presence has been growing for 
decades in many academic domains such as environmental sciences and ecology, engineering, 
computer science, geography or agriculture, and this trend is accelerating.  
In the context of vulnerability assessment, GIS has a key role when spatial information 
comes into play.  These assessments relate to natural or man-made related hazards such as 
seismic, air and water pollution, wildfires, and landslides.  Nevertheless, very few 
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publications concern power transmission systems impacted by extreme weather events.  One 
representative example of the recent publications on the subject is made when estimating the 
spatial distribution of outages due to hurricanes (Han et al., 2009). However, the dynamic of 
extreme weather events is not explicitly taken into account.  In fact, dynamic is difficult to 
model in GIS because it is more oriented to the modeling of static phenomena. One 
explanation could be that the core business of GIS is dealing with static maps and analyses.  
GIS is widely spread in many scientific fields, however, vulnerability assessments related to 
electric power systems and GIS are not common.  Moreover, the space-time dimensions 
cannot always be adequately handled by GIS.  Therefore, the identification of CMCs taking 
into account space-time correlations is challenging.  
In this research, GIS is used to model paths of transmission lines and extreme weather 
events which are well stored as maps or successive maps to simulate the passing of time.  At 
the time of crafting these models, GIS is suitable or sometimes necessary for dealing with 
complex infrastructures or natural entities spreading on large scales.  GIS enables the 
visualization and interaction with the models for fast and proper modifications.  Nevertheless, 
the GIS environment is not explicitly used for space-time simulations. They are carried out in 
Matlab which has some built-in GIS capabilities.  Although GIS allows sophisticated 
analyses, a temporal geographic information system could perform simulations that would be 
valuable in numerous fields.   
 
1.5 Essential and original points of the research 
 
There are a number of essential points of this research, which are highlighted in the 
following paragraphs. 
The vulnerability assessment is supported by scenario-based approach of power 
transmission systems and extreme weather events.  This approach allows the modeling of 
complex systems subject to uncertainties.  Scenario-based thinking allows the vulnerability 
assessment of future situations, which could be very different than those encountered in the 
past.  Plausible scenarios of power transmission systems and extreme weather events can be 
built for any future timeframe, and for any imaginable power systems or weather conditions.  
The level of vulnerability of electric power systems is measured by an aggregated index 
combining probability and severity indexes of CMCs.  The probability is evaluated by space-
time simulations taking into account the geographic distribution of transmission networks, the 
space-time correlations of extreme weather conditions, and the time dependent processes of 
power line failures and reconnection.  The severity is related to exceeding security limits, 
namely transmission line current overloads and buses voltage deviations.  The severity is 
evaluated by contingency analyses based on an AC power flow model taking into account the 
most important components of electric power systems such as power plants, transmission 
networks, transformers, security systems and loads. 
The concept of matrix of vulnerability highlighting the major zones of vulnerability is 
derived from the aggregated index of vulnerability.  Major zones of vulnerability are basically 
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a projection of the vulnerability index onto the infrastructures participating in CMCs and 
those which exceed security limits.  Major zones of vulnerability identify the transmission 
infrastructures participating in the vulnerability to facilitate an effective search of 
countermeasures. 
Countermeasures are proposed for major zones of vulnerability to reduce the vulnerability, 
and also aim to improve the structural resilience of power transmission systems by adding or 
modifying power lines, and/or changing network topology.  These countermeasures provide 
complementary alternatives to existing development plans of electric power systems.  
The evaluation of CMCs probability taking into account the dynamic of interactions of 
transmission infrastructures with extreme weather events is certainly an original point.  This 
would not have been possible without the use of GIS combined with simulations supported by 
reliability theory.  This combination is rare in the scientific literature, at least for the 
vulnerability assessment of large scale systems.  
Furthermore, the geographic model of transmission lines is coupled with its electric model.  
It allows the calculation of relevant states variables of electric systems to evaluate structural 
vulnerability.  The traditional network planning tool of contingency analysis is used to 
evaluate the severity of CMCs.  However, the set of plausible CMCs is either issued from 
deterministic or probabilistic methods that do not take into account the space-time 
correlations of extreme weather events, geographic distribution of overhead transmission lines 
or their physical resistance.  Consideration of these three points provides a more realistic 
vulnerability assessment during extreme weather events.  
 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
 
This core of this thesis is divided into five chapters as detailed below.  
Chapter 2 discusses the three most relevant approaches of existing methodologies of 
vulnerability assessment.  Strengths and weaknesses of the three approaches are underlined to 
allow critical analysis.  Key deficiencies are highlighted to formulate a methodology 
overcoming some of their common weaknesses.    
Chapter 3 exposes the methodology starting with an overview of its structure.  After that, 
scenarios of power transmission systems and extreme weather events are defined, as well as 
their associated models.  Next, probability and severity indexes of CMCs are formed to allow 
the formulation of the aggregated vulnerability index.  Major zones of vulnerability are then 
formalized starting with this vulnerability index.  A procedure for searching suitable 
countermeasures is then detailed.  
Chapter 4 crafts the power transmission systems and extreme weather events scenarios for 
the application of the Swiss power transmission systems impacted by thunderstorms.  Two 
periods of time have been taken into account for evaluating the evolution of vulnerability, 
namely the summer season 2006 and 2018.  The power transmission systems scenario 2018 
involves some plausible modifications added on the 2006 scenario, which is built on the 
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actual states recorded at this time.  Two plausible extreme weather events scenarios are built 
respectively on a past event and a simulated one. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the vulnerability analysis of the two power transmission 
systems scenarios impacted by the two extreme weather events. Emphasis is placed on the 
2018 scenario undergoing the simulated thunderstorms.  The temporal evolution of 
vulnerability is revealed as well as major zones of vulnerability.   
Chapter 6 proposes a more resilient alternative to the 2018 scenario.  This alternative aims 
at drastically reducing the vulnerability located in the major zones of vulnerability without 
creating new ones.  The efficacy of the alternative is discussed in terms of vulnerability 
reduction and feasibility. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with an overview of the main findings, contributions and 
limitations, as well as take-away points for future research.  
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2 State of the art 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews a selection of recent articles related to vulnerability assessments 
during extreme weather conditions.  These articles focus on distribution or transmission 
networks impacted by adverse or extreme weather events.  This presentation aims to obtain a 
clearer view of the major advantages and drawbacks of each class of the current approaches 
found in literature.  They are sources of inspiration at the time of developing a new 
methodology to meet the objective of this research.    
To facilitate the analysis, the focus has been particularly centered on the evaluation of 
probability of common mode contingencies (CMCs) taking into account space-time 
correlations and the effect of these CMCs on the security of the electricity supply.  The 
methods to assess the effects of adverse or extreme weather to the security of the electricity 
supply can be divided into three groups with different approaches.  
 
2.2 Presentation and analysis of the three main approaches 
 
First,  Billinton’s approach evaluates the worth of reliability in normal and adverse weather 
conditions.  The name of this group refers to a scientist from University of Saskatchewan who 
first proposed this approach, and numerous articles have been produced citing this work. The 
methodology is fully explained in his well know book (Billington and Wenyuan, 1994).  This 
methodology consists of multi-states models of power lines, describing their behavior which 
involved two possibilities, either in service or failed.  A Monte-Carlo simulation combined 
with a load flow model assesses reliability by aggregating indexes such as expected energy 
not supplied. This methodology fully integrates relevant components of electric power 
systems as well as their plausible behavior in terms of reliability.  
In Billington et al. (2002), annual failure rates of three weather models are compared.  
They distinguish themselves by their ability to differentiate normal, adverse and extreme 
weather. It is shown that not considering these three types of weather leads to optimistic 
estimation of failure rates.  In Billington and Singh (2006), single, two and three state weather 
models are applied to a distribution system.  Expected cost and energy not supplied are 
compared among the three models.  This simple application shows that single and two state 
models are highly optimistic, and should not be used to estimate realistic indices when 
adverse and extreme weather is prevalent. In these two papers, uncertainties about 
characteristics of weather and power line resistance are neglected. Li et al. (2009) 
incorporated fuzzy technique in the reliability assessment of transmission systems.  
Traditional methods and fuzzy methods lead to the same mean values of reliability indices.  
However, the fuzzy method provides better insight regarding the uncertainties inherent to 
 20 
 
transmission systems. All methods presented above do not take into account the temporal 
properties of extreme weather conditions.  Alvehag et al. (2008) modeled time dependent 
failure and repair rates  by  non-homogenous Poisson processes applied to a distribution 
system during high wind conditions.  The annual distribution of these conditions is taken into 
account as well as time varying loads.  It was found that costs of service interruption and 
energy not supplied are increased when temporal properties of severe weather conditions are 
modeled.  In this case, severe weather coincides with high winter consumption, resulting in 
the primarily drivers of these costs. 
In this approach, reliability worth is assessed during normal, adverse and extreme weather 
conditions.  Monte-Carlo simulations are performed to mimic the actual behavior of the 
system related to the level of consumption and the states of power line.  These lines can be in 
two states, either in or out of service.  Transitions between these two states are driven by 
failure and repair rates.  At the time of simulation, they are driven by the intensity of weather 
mentioned above.  This approach can assess reliability of complex electric systems in terms of 
various valuable indices.  Nevertheless, it has one salient flaw when assessing reliability 
during extreme weather conditions, namely, it does not take into account space-time 
correlations of weather events.  Failure and repair rates are based on past data which has been 
averaged and does not take into account space-time information.  Extreme weather conditions 
are rare, so it is unlikely to find extreme events in databases.  These events are also highly 
variable in time, space and intensity, suggesting the next extreme event could be very 
different than those previously experienced.  Electric systems also evolve over time, and thus, 
new infrastructures are without data.  
The second approach takes advantage of data sets of damages related to specific extreme 
weather events.  This statistical learning approach draws inferences between actual damages 
and explanatory variables. Guikema (2009) presents an overview of methods underlying this 
approach as well as their limitations.  A generalized linear mixed model is implemented to 
forecast the number of hurricane and ice storms related to electric power outages in Liu et al. 
(2008), Han et al.  (2009).  This model is based on a generalization of least squares regression 
containing random effects following a normal distribution.  Prediction of infrastructure 
damages at a town level could provide relevant information for supporting power companies 
before natural disasters strike.  However, only physical damages to distribution infrastructures 
are predicted for a given extreme weather event. Their effects to the security of electricity 
supply cannot be evaluated because no model of electric systems is involved.  This lack is 
corrected partially in Winkler et al. (2010), where a topological network fragility analysis is 
performed.  However, it does not take into consideration power flows because it aims to 
compare performance of different network topology when impacted by hurricanes.  Not 
surprisingly, highly meshed networks are less vulnerable than tree-like topologies. It is worth 
mentioning that GIS is used in the three articles to build spatial models of the system.  
The second approach is recent, among others, because of the large amount of data and 
heavy calculations required.  It is yet to be applied to hurricanes in the southern part of the 
USA where they are extremely severe, and not so rare.  Therefore, a large amount of data is 
available especially for distribution systems, which are more fragile than transmission 
systems.  In areas where extreme weather conditions are not as likely to occur, or where 
electric systems are well adapted to the natural environment, data is certainly lacking.  
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The third and last approach investigated is based on space-time weather event simulations.  
It consists of super-imposing a succession of weather event maps over the territory containing 
vulnerable infrastructures.  Then, their exposure is transformed into expected losses via 
damage functions.  This approach is already in use to estimate insurance losses related to 
natural catastrophes such as hurricanes or earthquakes. A GIS based hurricane hazard 
assessment system is detailed in Huang et al. (2001) for the southwestern United States. The 
final outcome is a map of the rate of expected annual damage for a given hurricane. It is based 
on records of past hurricane characteristics.  However, this method can also be applied to 
future weather conditions taking into account climate change. State of the art global climate 
models are coupled with a probabilistic operational insurance model in Schwierz  (2010).  
This approach has not been thoroughly applied to electric power systems, except in Brostrom 
(2007). An ice storm is simulated over two overhead power lines of the Swedish transmission 
network. These two lines are divided in segments to which a vulnerability model relating the 
ice load to failure rate is applied. Historical storms, including severe winds and precipitation, 
have been used for the simulation as well as a modified past storm to create a possible 
extreme ice storm.  Time dependent ice load and rate of failure have been carried out to 
determine segments more likely to fail. Unfortunately, only two power lines of the network 
have been investigated.  Therefore, the effects of ice storms on the security of the electricity 
supply cannot be assessed.  
This approach is able to model space-time correlations of extreme weather events. GIS are 
necessary to manage spatial data covering countries or even continents.  Simulations allow 
numerous complex processes to be taken into account, taking place in vulnerability 
assessments during extreme weather conditions.  However, research still has to be carried out 
to link possible damages or power line failures to the ability of electric power systems to 
perform their tasks.    
 
2.3 Summary 
 
In summary, current approaches do not simultaneously take into account space-time 
correlations of extreme weather events and electric models of the power systems.  They focus 
on either the simulation of power systems without really considering extreme weather events, 
or they focus on prediction of overhead power line outages without considering the 
consequences of the outages.  Billinton’s methodology cannot accurately take into account 
space-time correlations of extreme weather events, but it does a good job of modeling electric 
power systems. Purely statistical methods require outages data that are usually not available in 
case of rare and extreme weather conditions. Moreover, only physical damages to 
infrastructures are predicted, which impair the vulnerability evaluation of electric power 
systems.  However, statistical methods take into consideration complex spatial correlations as 
the third approach. It is also able to determine the effects of extreme weather events on parts 
of transmission infrastructures such as segments of transmission lines.  However, electric 
power systems are not yet fully integrated in the simulations.  
To conclude, these three approaches have advantages and drawbacks inspiring a novel 
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methodology of vulnerability assessment during extreme weather conditions based on 
simulations.  It is able to fully integrate space-time correlations and geographic distributions 
of overhead power lines to identify plausible CMCs.  The core of the vulnerability assessment 
can then be performed by contingency analyses to derive indices of vulnerability as inspired 
by the first approach. Finally, countermeasures can be identified to reduce vulnerability.  
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3 Methodology of the vulnerability assessment 
 
This chapter describes the methodology employed to assess the vulnerability of power 
transmission systems induced by extreme weather events.  First, the general framework and 
context of the methodology is set.  Second, the scenarios of electric power systems are defined 
as well as scenarios of extreme weather conditions.  Then, the method for identifying 
plausible common mode contingencies is described.  Afterward, metrics are derived to 
evaluate the overall level of vulnerability and to highlight major zones of vulnerability.  
Finally, the procedure for finding appropriate countermeasures is explained in order to 
reduce the vulnerability. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As shown in Chapter 1.1, extreme weather conditions are rare but can have significant 
impacts on the security of the electricity supply.  One of the most vulnerable parts of electric 
power transmission systems is its networks, which can be divided into two sub-networks.  
First, the distribution network composed of cables and overhead power lines at lower voltage 
levels.  This network distributes electricity from very high voltage networks or local 
productions to end-consumers.  Distribution networks are usually the place of frequent but 
small electric power disruptions, primarily because of their extensive length and unmeshed 
structure.  These networks are also sensitive to weather conditions when constituted of 
overhead power lines.  They are susceptible to extreme weather events because mechanical 
resistance is limited for economical reasons.  Cabling of distribution power lines is recognized 
as a good way to protect them against harsh weather conditions for reasonable additional cost.  
Therefore, cabling has been undertaken on a wide scale basis in most of European countries 
(COM, 2003). 
On the other hand, the transmission network is mainly constituted by a lattice of overhead 
power lines of high voltages, typically more than 220 kV.  They are the bulk transfer of 
electricity from large power plants to substations connected to distribution networks.  
Transmission networks are used to exchange energy among countries and span over 
continents.  This network is strategic because its malfunction could impact millions of people. 
The growth of modern societies relies on the high reliability of this network, so when outages 
occur at this level of voltage, power disruptions can take place on large scales (Sundell et al., 
2006).  They may start with insignificant outages leading to large disturbances by a 
succession of cascading failures (Makarov et al., 2005).  This phenomenon is highly 
unpredictable once it initiates, and everything all possible measures should be taken to avoid 
entering this emergency state.  The IEEE PES task force  provides a comprehensive review of 
the phenomenon (Baldick et al., 2008).  Extreme weather conditions can damage overhead 
transmission lines even if it is much less likely than for distribution power lines.  
Unfortunately, massive cabling of transmission networks does not yet seem economically 
reasonable and involves a multitude of concerns (OFEN, 2009a).  Therefore, careful planning 
 24 
 
of the network structure is needed to minimize the likelihood of large power disruptions. 
In common practice and most academic literature, simultaneous outages are considered as 
independent failures even during extreme weather events (Li, 2005).  This assumption is very 
optimistic because it underestimates the likelihood of coincident outages.  Extreme weather 
events exhibit strong spatiotemporal correlations and impact large portions of transmission 
networks.  Therefore, one has to consider CMCs instead of independent outages.  The formers 
are critical because power transmission systems are usually planned and operated according to 
the N-1 security criterion (Willis, 2004).  The identification of CMCs is not trivial since it 
involves large scale systems interacting in time and space.  The actual level of sophistication 
of power system simulations and GIS can facilitate the search of plausible CMCs capable of 
endangering the security of the electricity supply.  
Nevertheless, some barriers still impede the thorough search of probable and severe CMCs. 
Epistemic uncertainties, combinatorial complexity of the problem, and limited resources are 
the main obstacles. However, it is possible to identify some of the most probable and severe 
CMCs for some well defined scenarios of power transmission systems and extreme weather 
events.  Although all possible situations are not covered, a partial solution is better than none, 
so simplifications are introduced to formulate a tractable problem.   
First, many phenomena regarding the interactions of power transmission systems with 
extreme weather events can be discarded if they do not inconsistently deter the evaluation of 
CMCs probabilities.  Second, the delicate modeling of possible operators’ actions or 
cascading failures can be avoided by considering a static or structural vulnerability (Mao et 
al., 2006).  In this case, the vulnerability stems from exceeding static security limits provoked 
by plausible CMCs.  On the other hand, the conjunction space-time correlations of an extreme 
weather event and some potential weakly structured zones of a power transmission system are 
likely to result in some delimited zones of vulnerability.  These zones, or at least the most 
vulnerable ones (i.e. major zones of vulnerability), require planning measures to reinforce 
their structural resilience.  
Consider two types of measures to reduce structural vulnerability, the first of which acts on 
the plausibility of CMCs.  For example, mechanical reinforcements of pylons would decrease 
the likelihood of failures.  The second measure can be undertaken to minimize the 
consequences of CMCs.  For example, expanding the N-1 security criterion to N-X would 
increase the structural resilience.  Nevertheless, all these measures could be deemed excessive 
in the case of mature power systems.  More than 60 years of experience have led to a fairly 
good trade-off between security of the electricity supply and infrastructure costs.  Within the 
next decade, no technological breakthrough is expected to alter this point.  However, careful 
planning of the network structure is deemed appropriate to significantly reduce vulnerability 
without excessive costs (Gomes, 2004).  Structural modifications are costly and probably 
unjustifiable for the sole reason of minimizing vulnerability, consequently, they should be 
integrated in network development plans.  Massive investments in transmission networks are 
likely to be revealed within the next few decades, so this is a great opportunity to combine 
network developments and reduced vulnerability during extreme weather conditions.  At the 
planning stage, several alternatives of development exist.  The existing planning rules and 
criteria can be updated to take into account issues raised by the deleterious effects of extreme 
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weather conditions, which result in electric transmission systems which are structurally less 
vulnerable. 
 
3.2 Overview of the methodology 
 
The methodology is composed of four main stages.  The first stage pertains to the 
definition of the scenarios of power transmission system (SPTS) and extreme weather event 
(EWE) as well as their underlying models. The power transmission systems scenario is 
presented in Chapter 3.3 and the extreme weather events scenario in Chapter 3.4.  The 
evaluation method of common mode contingencies (CMCs) probability and severity are 
exposed in Chapters 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. The overall vulnerability quantification and the 
identification of major zones of vulnerability (MZV) are detailed in Chapter 3.7.  Finally, the 
method for identification of countermeasures is provided in Chapter 3.8.  
 
 
Figure 3: The four main stages of the methodology
 
The first stage establishes the models of electric and weather systems.  When applied to 
concrete cases, these models have to be adapted via their parameters to the problem at hand. 
The term of scenarios is particularly appropriate at the time of the application of the 
methodology since different instances of the same power system or weather conditions can be 
considered.  The SPTS is composed of three models, namely the electric model, the 
geographic model and the reliability model. These models describe the relevant features of 
power transmission systems required for the evaluation of probability and severity of CMCs. 
A space-time modeling of the weather event under investigation composes the scenario of 
extreme weather event (SEWE). The structure of these models is applicable for the wide 
majority of real or imaginable power transmission systems and EWEs. 
The second stage starts with the evaluation of the time-dependant probability of a set of 
CMCs. This set groups the combinations of power lines which are a priori the most likely to 
I. SPTS and scenarios of EWE 
IV. Proposal of countermeasures 
III. Vulnerability index and MZV 
II. Probability and severity of CMCs 
 26 
 
fail. This probability is the results of temporal simulations of transmission line exposure to 
hazardous features of EWEs, such as wind or lightning strikes. Over the duration of EWEs the 
temporal and maximum probability of CMCs are primordial components of the vulnerability. 
This entails two vulnerability measures respectively for a given time or for the total duration 
of the EWE. These two types of probability are interchangeable in the mathematical 
formulation. Therefore, the term probability is indifferently used for one or the other type. 
The most probable CMCs are then set aside for the severity index evaluation by a contingency 
analysis. This index is a function of violation of security limits such as current overloads or 
inadmissible voltage deviations. 
The third stage consists in the definition of a vulnerability index and the mathematical 
formulation of MZV via the concept of matrix of vulnerability. The vulnerability index is the 
sum over all CMCs of the product of their respective probability and severity. This index is 
similar to the common definition of risk. The absolute value of this index is not very practical 
partially because it relies on subjective probabilities. However, this vulnerability assessment 
seeks weaknesses of the infrastructures not an evaluation of risk level. The search of 
weaknesses is achieved by the concept of matrix of vulnerability which is a projection of the 
vulnerability index onto two dimensions, the transmission lines in CMCs and those which 
undergo violation of security limits. A zone of vulnerability groups together transmission 
lines in CMCs and undergoing violations of security limits which are the most related while 
discarding the less related. MZV are zones of vulnerability which are responsible of most of 
the vulnerability. They allow locating the salient weak parts of the system.  
The last part is related to the reduction of vulnerability. It is assumed that the vulnerability 
has to be reduced by countermeasures able to reinforce the structural resilience of the 
network. These countermeasures should fit in the development plan of the electric system as a 
possible alternative. Imaginable types of countermeasures pertain to addition or modification 
of transmission lines or topology changes of the network. A strategy of vulnerability 
reduction is based on the analysis of the vulnerability causes of the MZV. Following the 
strategy, countermeasures are proposed respecting some guidelines fostering their suitability. 
Finally, the countermeasures are implemented in the SPTS and the vulnerability reduction is 
assessed. Countermeasures able to reduce drastically the vulnerability can be presented as 
suitable.  
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3.3 Models of the electric power transmission system 
 
Three models are needed to support the three different aspects of SPTS.  
 
 
Figure 4: Scenario of the power transmission system and its three models 
 
The electric model is based on an AC power flow model of the transmission system.  The 
AC power flow model comprises the usual components of power transmission systems such 
as generators, loads, buses, transformers and power lines This model allows power flow 
analysis, also named power flow simulation or load flow analysis, which determines voltage 
angles and magnitudes at buses, using voltages and power conditions for loads and 
generators. The voltage angles and magnitudes are then utilized to compute real and reactive 
power flows along power lines. This model is a non-linear and static model of electric 
networks. Contingency analyses use power flow analyses to evaluate the severity of CMCs. 
The geographic model details the path on the ground of every overhead power line of the 
electric model. The paths are represented by lines divided into segments. Their middle point is 
the location where their exposure to weather is calculated. The geographic model is stored in 
a geodatabase accessible by GIS, and powerful built-in functionalities allow crafting, 
modifying, and visualizing the geographic model.  
The reliability model evaluates the unavailability of overhead power lines due to its 
exposure to weather. The unavailability relies on two antagonist processes. First, the failure 
process, acting on segments, is a function of weather exposure and segment strength. Second, 
the reconnection process acts on transmission lines, represents the combined effects of 
automatic reclosing circuit breakers, operators’ measures and fixing teams. This model is 
based on a continuous-time Markov chain.  
 
3.3.1 The electric model 
 
The electric model defines and contains all data necessary to perform power flow analyses. 
It is the method used in contingency analysis which evaluates the severity of CMCs in chapter 
3.6. Power flow analyses are extensively employed in the planning and operation of 
distribution and transmission systems. The main information obtained from power flow 
simulations is the active and reactive power transmitted through power lines, the branch 
Scenario of the power transmission 
system 
Electric 
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Geographic 
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Reliability 
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currents, and the magnitude and angle of voltages at buses. This analysis method allows 
computing the immediate steady-state operating point after disturbances such as CMCs. It is 
assumed that all the current and voltage transients vanish quickly without triggering any other 
outages. This static evaluation method is a crude approximation of the reality since the 
dynamic of the system is not taken into account. However, this tool has been used for decades 
at the planning and operation stage (Alguacil et al., 2009). Its relative simplicity allows the 
analysis numerous configurations of large systems in an acceptable time. The comprehensive 
review of Stott (1974) summarizes the abundant literature available in 1974 describing the 
different underlying methods of power flow analyses and their limitations.  
Interconnected networks comprise thousands of elements such as buses and power lines. 
Specialized programs help the modeler handle the large amount of data and perform power 
flow analyses with several numerical methods in a user-friendly environment. In this research, 
the software Neplan (Busarello and Cott, 2010) is used to carry out power flow analysis. It 
allows the user to interact with electric elements, visualize the network schema, and perform 
analyses of SPTS for large scale systems. In general, these programs implement a standard 
AC flow model with some adaptations related to the depth of modeling and computing 
performance. Therefore, the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the 
standard inputs and output of power flow simulation while its mathematical formulation is 
detailed in Appendix 9.1 
The electric model based on an AC power flow model includes the following types of 
elements: bus, transformers, generators, loads and lines. Different levels of modeling are 
possible. For example, buses, which represent substations, can be simply a busbar or a 
complex tangle of busbars, circuit breakers, protection and control equipments. Here, only 
passive elements are modeled to keep the complexity at a manageable level. However, these 
simplifications are compatible with the structural vulnerability analysis. The three-phase 
elements are represented in a single-line diagram since it is assumed the three-phase system is 
balanced and only three-phase outages are considered. The electric schema illustrates the 
elements retained with a color index indicating two levels of voltage.  
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Figure 5: Illustration of the electric model  
 
The buses connect together generators, loads, transformers and power lines. Buses are 
subject to limited deviations around their nominal voltage. Voltage deviations outside 
predefined boundaries are considered violations of security limits and in this case, the 
disconnection of essential equipment can take place. Elements are connected to a bus by a 
switch, which allows disconnecting of network elements. In this model, switches connect or 
disconnect at the same time the three phases of the element to simulate element maintenances 
and outages.  
Generators represent power plants connected to buses. Their main parameters include the 
actual active and reactive power injected, minimum and maximum reactive power, preset 
voltage and types. There are three types of generators, which also determine the bus type. A 
PQ bus has generators that have a constant predefined active (P) and reactive (Q) power. In 
this case, the bus voltage is variable and determined after power flow analyses. The PV bus 
has generators with a constant predefined active power output. Their reactive power is 
adapted to force the actual bus voltage (V) to the preset voltage. When the reactive power 
exceeds its limits, the PV bus is changed into a PQ bus. Only a fraction of buses in 
transmission networks are PV type to keep the other buses voltage near their nominal value. 
PV generators are important elements keeping voltages within their security limits.  
Finally, the slack bus SB serves as a reference for the angles of all other bus voltages. This 
bus is usually connected to a generator of large capacity since it is forced to compensate for 
the difference between the aggregated production and consumption, which include the active 
power losses of the power lines. Only one SB bus is usually required and should be located 
far from the region under investigation. Distributed slack buses are sometimes implemented 
to more realistically allocate the difference between production and consumption. Deo (2007) 
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offers a descriptions of the alterative modeling underlying power flow analyses. Loads are the 
opposite elements to generators. The former correspond to either large consumers or lower 
voltage networks. Primarily parameters for loads are the active and reactive powers withdraw 
from buses.  
Transformers connect buses of different voltages. The main parameters are the resistance 
and leakage reactance at primary and secondary windings. The ratio of voltage between 
primary and secondary terminals is set by the ratio between the number of turns in the 
primary and secondary windings. This ratio can be adapted in tap transformers enabling 
voltage regulation.  
Lines represent three-phase circuits of overhead power lines or cables connecting two 
buses. These circuits are characterized by an equivalent Π model giving a good 
approximation of their behavior for medium line length, namely less than 250 km. In this 
case, the branch resistance and reactance, the shunt capacitance and the maximum current are 
their main parameters. For long transmission lines, a model represented by an infinite series 
of two-port elementary components whose global behavior follows the telegraphers’ 
equations must be considered (Aguet and Morf, 1990). The maximum current is related to the 
maximum temperature of the conductors after which plastic deformations happen possibly 
leading to outages and costly repair. The maximum current relies on environmental factors 
such as outside temperature and wind speed. In practice, the maximum current is set at a 
seasonal fixed value. A branch current surpassing the maximum current of a given power line 
entails an violation of security limits. Minor current overloads can be withstood a definite 
time based on the overload magnitude, while major overloads are likely to cause immediate 
disconnection of the power line.   
The next table summarizes the main parameters (Pr) and variables (Vr) in most of the AC 
load flow models. The buses are identified by the indexes ݅ or ݆ belonging to the set of 
buses ࣜ ൌ ൛1, … , ࣶܰൟ. Transmission lines are identified by their index ݈ א ࣦ ൌ ൛1, … , ܰℓൟ. 
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 Table 3: Main parameters and variables required for power flow analyses 
 
Element Symbol Label Type 
Bus ܸ௜ Voltage Pr or Vr 
௡ܸ௢௠௜  Nominal voltage Pr 
௔ܸௗ௠௜  Max voltage deviation Pr 
ߠ௜ Voltage angle Vr 
Line ܴ௟ Branch resistance Pr 
ܺ௟ Branch  reactance Pr 
ܥ௟ Shunt capacitance Pr 
ܩ௟ Shunt conductance Pr 
ܫ௟ Branch current Vr 
ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  Max current rating Pr 
ܲ௟ Active power Vr 
ܳ௟ Reactive power Vr 
Transformer ܴ௉௜,௝ Resistance at primary Pr 
ܺ௉௜,௝ Reactance at primary Pr 
ܴௌ௜,௝ Resistance at secondary Pr 
ௌܺ
௜,௝
 
Reactance at secondary Pr 
ܰ௜,௝ Voltage ratio Pr or Vr 
Load ௅ܲ௜ Active power Pr 
ܳ௅௜  Reactive power Pr 
Generator ܲீ௜  Active power Pr 
ܳ௜ீ  Reactive power Pr or Vr 
ܳீ௠௜௡௜  Min reactive power Pr 
ܳீ௠௔௫௜  Max reactive power Pr 
ܸீ௜  Preset voltage Pr 
ܩ௜்  Type PQ, PV or SB Pr 
 
 
At the time of application to a specific SPTS, the electric parameters are set to model the 
system under investigation. For real systems, electric utilities provide the basic data which 
can then be modified to suit the problem. Once the parameters are known, the equations of the 
AC power flow model are solved by numerical methods. A complete mathematical 
formulation can be found in Grainger and Stevenson (1994) in Chapter 9. Fundamental 
equations are presented in appendix 9.1. The model consists of a system of non-linear 
equations solved by the Newton-Raphson method (Kelley, 2003). It is an iterative method 
converging quickly to the root of a function. First, an initial guess of plausible bus voltage ܸ௜ 
and angle ߠ௜ is made. Then, voltage magnitude and angles are tweaked to eleminate the buses 
power mismatch. Line current ܫ௟, active power ܲ௟ and reactive power ܳ௟ are derived from bus 
voltages.  
While evaluating the severity of CMCs by contingency analyses, power flow analyses are 
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successively performed by disconnecting the transmission lines included in each CMC. For 
each of them, violations of security limits stemming from current overloads of power lines 
and inadmissible voltage deviations of buses are identified.  
Violations of security limits have two main consequence types. First, violations have a 
small magnitude and thus can be withstood by equipment until operational measures are 
taken. In the second case, some equipment fails or is disconnected due to higher violations, 
potentially leading to cascading failures and blackouts (Pourbeik et al., 2006). Unfortunately, 
the AC power flow model gives a static picture of the state of the system discarding transients 
responsible for power disruptions (Novosel et al., 2004). Some dynamics can be using a 
succession of pictures of the network, combining simulations of the possible actions of 
security devices and operators (Hardiman et al., 2004). However, the evaluation of the 
possible consequences of violations is not within the scope of this study since it aims at 
assessing static or structural vulnerability. Here, violations of security limits are considered as 
good indicators of vulnerability for identifying vulnerable zones and proposing planning 
measures.  
  
3.3.2 The geographic model 
 
The probability of CMCs for overhead power lines are related to the space-time correlation 
of EWEs, in addition to the distribution of transmission networks over a territory. A 
geographic representation of the network is required to evaluate interactions between 
transmission lines and EWEs. The geographic model contains all relevant geographic 
information to virtually lay out the electric model on a map. The geographic model stores data 
from the reliability model and includes attributes linking it to the electric model. The 
geographic model is structured to allow its implementation under standard GISs.  
Each overhead power line in the electric model must have a double in the geographic 
model. Although the three conductors of a circuit are spaced several meters apart and hung 
between 20 to 50 meters, only an averaging trace on the ground is required for the geographic 
model. The electric and reliability models both consider transmission lines as a single 
electricity carrier. In addition, the probability of CMCs is not sensitive to small horizontal 
displacements of a few meters. Therefore, the three-phase circuits of the electric model are 
represented by their projection onto a polygonal path stored in a path layer. A polygonal path, 
or sometimes named polyline in GIS, is a piecewise linear curve composed of a series of 
connected segments or also named vertices (Breslin et al., 1999). Paths are also represented 
by evenly spaced points stored in an exposure point layer. These points correspond to virtual 
transmission line segments where exposure to EWEs and calculation of probability failure are 
performed. Afterwards, these points are referred to exposure points. The path and exposure 
point layers are stored in a geodatabase containing geographic information as well as relevant 
characteristics of transmission lines, such as nominal voltage or name.  
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Figure 6: Two layers of the geographic model
 
The path layer is generally available at the electric utilities or at the system operator. 
However, their models do not always comply with the requirement that each transmission line 
of the electric model must have one unique trace in the geographic model. Moreover, different 
layer formats are likely since transmission networks are usually owned or operated by several 
utilities. The recourse to a GIS helps collect and process diverse geographic data to produce a 
coherent and unique model.  
Several difficulties can arise when building the model. For example, each transmission line 
of the electric model must be linked to its counterpart in the geographic model with the same 
name or ID number. This could be tricky since those two models can have different 
abstraction levels, entails a tremendous effort of modeling especially for large networks. 
However, GISs have powerful functionalities that can solve most of modeling problems. 
Due to spatiotemporal correlations of EWEs, power lines are not exposed with the same 
intensity at different locations. Line exposure to EWEs varies along its path, but this exposure 
and the strength of portions of transmission lines do not radically change over a reasonable 
distance. This fact leads to the division of continuous path into a discrete model represented 
by evenly-spaced exposure points. The distance between points can be variables but should 
not be too long or too short. An appropriate distance is a trade-off between the number of 
points influencing computing time and memory, and the level of detail needed to render the 
space-time correlations. A rule of thumb is that the distance between two exposure points 
should be a fraction of the spatial resolution of the EWE under investigation. Otherwise, 
information embodied in the EWE would only be partially taken into account. The number 
exposure point ݏ for transmission line ݈ is ௦ܰ௘௚௟ . All the exposure points of a specific 
Electric 
Path  layer 
Exposure points 
layer 
Geodatabase 
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line belongs to ्௟ ൌ ൛ݏ א ्௟| ݏ א ൣ1, ௦ܰ௘௚௟ ൧ൟ. 
The geodatabase stores two types of data. The first type regards all geographical 
information about paths and exposure points in a specific coordinate system. Paths are stored 
as a list of ݊௟ connected points. These points and the exposure points are located in a 
Cartesian coordinate system by their three coordinates (ݔ, ݕ, ݖ). In most of the application, 
only the first two dimensions (ݔ, ݕ) are relevant. Other geographic coordinate systems could 
be more appropriate for large-scale transmission systems due to the ellipsoidal shape of the 
earth. The second type of data is attributes linked to layer features. For instance, each trace 
has an identifier connected to its double in the electric model. Each exposure point has 
attribute including segment length and parameters from the reliability model. The following 
table presents the mathematical form of the transmission lines path ݈ and their exposure 
points ݏ.  
 
Table 4: Mathematical form of the features of the geographic model 
Path of line ݈ ࣪௟ ൌ ൛൫ݔଵ௟ , ݕଵ௟ , ݖଵ௟ ൯, … , ൫ݔ௡೗௟ , ݕ௡೗௟ , ݖ௡೗௟ ൯ൟ 
Exposure point coordinates ߪ௟,௦ ൌ ൫ݔ௟,௦, ݕ௟,௦, ݖ௟,௦൯ 
Set of exposure points ࣭ ൌ ሼߪ௟,௦ א ࣭| ݈ א ࣦ, ݏ א ्௟ሽ 
Segment length  ݀௟,௦ 
Reliability model parameters ܴ௟,௦ ൌ ሼݎଵ, ݎଶ, … ሽ 
 
This mathematical formulation is general and not related to any specific GIS. However, the 
formulation is compatible with GIS software used for this research, ArcInfo (ESRI, 2010b). 
Large geodatabases are supported and numerous of built-in toolboxes are available for this 
software. Its user interface allows many operations to be made without requiring coding 
skills. ArcInfo is a powerful example of GIS that simplifies geographic information 
processing.  
The use of GIS in planning transmission networks is increasing, at least in academic 
literature, in particular when the objective is to find a suitable path (Monteiro et al., 2005) or 
rerouting overhead power lines (Luemongkol et al., 2009). GIS combined with the LIDAR 
technique is also utilized for vegetation management along right-of-ways (Mills et al., 2004). 
Nag and Sengupta (2008) review some applications of GIS to transmission networks. 
However, electrical models and geographical models are rarely integrated in the same 
framework. The methodology proposed here is thus quite novel. 
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3.3.3 The reliability model 
 
The reliability model of the SPTS lays down a methodological framework aimed to 
evaluate the temporal unavailability of each transmission line. The reliability model is 
incorporated in the SPTS because this model is closely linked to the transmission lines of the 
electric model and the exposure points in the geographic model. The temporal unavailability 
is at the foundation of the evaluation of CMC probability developed in Chapter 3.5.  
As with any model, the reliability model is also a simplification of the processes taking 
place in reality. When considering the modeling of the interaction between EWE and 
transmission lines, complexity and uncertainty issues arise. It would be pointless and vain to 
try describing every detail of the processes taking place during EWE. Moreover, the amount 
of data to collect, the development of the model, and the duration of the simulations would 
surpass any reasonable amount of resources allocated for this research. Therefore, the 
modeling must be strongly influenced by the objective of the vulnerability assessment, 
namely the identification of zones of vulnerability. This entails that estimation from 
subjective probability of transmission line failure leading to the discrimination of likely 
CMCs and unlikely ones is sufficient. The term subjective corresponds to the case where 
probability is a measure of certainty about a particular statement as opposed to the objective 
meaning related to frequency. Therefore, the concept of probability implemented here should 
not be interpreted as frequency, but as a means for ranking plausibility.  
Most of the vulnerability assessments of power systems do not take into account 
spatiotemporal correlations. They strongly increase the probability of some CMCs while 
others are very unlikely to happen. For instance, Billington is one of the authors of an 
accepted reliability assessment (see Chapter 2.2). Without doubt, this method is appropriate 
when assessing large electric power systems during normal weather conditions. According to 
Li (2005), it reaches its limits during EWE because space-time correlations are discarded.  
The reliability model proposed here takes them into account, as well as the paths and physical 
strength of the overhead transmission lines.  
EWEs are one of the main causes of CMCs. Therefore, the probability of CMCs has to take 
into account exposure to natural elements and the strength of transmission infrastructure. 
However, this probability is also affected by security equipment, action of operators and 
repair teams. Indeed, CMCs are alleviated in time depending on failure type. Intermittent 
failures last a very short duration of time such as most of the failures triggered by lightning, 
which are mitigated by reclosing breakers. Extended failures last until physical components 
are repaired, for instance after hurricanes. Blache and Shrivastava (1994) present a 
comprehensive classification of failure. Therefore, the probability of CMCs at a given time 
stems from failure processes and reconnection processes.  
In the electric model, transmission lines are modeled as single electric links between buses. 
Partial failures of one phase cannot be analyzed by a standard AC power flow model. 
Therefore, it is assumed that transmission line failures are complete and thus comprise the 
failures of all three phases at the same time. Moreover, it is assumed that failure and 
reconnection processes are memoryless, (i.e. the future state of the transmission line only 
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depends on its current state disregarding all the previous states). This assumption is known as 
the Markov property  (Brémaud, 2001b). On the whole, each transmission line has only two 
states, the functional (Up) and nonfunctional (Down) states. Over a small duration ݀ݐ, the 
change from Up to down state is operated by failure processes whereas the opposite is 
handled by reconection processes. This representation of transmission line states can be 
formalized by a time-continuous Markov process. Since the failure processes depend on 
weather conditions, which change over time, the Markov process is nonhomogeneous 
(Brémaud, 2001a).  
Nonhomogeneous time-continuous Markov processes are not commonly implemented in 
reliability analysis (Zhang and Horigome, 2001). This is likely due to their complexity and 
lack of information about parameters. It implies the literature about this subject is theoretical 
and any application to a concrete problem is challenging. Therefore, it is proposed here to 
develop a simple but appropriate method tailored for the problem at hand. 
The derivation of the time-dependent equations describing unavailability of any item such 
as transmission line starts with the following schema representing the two states and the 
possible transition during a duration ݀ݐ.  
 
 
Figure 7: Transition in the two states model of power line ݈ 
 
Formally, the state of a transmission line ݈ at time t may be described by the state variable 
ܺ௟(ݐ): 
ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ ቄ1          if Up at time t0          if Down at time t (3.1)
 
For a transmission line ݈, the probability of transition from any of the states at time ݐ to any 
other states at time ݐ + ݀ݐ depends on the failure rate ߣ௟(ݐ) and reconnection rate ߤ௟(t). rate of 
failure and reconnection of an item are defined by the following equations, (Rausand and 
Hoyland, 2004).  
1 െ ߤ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ 
1 െ ߣ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ 
ݐ ݐ + ݀ݐ 
ߤ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ 
ߣ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ 
Up 
Down 
states 
time 
ܷ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) 
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ߣ௟(ݐ) ൌ ܲݎ(ݐ ൑ ܶ ൏ ݐ + ݀ݐ | ܶ ൒ ݐ )݀ݐ  (3.2)
ߤ௟(ݐ) ൌ ܲݎ(ݐ ൑ ܶ
כ ൏ ݐ + ݀ݐ | ܶכ ൒ ݐ )
݀ݐ  (3.3)
 
Where ܶ  and ܶכ are, respectively, continuous random variables denoting the time to 
failure and to reconnection of the power line ݈. Equation (3.2) shows that the probability of 
moving from the Up state at ݐ to the Down state at ݐ + ݀ݐ is equal to ߣ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ as mention in the 
schema. According to the second axioms of probability, which stipulates that the sum of all 
possible events equals one, the probability of staying in the UP state is 1 െ ߣ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ. The 
justification of the transition from the Down state is similar by taking into account equation 
(3.3). It is worth mentioning that in some textbooks, the rate of failure is called hazard rate or 
hazard function noted ݄(ݐ) (Ascher and Feingold, 1984). In this case, the symbol ߣ is reserved 
for constant hazard rate.  
By definition, the line unavailability ܷ௟(ݐ) is the probability being in its nonfunctional or 
Down state or ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ 0. Its complementary is availability ܣ௟(ݐ) ൌ 1 െ ܷ௟(ݐ). From the schema 
above, the unavailability ܷ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) is the result of only the two state transitions (red). 
Therefore, the unavailability can be expressed by the probability that the line is Up at ݐ and 
does fail between ݐ and ݐ + ݀ݐ  or the line is Down at time ݐ and is not repaired between ݐ and 
ݐ + ݀ݐ. 
 
ܷ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) = Probability (ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ1 AND ܺ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) ൌ 0 OR ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ 0 AND ܺ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) ൌ 0) 
 
Or formally 
ܷ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) ൌ ቀ1 െ ܷ௟(ݐ)ቁ . ߣ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ + ܷ௟(ݐ). ൫1 െ ߤ௟(ݐ). ݀ݐ൯ (3.4)
with   ܷ௟(ݐ ൌ 0) ൌ 0 (3.5)
Rearranging some terms yields to  
ܷ௟(ݐ + ݀ݐ) െ ܷ௟(ݐ)
݀ݐ ൌ ߣ
௟(ݐ) െ ߣ௟(ݐ). ܷ௟(ݐ) െ ߤ௟(ݐ). ܷ௟(ݐ) ฺ 
ܷ݀௟(ݐ)
݀ݐ ൌ ߣ
௟(ݐ) െ ቀߣ௟(ݐ) + ߤ௟(ݐ)ቁ . ܷ௟(ݐ) ൌ ݂൫ܷ௟(ݐ), ݐ൯ (3.6)
 
This differential equation describes the temporal evolution of the unavailability of any line 
݈ of the transmission network. Only the initial condition ܷ௟(0) has to be given. It is assumed 
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that lines are all operational at the beginning of the simulation, i.e. equation (3.5). If the rates 
of failure and reconnection were constant, equation (3.6) would be a linear ordinary 
differential equation of first order with constant coefficient. Its solution could be easily found 
(Polyanin and Zaitsev, 2003). The time varying rate of failure and reconnection impede any 
analytical solution. In this case, numerical solutions are the only way out. Equation (3.6) can 
be numerically solved by the classical Runge-Kutta method (Rappaz and Picasso, 2000). It is 
a fourth-order method which means that the total error is proportional to ݄ସ, where ݄ is the 
stepsize (Iserles, 1996). At time ݐ௡ାଵ ൌ (݊ + 1). ݄ with ݊ ߳ Գ, the numerical estimate of the 
unavailability ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡ାଵ) is: 
 
෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡ାଵ) ൌ ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡) + ௛଺ (݌ଵ + 2݌ଶ + 2݌ଷ + ݌ସ) (3.7)
݌ଵ ൌ  ݂൫ ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡), ݐ௡൯ (3.8)
݌ଶ ൌ  ݂ ൬ ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡) +
݄
2 ݌ଵ, ݐ௡ +
݄
2൰ (3.9)
݌ଷ ൌ  ݂ ൬ ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡) +
݄
2 ݌ଶ, ݐ௡ +
݄
2൰ (3.10)
݌ସ ൌ  ݂൫ ෩ܷ௟(ݐ௡) + ݄. ݌ଷ, ݐ௡ାଵ൯ (3.11)
 
The four factors ݌ are estimated slopes of ෩ܷ௟ at different times. The estimate (3.7) at ݐ௡ାଵ is 
the estimate at ݐ௡ plus a linear function of the step size and the weighted average of slopes. 
The Runga-Kutta method can be adapted to allow variable stepsize reducing computing time. 
For instance, Dormand and Prince (1980) provide a family of embedded Runge-Kutta 
methods with variable stepsize.  
The evolution of the rate of failure still has to be defined, taking into account EWEs and 
the geographic model of Chapter 3.3.2. According to this chapter, transmission lines are 
divided into segments in series represented by their exposure point. One needs the following 
strong but plausible assumption to derive the rate of failure. That is to say, each segment fails 
independently from each other. It is plausible since segments of transmission lines are 
designed to avoid the propagation of mechanical or electrical outages to the adjacent 
segments. For instance, reinforced pylons are regularly placed among other pylons to stop the 
propagation of possible collapsing pylons. As mentioned on Modarres et al. (1999) page 198, 
the rate of failure of a system composed by independent components in series is the sum of its 
component rates of failure. The demonstration of this statement is given in Appendix 9.2. 
This rule applied to a power line ݈ composed of ௦ܰ௘௚௟   independent segments gives: 
ߣ௟(ݐ) ൌ ෍ ߣ௟,௦(ݐ)
ேೞ೐೒೗
௜ୀଵ
 
(3.12)
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Where ߣ௟,௦(ݐ) is the rate of failure for the segment ݏ of the line ݈. This rate of failure is a 
function of the strength and the exposure to EWE of the segment.  The term hazard function ݄  
found in academic literature corresponds well with this function. This function has no 
generalized formulation, it is strongly dependent on the type of EWE. For example, winter 
storms interact differently with overhead power lines than thunderstorms. The hazard function 
has to be explicitly defined at the time of the methodology application. However, parameters 
of strength or resistance noted ݎ௟,௦ are in all cases required, as well as the exposure ܧ൫ܵ௟,௦, ݐ൯ 
defined in chapter 3.4. These quantities can be vectors since they could contain more than one 
parameter. Resistance parameters are assumed constant during EWEs.  
 ߣ௟,௦(ݐ) ൌ ݄ ቀܴ௟,௦, ܧ൫ߪ௟,௦, ݐ൯ቁ (3.13)
 
Regarding the reconnection processes, they are assumed independent of weather 
conditions, memoryless, and aggregated at the transmission line level. It requires that all the 
possible ways of reconnecting a line are lumped in a single process, which is not influence by 
weather conditions. This is a strong simplification because reconnection processes are 
certainly to some degree influenced by the intensity of weather along transmission line. In 
addition, rapid action of automatic security equipment is considered similar to slow repair of 
mechanical damages. In these conditions, the reconnection rate is constant.  
 
     ߤ௟(ݐ) ൌ ߤ௟  (3.14)
 
The only degree of modeling freedom is that each transmission line has its own rate of 
reconnection. A more realistic model of time-dependent unavailability should integrate more 
failures or reconnection modes acting on different parts of transmission lines. Although 
possible, this would extensively complicate the task of modeling and collecting data at the 
time of application. Time consuming Monte-Carlo simulations could be necessary to evaluate 
the unavailability. Therefore, the level of sophistication is deemed sufficient to fulfill the 
objective of identification of zones of vulnerability.  
 
3.4 Scenario of extreme weather event 
 
A SEWE is a spatiotemporal description of a plausible extreme weather event. It contains 
the exposure vector necessary to evaluate the hazard function defined by equation (3.13). The 
available source of data to build SEWE is not necessarily in the format required to implement 
the hazard function. Indeed, it is required that the exposure should be known at exposure 
points of all segments of all transmission lines at any time. To ensure compatibility between 
the requirements mentioned above and SEWE, they are transformed in space and time. First, 
 40 
 
this chapter mathematically defines the required format of the exposure of segments of 
transmission lines and a possible representation of SEWE. Then, a transformation method is 
proposed to interpolate SEWE into a usable format for the hazard function.   
Each weather condition has hazardous features which influence the likelihood of outages 
and thus the hazard function. For instance, hazardous features of hurricane are wind speed and 
direction. For thunderstorms, lightning strikes and their characteristics such as location of 
impact or peak current are example hazard features. To define the hazardous feature ߟ which 
is a particular threat for the physical integrity of power lines, a total of ܰா hazardous features 
are formally described by a vector field of exposure, represented by the vector-valued 
function ܧ. This field is defined for the set ߓ constituted by the set ࣭ of exposure point 
ߪ௟,௦ ൌ ൫ݔ௟,௦, ݕ௟,௦, ݖ௟,௦൯ augmented with the set of positive time ࣮ ൌ ሼݐ א ࣮| ݐ א  Թାሽ.  
ܧ: Υ ՜ Թேಶ  
With Υ ൌ ࣭ ൈ ࣮ (3.15)
ܧ൫ߪ௟,௦, ݐ൯ ൌ ܧ൫ݔ௟,௦, ݕ௟,௦, ݖ௟,௦, ݐ൯ ൌ ቌ
ߟଵ
…
ߟேಶ
ቍ  
The exposure is defined in a Cartesian coordinate system as an example. This coordinate 
system is appropriate to represent small portions of the earth. In other cases, other coordinate 
systems would be preferred.  
SEWE are built from sources of exposure data provided by weather stations or numerical 
simulations. These sources produce discrete numerical data in space at sites ݀ and times ݇. For 
instance, weather stations are distributed over a territory at some specific locations recording 
meteorological data at the typical rate of minutes to hours (Suter et al., 2006). Numerical 
simulations offer estimates of meteorological conditions at fixed points of a grid at variable 
time rates (Schättler et al., 2009). Therefore, exposure data of SEWE must be interpolated to 
the four coordinates of the set ߓ.  
To define the data source of exposure, the vector-valued function ܹ represents vector field 
of data from weather stations or numerical simulations. It is defined for the set Ψ constituted 
of the set ࣞ of the coordinate of the sites ߜௗ ൌ (ݔௗ, ݕௗ, ݖௗ)  augmented with the set ࣥ of 
discrete times ݇. 
ܹ: Ψ ՜ Թேಶ  
 With Ψ ൌ ࣞ ൈ ࣥ (3.16)
ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇൯ ൌ ܹ൫ݔௗ, ݕௗ, ݖௗ, ݇൯ ൌ ቌ
ߟଵ
…
ߟேಶ
ቍ  
The vector field ܹ must be transformed to estimate the exposure at the element of the set 
ߓ of (3.15). A comparison among numerous existing interpolations methods is performed in 
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Dobesh et al. (2007). Their performance and complexity vary over a long range. A method 
cannot be proposed in general since their performance is related to the type of weather 
condition under investigation. For instance, an inverse distance weighting interpolation of 
wind speed recorded by distant weather stations could lead to large errors due to specific local 
conditions, especially in mountainous regions. Interpolation methods can be splinted into two 
main categories, the deterministic and the statistics. The latter is part of the field of statistic 
and more specifically geostatistics.  It is based on statistical methods, which represent spatial 
distributions taking into account spatial autocorrelations. Kriging methods are well known 
interpolation techniques, which are part of the geostatistics field (Cressie, 1993). 
Deterministic methods are simpler and faster at the price of accuracy losses. They are 
preferred here, since the speed of calculation is an important criterion because interpolations 
have to be made at every time step of the availability calculation of equation (3.4).  
It is proposed to perform time and spatial interpolations successively. However, methods 
exist to consider time as an additional coordinate to carry out spatiotemporal interpolation in 
one batch (Li and Revesz, 2004). The sequence of interpolations is as follow: 
First, an temporal interpolation of ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯ from  ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇൯ is performed by an interpolant 
ܶܫ. 
෡ܹ ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯ ൌ ܶܫ ቀܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇௜൯ቁ (3.17)
 
For instance, a linear interpolation is quick and easy, even if its accuracy could be limited 
for a long duration.  
෡ܹ ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯ ൌ ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇௜൯ + ቀܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇௝൯ െ ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇௜൯ቁ . ݐ െ ݇
௜
݇௜ െ ݇௝ (3.18)
 
Where ݐ ߳ ൣ݇௜, ݇௝൧ and with ݇௜ and ݇௝ are respectively the discrete times just before and 
after ݐ. Then, ෡ܹ ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯ is spatially interpolated by the interpolant ܵܫ from ߜௗ to the element of 
set ߓ. 
ܧ෠൫ߪ௟,௦, ݐ൯ ൌ ܵܫ ቀ ߪ௟,௦, ෡ܹ ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯ቁ (3.19)
 
The interpolant SI is problem specific and should be selected taking into account the space-
time characteristics of the weather condition under investigation. Possible SIs include nearest-
neighbor, natural neighbor, linear and bilinear or inverse distant weighting. The latter is 
presented hereunder. Gilgen (2006) gives an overview of existing methods.  
The inverse distance weighting interpolation allow the estimation of an unknown exposure 
ܧ෠ at  ߪ௟,௦ ൌ ൫ݔ௟,௦, ݕ௟,௦, ݖ௟,௦൯  by a weighted sum of the known exposure ෡ܹ  at neighboring points 
ߜௗ ൌ ൫ݔௗ, ݕௗ, ݖௗ൯. The weight ݓ൫ߜௗ൯ is inversely proportional to the distance between the 
unknown and the known point. The power factor ݌ is a real number. It influences the weights 
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Layer of weather 
data at time ݇௝  
Vector field of 
exposure at 
time ݐ 
ܧ෠൫ߪ௟ୀଵ,௦ୀ଺, ݐ൯ 
Layer of weather 
data at time ݇௜ 
ߜௗୀଵ 
ߜௗୀଶ 
ܹ൫ߜௗୀଷ, ݇௜൯ 
෡ܹ ൫ߜௗୀଷ, ݐ൯ 
ܹ൫ߜௗୀଷ, ݇௝൯ 
giving more importance to close points when ݌ is higher.  
ܧ෠൫ߪ௟,௦, ݐ൯ ൌ ෍ ݓ൫ߪ
௟,௦, ߜௗ൯. ෡ܹ ൫ߜௗ, ݐ൯
∑ ݓ(ߪ௟,௦, ߜௗ)ேௗୀଵ
ே
ௗୀଵ
 
(3.20)
With     ݓ൫ߪ௟,௦, ߜௗ൯ ൌ ଵ
ฮఙ೗,ೞିఋ೏ฮ೛
 (3.21)
The SEWE containing the spatiotemporal data ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇൯ is readily stored in a geodatabase 
like the geographic model of Chapter 3.3.2. For each time ݇, a layer of  the EWE supports all 
the points ߜ at which the values of the exposure ܹ൫ߜௗ, ݇൯ are known. The GIS coupled with 
this geodatabase greatly facilitate the interpolation. Indeed, most GIS programs have 
toolboxes implementing the standard SIs mentioned above. Moreover, the data of the 
geographic model, such as the exposure point of the set ࣭, are directly available through the 
same geodatabase. The use of GIS ensures the visualization of the data to detect errors, a 
suitable means of storage of multidimensional data, several methods of interpolation and a 
common framework for diverse geographic models. The next schema illustrates the procedure 
for interpolating a weather data from a SEWE to the exposure point ߪ௟ୀଵ,௦ୀ଺ at time ݐ. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Example of interpolation from 3 weather stations to a segment 
 
The SEWE is represented by the two white layers containing the data of weather station or 
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numerical simulations at time ݇௜ and ݇௝. Three black points ߜௗ, with a known exposure, are 
represented in addition to the red exposure points ݏ ൌ 6 of transmission line ݈ ൌ 1. The black 
arrows show the TI as defined by (3.17), whereas the blue arrows represent the SI as defined 
by (3.19).  
 
3.5 Probability evaluation of plausible common mode 
contingencies 
 
This chapter aims at searching a set of plausible CMCs and evaluates their probability. The 
severity of CMCs is evaluated afterwards by a contingency analysis in Chapter 3.6. The 
tremendous number of possible CMCs combined with finite computing resources imply that 
the evaluation of their probability and severity has to be restrained to a more tractable 
number. Therefore, only the transmission line with the highest unavailability are retained by a 
screening method prior to their combination forming plausible CMCs. Afterwards, the 
calculation of the time dependent CMCs probability is performed assuming that transmission 
lines fail independently. Finally, the maximum probability of each CMC during the 
simulation is set aside to condense the temporal probability by a single key value. The schema 
hereunder shows the main steps implemented in this chapter.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Overview of the probability evaluation CMCs 
 
The temporal unavailability of transmission line ݈ is given by equation (3.6) of the 
reliability model. It is likely that only a part of the network is significantly impacted by 
SEWE. It entails that some transmission lines are more unavailable than others during 
Space-time simulations 
Identify a set of 
plausible CMCs 
SEWE 
Temporal and maximum 
probability of CMCs  
SPTS 
Unavailability of 
transmission lines 
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weather events. It is assumed that the most plausible CMCs are combinations of transmission 
lines, which exhibit highest unavailability during weather events. This assumption allows 
setting a screening method to identify a set of plausible CMCs. It begins with the calculation 
of the maximum unavailability of each transmission lines ݈ during SEWE. 
෡ܷ௟  ൌ ݉ܽݔ௧ሾܷ௟(ݐ)ሿ (3.22)
All power lines with an ෡ܷ௟ above a certain threshold ்ܷare deemed likely enough to fail to 
generate plausible CMCs. This inclusion criterion is certainly not unique and can be further 
developed. However, it is a good trade-off between simplicity and performance in practice. 
The threshold is determined by the following method, named cumulative sum screening. 
1) Find the bijective function ܥ(݈) ൌ ݈Ԣ map the index ݈ to the new sorted index ݈Ԣ. The 
transmission lines are sorted by decreasing order of unavailability. 
Find ܥ(݈) ൌ ݈ᇱ such as ෡ܷ௟ᇲ ൒ ෡ܷ൫௟ᇲିଵ൯ (3.23)
2) Calculate the cumulative sum ܨ(݈ᇱ) of ෡ܷ௟ᇲ.    
ܨ(݈ᇱ)  ൌ ෡ܷ௟ᇲ+ ෡ܷ௟ᇲିଵ (3.24)
3) Choose a cumulative sum threshold percentage ߙ.  Find the transmission line ்݈ having 
a cumulative sum the nearest to ߙ of the sum of all ෡ܷ௟ 
Find lT such as ቚ ෡ܷ୪T െ ݏݑ݉௟ᇲൣ ෡ܷ௟ᇲ൧. ߙቚ is minimum (3.25)
4) Identify the threshold ෡ܷ ் 
෡்ܷ ൌ ෡ܷ஼షభ൫௟೅൯  (3.26)
5) Finally, compose the set ߊ containing the most unavailable transmission lines  
ߊ ൌ ൛݈ | ෡ܷ௟ ൒ ෡்ܷൟ (3.27)
The cumulative sum method enables the combination of the most unavailable transmission 
lines to form CMCs, discarding the lines insignificantly contributing to the total 
unavailability. It is very effective for screening, especially when a fraction of the network is 
strongly impacted by a SEWE. This is usually the case in real situations where space-time 
correlations cause concentrated spots of intense activity. Nevertheless, other screening 
methods could be as effective or even more effective in specific weather conditions or 
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network topologies.  
Then, all possible ݉-combinations of the line indexes included in ߊ are performed to form 
a set ߁௠(ܿ)  of plausible CMCs. The multiplicity ݉ is the number of transmission lines 
present in a particular CMC, while ܿ is the ܿ௧௛ CMC of multiplicity ݉. The complementary 
set ߁ത௠(ܿ) contains the rest of line indexes not belonging to ߁௠(ܿ). The number of element 
௖ܰ௠௖௠  of ߁௠ is found by the binomial coefficient. 
௖ܰ௠௖௠ ൌ ܿܽݎ݀( ߁௠) ൌ ቀ݊
௹
݉ ቁ ൌ
݊௹!
݉! (݊௹ െ ݉)! 
(3.28)
Where  ݊ߊ ൌ ܿܽݎ݀(ߊ) (3.29)
The number ௖ܰ௠௖݉  of elements of the sets ߁௠ for a given multiplicity ݉ ൒ 3 can become 
intractable when ݊௹ is large. In this case, threshold ߙ of the screening method is diminished 
to limit the number of plausible CMCs. The enumeration of the element of set Μ to generate 
plausible CMCs is a method reaching its limits for large networks extensively impacted by 
EWEs. In this case, Monte-Carlo simulations treating the problem as a real experiments could 
used instead of analytical methods (Billington and Wenyuan, 1994). Anyhow, high 
multiplicity CMCs should not be plausible for well devised and maintained networks. 
Therefore, the upper bound ܰࣾ of multiplicity is likely to be limited to 3 or 4 in practice.  
At a given time, the probability ௠ܲ௖ (ݐ) of facing a CMC ߁௠(ܿ) is the probability that lines 
in ߁௠(ܿ) are unavailable whereas the rest of the lines in ߁ത௠(ܿ) are available.  
௠ܲ௖ (ݐ) ൌ ቎ ሩ ܲ൫ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ 0൯
௟א୻೘(௖)
቏ ځ ቎ ሩ ܲ൫ܺ௟(ݐ) ൌ 1൯
௟א୻ഥ೘(௖)
቏ (3.30) 
 
If one assumes transmission lines fail and are reconnected independently of each other, is 
the temporal probability of CMCs is :  
 
௠ܲ௖ (ݐ) ൌ ෑ ܷ௟
௟ఢ୻೘(௖) 
(ݐ). ෑ (1 െ ܷ௟(ݐ))
௟ఢ୻ഥ೘(௖)
 (3.31)
 
The assumption of independence of transmission lines excludes all direct causal relations 
among lines. For example, this may be the case when a conductor of a three-phase circuit is 
damaged and falls on another circuit. On this occasion, conditional probabilities should be 
used. 
Instantaneous probability ௠ܲ௖ (ݐ) is not the best metric for evaluating the plausibility of 
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severe CMCs. The violation of security limits entailed by CMCs can be withstood without 
damages up to a certain point. In the case of power line overloads, currents above the 
maximal rating are often tolerable for several minutes. Conductor temperatures augment 
within a few minutes allowing operators to take alleviating measures. It is worth mentioning 
that cascading failures can happen directly after CMCs occur. However, it is assumed that 
lasting CMC are more critical. Therefore, an average probability തܲ௠௖ (t) during a centered 
window of duration ܶௐ is deemed more appropriate than the instantaneous one.  
തܲ௠௖  (t) ൌ
׬ ௠ܲ௖ (ݐ)௧ା்
ೈ
௧ . ݀ݐ
ܶௐ  
(3.32)
 
This probability evolves with time, reaching peaks and troughs. It is far too much 
information for assessing vulnerability on a global basis. The temporal information regarding 
CMC probability is not relevant in this case. The maximum average probability ෠ܲ௠௖  during the 
simulation period is more appropriate since it focuses only on the highest probability peak. 
෠ܲ௠௖  ൌ ݉ܽݔ௧ሾ തܲ௠௖ (t)ሿ (3.33)
 
3.6 Severity assessment 
 
The severity of plausible CMCs for a given SPTS is assessed on the basis of a contingency 
analysis. It is a familiar method in network planning and static security assessment. This 
analysis is based on an AC power flow model of the network in appendix 9.1.3. The two main 
output of contingency analysis are the intensity of branch current along transmission lines and 
voltage magnitude at buses. In sound electric power systems, these two electric measures are 
maintained within security boundaries. In steady-state conditions, currents must be kept 
below its maximum value in order to limit the temperature of conductors below their 
maximum allowable temperature. Voltage at buses must also be kept around the nominal 
voltage to avoid tripping of electric components. CMCs can provoke exceeding of these 
boundaries because most of the networks are planned to withstand only single outages. The 
following conditions on the current of power line ݈ and the voltage of bus ݅ must be respected 
to consider the electric power system in a normal state. Currents and voltages are complex 
numbers whose units are respectively ampere and kilo-volt. Only their magnitude is 
constrained.   
หܫ௟ห ൏ ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  (3.34)
෠ܸ ௜ ൌ หܸ
௜ െ ௡ܸ௢௠௜ ห
௡ܸ௢௠௜
൏ ௔ܸௗ௠௜  (3.35)
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Where ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  is the absolute rating branch current and ௔ܸௗ௠௜  the maximum admissible 
deviation of bus voltage expressed as a percentage of the nominal voltage. The deviation 
outside the security limits are transformed into severity indexes. It measures the plausibility of 
elements direct tripping due to exceeding security limits. By construction, the severity index 
is bounded between 0 and 1. The lower limit coincides with CMC involving no current or 
voltage exceeding. The upper limit corresponds to a severe situation where the element 
undergoes major exceeding leading to its disconnection from the network because of security 
systems or physical damages. The relation between current overloads, voltage deviations and 
severity is assumed linear as illustrated hereunder. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The two components of the severity index 
 
      The severity of each CMC from the set of ߁௠  is measured by two indexes. First, the 
current severity index ܵܥ௠௖ (݈)is related to the branch current of line ݈.  
ܵܥ௠௖ (݈) ൌ 0 if หܫ௟ห ൑ ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  (3.36)
ܵܥ௠௖ (݈) ൌ
หܫ௟ห െ ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟
ܫ௠௔௫௟ െ ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟
 
if ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟ ൏ หܫ௟ห ൏ ܫ௠௔௫௟  (3.37)
ܵܥ௠௖ (݈) ൌ 1 otherwise (3.38)
Contingency analysis 
Current severity index  
 
Plausible CMCs 
Voltage severity index  
SPTS 
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Where ܫ௠௔௫௟  is assumed to be the current leading for sure to the disconnection of the line ݈.  
Second, the voltage severity index ܵ ௠ܸ௖(݅) is related to the voltage of bus ݅. 
ܵ ௠ܸ௖(݅) ൌ 0 if ෠ܸ ௜ ൑ ௥ܸ௔௧௜௡௚௜  (3.39)
ܵ ௠ܸ௖(݅) ൌ
෠ܸ ௜ െ ௔ܸௗ௠௜
௠ܸ௔௫௜ െ ௔ܸௗ௠௜
 
if ௔ܸௗ௠௜ ൏ ෠ܸ ௜ ൏ ௠ܸ௔௫௜  (3.40)
ܵ ௠ܸ௖(݅) ൌ 1 otherwise (3.41)
 
Where ௠ܸ௔௫௜  is assumed to be percentage of the nominal voltage which leads for sure to the 
partial or total disconnection of all the elements connected at the bus ݅ such as loads, 
generators, transformers or transmission lines. 
Both of the severity indexes do not take into account further disconnections known as 
cascading failures. Their complex dynamic is still not fully understood, although several 
modeling attempts have been made as mentioned in (Duenas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009). 
The partial composite index of severity ሚܵ௠௖ (݈, ݅) is calculated for each CMC of ߁௠(ܿ) as the 
weighted average of the current severity index of the power line ݈ and voltage severity index 
of the bus ݅. Both terms are normalized by the number of element susceptible to fail. In the 
case of current severity index, ܰℓ െ ݉ lines could be potentially overloaded above ܫ௠௔௫௟ . 
Regarding the voltage severity index, ࣶܰ can undergo a voltage deviation greater than ௠ܸ௔௫௜ . 
ሚܵ௠௖ (݈, ݅) ൌ  
ݓଵ
ܰℓ െ ݉ . ܵܥ௠
௖ (݈) + ݓ
ଶ
ࣶܰ . ܵ ௠ܸ
௖(݅) 
 
(3.42)
Where ݓଵ + ݓଶ ൌ 1 (3.43)
The total composite index of severity ܵ௠௖  is the sum of the partial one over all power lines ݈ 
and busbar  ݅. 
ܵ௠௖ ൌ  ෍ ෍ ሚܵ௠௖ (݈, ݅)
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ൌ  ݓ
ଵ
ܰℓ െ ݉ . ෍ ܵܥ௠
௖ (݈)
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
+ ݓ
ଶ
ࣶܰ . ෍ ܵ ௠ܸ
௖(݅)
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
 
(3.44)
 
The normalization introduced in (3.42) combined with the condition (3.43) impose that the 
total composite severity index, or just the severity index ܵ௠௖ , is bounded in the interval ሾ0,1ሿ. 
The two weights change the influence of current overloads or voltage deviations on the 
severity index and ultimately on the vulnerability index. Both types of severity index can be 
treated separately by setting one of the weights to one and the other to zero. 
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3.7 Vulnerability quantification 
 
The proposed metric of vulnerability has two major properties.  First, vulnerability stems 
from probable and severe CMCs.  These two factors must both be present to threaten the 
security of supply.  Therefore, the vulnerability induced by a given CMC is assumed to be the 
product of its probability by its severity as defined Chapters 3.5 and 3.6.  This definition of 
vulnerability is similar to the popular risk definition (Varadan and van Casteren, 2009). 
Second, vulnerability is extensive.  Namely, the vulnerability of a set of CMCs is the sum of 
the vulnerability of each CMC.  These two properties are at the base of the vulnerability index 
and are presented in the following subchapters.  
 
Figure 11: Overview of the vulnerability quantification 
 
 
 
3.7.1 Vulnerability indexes 
 
The vulnerability index represents the overall vulnerability of a STPS impacted by a 
SEWE. It is defined as the sum of the vulnerability induced by each CMC of the set ߁௠.  The 
individual vulnerability stemming from each CMC is simply the product of its probability 
തܲ௠௖  (t) or ෠ܲ௠௖  by the composite index of its static severity ܵ௠௖ .  Two indexes are derived for the 
two types of probability.  The temporal probability തܲ௠௖  (t) combined with  ܵ௠௖  leads to the 
temporal vulnerability index denoted by ܸ(ݐ). 
ܸ(ݐ) ൌ ෍ ෍ തܲ௠௖  (t). ܵ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 
(3.45)
Severity ܵ௠௖  
Probability ௠ܲ௖  
Vulnerability index and matrix 
Set of CMCs  ߁௠ 
Π CMC ߁௠(ܿ) 
Vulnerability of  ߁௠(ܿ) 
Σ  ܿ ൌ ܿ + 1 
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This vulnerability index describes the temporal evolution of vulnerability. Peaks of 
vulnerability occur when extreme weather impacts vulnerable zones of the power system. 
This index permits to highlight the periods of vulnerability for a better understanding of the 
source of vulnerability. 
The aggregated vulnerability index ܸ has the same form as (3.45), but the maximum 
probability ෠ܲ௠௖  is used instead of the temporal one. 
ܸ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෠ܲ௠௖  . ܵ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 
(3.46)
This vulnerability index aggregates the vulnerability induced by each of the CMC present 
in the set ߁݉.  This index allows the comparison of vulnerability levels of combinations of 
SPTS and SEWE.  The absolute value of vulnerability is difficult to interpret and likely to be 
very small due to low probabilities of CMC expected in a real system.  On the contrary, the 
difference in vulnerability indexes among combinations of SPTS and SEWE allow their 
ranking on a vulnerability scale.  SPTS with a lower vulnerability index guaranties better 
security of supply, and can be designated as better alternatives for future development of the 
electric system.  
The aggregated vulnerability index has to be used with caution, because the vulnerability 
assessment is partial and limited to a subset of all possible CMCs.  Only a minority of all 
possible CMCs are taken into account.  Indeed, a screening method is required to select some 
of the most probable CMCs from the tremendous number of all possible CMCs.  It entails that 
the set Γ୫ is not necessarily the same for different SPTS and SEWE due to the screening 
method.  This is a serious bias impairing the use of this index for ranking.  In order to rank 
and compare different combinations of SPTS and SEWE, a common set ߁௠ should be utilized 
for all simulations.   
The vulnerability comparison index ܸ௖ allows gauging vulnerability against a scenario of 
reference. This scenario could represent a SPTS undergoing no particular extreme weather 
conditions where most of the plausible contingencies have no common modes.  The ratio of 
vulnerability is transformed by the logarithm to base 10 to facilitate its interpretation in terms 
of order of magnitude.  
ܸ௖ ൌ ݈݋݃ଵ଴ ቆ
෠ܸ
෠ܸ ௥௘௙ቇ (3.47)
The vulnerability ෠ܸ ௥௘௙ of the reference scenario is derived from the procedure described in 
Chapter 3.5. However, temporal unavailability ܷ௟(ݐ) of power lines is replaced by their 
average unavailability ഥܷ௟ in normal weather conditions. The aggregated indexes of 
vulnerability are normalized by the number of CMC of each multiplicity to avoid biases 
induced by different numbers of CMC for each combination of scenarios. The normalized 
index of vulnerability ෠ܸ  can also be scaled by the probability ܲ௘ of the SEWE if this 
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information is available. This allows different levels of plausibility of SEWE to be taken into 
account. This probability is set to one for the scenario of reference, and also in other scenarios 
where there is insufficient information.  
෠ܸ ൌ ܲ௘. ෍ 1
௖ܰ௠௖௠
෍ ෠ܲ௠௖  . ܵ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 
(3.48)
The vulnerability comparison index allows evaluation to be performed to determine 
whether the level of vulnerability is sufficiently high to justify the search of countermeasures. 
When ܸ௖ is close to zero, it would mean the vulnerability level during a SEWE is in the same 
order of magnitude as in normal weather conditions. In this case, countermeasures would not 
be easily justified. On the contrary, a ܸ௖ above one would indicate that countermeasures 
should be envisaged, and the necessity would continue to rise along with the comparison 
index.  
 
3.7.2 Matrix of vulnerability 
 
The vulnerability index is of little use at the time of identifying suitable countermeasures to 
reduce vulnerability.  The vulnerability matrix addresses this problem by locating the 
vulnerable zones of the network.  This matrix decomposes the vulnerability index into two 
dimensions.  The first is the transmission lines included in CMCs, and the second is the 
transmission lines undergoing violation of security limits.  This matrix can be seen as a cause 
to consequences diagram, which is a convenient way to characterize and locate the root of 
vulnerability.  This matrix simplifies the complex relations between CMCs and violations of 
security limits projecting them onto network infrastructures such as transmission lines and 
buses.  Two types of matrix are required to properly describe vulnerability.  First, the 
aggregated matrix of vulnerability ܯ௏ characterizes the relations between CMCs and 
violations as follows: 
ܯ௏ ൌ ൫ݒ௞,௟,௜൯ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෠ܲ௠௖ . ሚܵ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
. γ(k, m, c) (3.49)
Where            ߛ(݇, ݉, ܿ) ൌ ቐ
ଵ
௠ , ݇ ߳ ߁௠(ܿ) 
0, otherwise
 
(3.50)
With               ݇ ߳ ࣝ ൌ ൛1, … , ܰℓൟ, ݈ ߳ ࣦ ൌ ൛1, … , ܰℓൟ,  ݅ ߳ ࣜ ൌ ൛1, … , ࣶܰൟ (3.51)
The element ݒ௞,௟,௜ of the three dimensional matrix has the coordinates (݇, ݈, ݅).  The 
coordinates ݇ and ݈ represent transmission lines and ݅ the buses.  The first dimension is the 
lines included in CMCs, which cause violations of security limits.  The other two dimensions 
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are respectively the violations of security limits for current overloads and voltage deviation.  
The term ሚܵ௠௖  is the partial composite index of severity as defined by (3.42).  The function ߛ 
projects equally the vulnerability of each CMC ߁௠(ܿ) onto the power lines ݇ belonging to 
߁௠(ܿ). 
One interesting property of the matrix ܯ௏ is that the sum of its elements over its three 
dimensions is equal to the aggregated vulnerability index ܸ. Appendix 9.3 details the 
demonstration. 
෍ ෍ ෍ ݒ௞,௟,௜(ݐ)
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
ൌ ܸ (3.52)
This equation shows that the matrix of vulnerability ܯ௏ is a projection on its three 
dimensions of the vulnerability index without loss of information.  In theory, the matrix of 
vulnerability ܯ௏ is appropriate to identify suitable countermeasures.  In practice, its three 
dimensions are a burden.  Two dimensional matrixes are much more convenient when it 
comes to representing them.  This can be accomplished easily by setting one of the weights 
for  ݓଵ or ݓଶ  of the partial composite index of severity at zero and the other at one.  In this 
case, current overload and voltage deviations are treated separately.  
The matrix of vulnerability has the following form when only the current overloads are 
taken into account. 
ܯ௏ ൌ ൫ݒ௞,௟൯ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෠ܲ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
. ܵܥ௠
௖ (݈)
ܰℓ െ ݉ . γ(k, m, c) 
(3.53)
When         ݓଵ ൌ 1  and  ݓଶ ൌ 0 
 
(3.54)
The matrix of vulnerability is simplified as follows when only voltage deviations are taken 
into account. 
ܯ௏ ൌ ൫ݒ௞,௜൯ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෠ܲ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
. ܵ ௠ܸ
௖(݅)
ࣶܰ . γ(k, m, c) (3.55)
When          ݓଵ ൌ 0  and  ݓଶ ൌ 1 
 
(3.56)
All developments detailed here have been presented for the aggregated matrix of 
vulnerability using the maximal probability ෠ܲ௠௖ .  Similarly, the temporal matrix of 
vulnerability is formed by replacing ෠ܲ௠௖  by the temporal probability ഥܲ௠௖  (t).  This matrix 
characterizes the temporal evolution of the relations between CMCs and violations of security 
limits.  It is useful to picture the causes of vulnerability at a time of particular interest (such as 
peaks of vulnerability) as in the application of Chapter 5.2.2.  
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3.7.3 Zones of vulnerability  
 
The matrixes of vulnerability link transmission infrastructures in CMCs to infrastructures 
enduring their severe consequences in terms of violation of security limits.  These matrixes 
are helpful in locating vulnerable zones by visually examining them.  However, their size can 
be cumbersome in certain cases, and their level of detail is too high to allow a quick 
understanding of the causes of vulnerability and also for the search for measures to reduce the 
vulnerability. 
For this purpose, the elements of matrixes of vulnerability are aggregated in ܰ௭ zones of 
vulnerability.  They group the transmission lines in CMCs and the power lines and buses 
enduring violations of security limits, respectively.  Elements that are strongly linked are in 
the matrix of vulnerability while in the same zone of vulnerability, whereas elements that are 
poorly related should be in separate zones. Elements contributing negligibly to the 
vulnerability can be discarded to simplify the search of pertinent zones of vulnerability. The 
following paragraphs explain a method for identifying these zones.  
The set ࣴ୮ contains the indexes of transmission lines and buses of the p୲୦ zone.  The 
number of zones ܰ௭ is an initial estimate corresponding to a plausible number of zones.  The 
set ࣴ୮ is defined as the Cartesian product of subsets containing indexes of the transmission 
lines and buses.  The set ࣝ୮ contains indexes of transmission lines included in CMCs while 
ࣦ୮ and ࣜ୮  indexes transmission lines and buses enduring violations of security limits.  
 ࣴ୮ ൌ ࣝ୮ ൈ ࣦ୮ ൈ ࣜ୮ (3.57)
Where 
ࣝ୮ځࣝ୯ ൌ ׎, ࣦ୮ځࣦ୯ ൌ ׎, ࣜ୮ځࣜ୯ ൌ ׎ 
׊ ݌, ݍ ߳ ሾ1, ܰऊሿ and ݌ ് ݍ (3.58)
And ራ ࣝ௣
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
ൌ  ࣝ, ራ ࣦ௣
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
ൌ  ࣦ, ራ ࣜ௣
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
ൌ ࣜ (3.59)
 
Conditions (3.58) imply that subsets ࣝ୮ and ࣝ୯ are disjointed.  Conditions (3.63) imply 
that the union of all ࣝ୮ contain all elements of ࣝ. These conditions are also valid for the 
subsets ࣦ୮and ࣜ୮. 
Measures of vulnerability also have to be defined.  First, the zonal vulnerability index is 
the sum of vulnerability stemming from any sets ࣝ୮, ࣦ୯ and ࣜ୰. 
V୮,୯,୰ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෍ ݒ௞,௟,௜
௜ఢࣜ౨௟ఢࣦ౧௞ఢࣝ౦
 (3.60)
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According to (3.52), the sum of all components of the matrix of vulnerability ܯ௩ equals the 
vulnerability index  ܸ. Given the conditions (3.58) and (3.59), the sum of each zonal 
vulnerability index V୮,୯,୰ over all subsets ࣝ୮, ࣦ୯ and ࣜ୰ is also equal to ܸ.  
The vulnerability index ܸ can also be decomposed into two separate components, the intra 
zone overall vulnerability and the inter zones overall vulnerability: 
A portioning of the matrix of vulnerability in zones of vulnerability is defined as optimal 
when the intra zone’s overall vulnerability is maximal.  According to (3.62), an optimal 
portioning also leads to a minimized inter zone’s overall vulnerability.  Therefore, the 
transmission line and bus indexes are distributed into the subset ࣝ୮, ࣦ୮ and ࣜ୮ to maximize 
the intra zone overall vulnerabilityV୧୬୲୰ୟ or minimize V୧୬୲ୣ୰. 
 
Distribute all ݇ ݐ݋  ࣝ௣, ݈ ݐ݋ ࣦ௣, ݅ ݐ݋ ࣜ௣ (3.65) 
Such as V୧୬୲୰ୟ maximized or V୧୬୲ୣ୰ minimized (3.66) 
With ݇߳ ࣝ, ݈ ߳ ࣦ,  ݅ ߳ ࣜ and ݌߳ ሾ1, ܰऊሿ (3.67) 
 
The choice of optimization algorithm is not unique and is left to the modeler as well as the 
number of zones of vulnerability ܰ௭.  By experience, the modeler is able to find near optimal 
portioning in a few minutes by hand.  However, automatic techniques could be used to 
automate this process.  It is not guaranteed they would be better than a manual method when 
taking into account the duration of development and implementation of the method. 
 
෍ ෍ ෍ V୮,୯,୰
ேऊ
୰ୀଵ
ேऊ
௤ୀଵ
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
ൌ ෍ ෍ ෍ ݒ௞,௟,௜
௜ఢࣜ௟ఢࣦ௞ఢࣝ
ൌ ܸ (3.61)
ܸ ൌ V୧୬୲୰ୟ + V୧୬୲ୣ୰ (3.62)
   V୧୬୲୰ୟ ൌ ෍ V୮,୯,୰
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
ൌ ෍ V୮
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
      such as p ൌ q ൌ r (3.63)
V୧୬୲ୣ୰ ൌ ෍ ෍ ෍ V୮,୯,୰
ேऊ
୰ୀଵ୰ஷ୯
ேऊ
௤ୀଵ௤ஷ௣
ேऊ
௣ୀଵ
 (3.64)
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Each zonal vulnerability index V୮,୯,୰ is an elementary brick of the system vulnerability. 
The zonal vulnerability ratio V୰ୟ୲୧୭୮.୯,୰ gauges the importance of each of those bricks as a 
percentage of the vulnerability index ܸ.  
V୰ୟ୲୧୭୮,୯,୰ ൌ  
V୮,୯,୰
ܸ  (3.68)
This ratio is fundamental when searching for countermeasures.  Zones of vulnerability 
(݌ ൌ ݍ ൌ ݎ) with the highest ratio are those in which countermeasures must preferentially be 
implemented.  After, these zones are named major zones of vulnerability (MZV).  This 
concept aggregates the outcomes of complex space-time calculations in a natural way.  It 
facilitates the search for countermeasures and can be easily illustrated by matrixes or maps.  
An example of matrix and zones of vulnerability is provided in Table 15 and the zonal 
vulnerability ratio in Table 16 of Chapter 5.2.1. 
All developments here are detailed for the zonal vulnerability index using matrix of 
vulnerability ܯ௏.  Likewise, the time-dependent zonal vulnerability index is formed by 
replacing ݒ௞,௟,௜ by its temporal counterpart ݒ௞,௟,௜(ݐ). 
 
3.8 Proposal of suitable countermeasures 
 
Vulnerability is an inherent property of real complex systems. It is difficult to imagine 
perfectly designing invulnerable systems as vast as transmission networks, especially when 
they are subject to a continuously changing environment.  However, reduction of vulnerability 
is an achievable objective, and after identifying of MZV, countermeasures can be proposed to 
diminish the vulnerability, subject to certain constraints.  
Extreme weather conditions are by definition rare and exhibit varying space-time patterns 
entailing two major points.  First, countermeasures should be effective during extreme 
weather events and useful during normal weather conditions.  That is, their acceptance will be 
higher if they are justified in more cases than simply situations that are unlikely to occur.  
Second, countermeasures are meant to reduce vulnerability regarding only a few SPTS and 
SEWE.  In an ever changing environment, these scenarios are at best a fraction of all possible 
scenarios.  It is hard or even impossible to evaluate a priori if the proposed countermeasures 
will be helpful during their useful lifetime.  There is no silver bullet for reducing the 
vulnerability of electric power systems, but it is believed that an educated guess is far better 
than a random one.  
The process of identifying suitable countermeasures is not straightforward because it is an 
open world problem.  This process produces resilient alternatives to the development plan of 
SPTS.  At the planning stage, the knowledge and skills of the modeler are of great 
importance.  However, the modeler must be guided in the search for countermeasures by a 
well defined process.   
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Figure 12: Methodology for suitable countermeasures proposal 
 
The search for countermeasures begins with the identification of MZV by the zonal 
vulnerability ratio from Chapter 3.7.3.  CMCs causing MZV are potential threats to the 
security of the electricity supply.  These contingencies are analyzed to determine the most 
threatening, which could initiate cascading failures or potentially lead to islanding of whole 
regions (Kumbale et al., 2008).  The main causes of vulnerability are then inferred based on 
those hazardous CMCs.  This stage also requires the intervention of the modeler’s expertise.  
For example, main causes could be lack of transmission line redundancy or bottlenecks.  
After, a strategy is developed to alleviate the main causes of vulnerability.  Here, a strategy 
refers to a set of guidelines directing the search for countermeasures. For example, a strategy 
could consist of connecting large power plants to high capacity 380 kV interconnection lines 
to relieve the 220 kV network.  
Subsequently, the strategy leads to the identification of suitable countermeasures, which 
are implemented in the STPS.  They are for instance new power line construction, network 
topology changes or augmented capacity transfer of power lines.  Countermeasures are 
conditioned to the following qualitative guidelines for suitability. 
 
 
 
Guidelines for 
suitability 
Identification and implementation 
of countermeasures in SETS 
 
Evaluation of the vulnerability 
reduction 
Proposal of countermeasures 
Major zones of vulnerability  
Another 
attempt 
No 
Yes 
Strategy of vulnerability reduction 
 
Main causes of vulnerability 
 
Substantial ? 
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• Technical feasibility  
• Usefulness during normal weather condition 
• Principle of parsimony of resources  
• Proportionality to the level of vulnerability  
• Compatibility with regulations and society acceptance 
• Effectiveness at reducing vulnerability 
 
First, the technical feasibility constraint is deemed fulfilled if countermeasures are not 
impractical, such as construction of superconducting cables over high alpine summits. 
Second, CMCs must be useful not only during extreme weather events, but also during 
normal weather conditions.  Extreme weather events are by definition rare, and CMCs 
endangering the security of the electricity supply are even rarer. Countermeasures would not 
be economically justified if they were only valuable in situations unlikely to occur.  
Therefore, countermeasures must be integrated as alternatives to development plans of 
transmission networks.  Third, the parsimony principle aims at saving human and material 
resources and matching them with the level of vulnerability.  For example, it would be 
inappropriate to triple all power lines of a network to reduce the vulnerability due to lightning.  
Furthermore, the compatibility of countermeasures with regulation and social acceptance is 
crucial.  This has been a major burden for the construction or modification of power lines 
over the past few decades in many countries.  Electromagnetic pollution of overhead power 
lines in addition to the visual impact on the environment need to be minimized for 
transmission lines to be erected within a reasonable timeframe (OFEN, 2009b).  Finally, 
countermeasures must be effective in reducing vulnerability, although no absolute level is 
required.  This list of guidance principles can be further extended, but are deemed satisfactory 
for addressing the current search for countermeasures. Kiessling et al. (2003) present a 
comprehensive overview of the issues mentioned before related to the planning and the 
construction of overhead power lines. 
The last point on the list is quantitatively evaluated by simulating countermeasure effects 
on the vulnerability index.  Practically, the countermeasures are implemented in the SPTS and 
the calculation of the vulnerability index from Chapter 3.7 is carried out.  The results of the 
simulations are then analyzed and interpreted to determine vulnerability reduction. 
Countermeasures significantly influencing the vulnerability are accepted as good alternatives 
to the development plan of the power system.  
Although no quantitative objective is required, the proposed countermeasures are able to 
reduce the vulnerability subject to a list of qualitative guidelines.  This is compatible with the 
objective of the vulnerability assessment, which aims to suggest relevant measures to improve 
the security of supply.  This methodology is not meant to draw definitive conclusions about 
what must be done, but rather screen suitable actions from possibilities according to a fully 
described methodology.  A thorough examination of countermeasure suitability can take place 
subsequent to this screening process.  
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4 Definition of scenarios for the application to 
thunderstorms 
 
This chapter demonstrates the building of plausible scenarios of power transmission 
system and extreme weather events, which model two extreme thunderstorm events. The first 
is constructed with data from past events recorded by sensors. The second is a simulated 
event of six cells crossing Switzerland. The scenarios of power transmission systems model 
the Swiss electric power system interconnected to the continental Europe transmission 
network. These scenarios are situated in 2006 and 2018 to study the evolution of vulnerability 
induced by the construction of new infrastructures of transmission and production. The 
parameters of the underlying electric, geographic and reliability models  are estimated based 
on currently available information.  
 
4.1 Context  
 
The vulnerability assessment methodology from Chapter 3 is applied to thunderstorms 
impacting the overhead power lines of the Swiss transmission network.  Thunderstorms have 
been chosen because of their capacity to cause common mode contingencies on transmission 
networks and because of their complex space-time correlations.  In the past, several blackouts 
have been triggered by lightning striking transmission lines.  For example, the Brazilian 
blackout of 1999 was initiated by thunderstorms disconnecting 440 kV lines leading to a 
maximum loss of load of 24 GW for a few hours (Gomes et al., 2004).  A list of blackouts 
triggered by thunderstorms is found in Knight (2001), Chapter 6.  Lightning is by far the most 
hazardous feature of thunderstorms regarding very high voltage lines.  Precipitation and 
strong wind are also present during thunderstorms.  However, they do not have as significant 
of an impact as lightning.  
Thunderstorms exhibit complex space-time patterns, which are ideal to illustrate the 
methodology.  Moreover, thunderstorms are likely to be more intense and/or frequent due to 
global warming as mentioned in of IPCC (2007), Chapter 12.  Actual climate evolution over 
the next few decades is debatable, and the prediction of a well-respected institution like IPCC 
must even be handled with care. 
The Swiss transmission network includes 220 kV and 380 kV lines passing over the Swiss 
territory.  This network is connected to the European transmission network stretching all over 
Europe and connecting large power plants to load centers. Within the next few years, the 
Swiss electrical power system will change.  According to the Swiss Federal Office of Energy , 
new transmission lines, topology changes and new power plants are planned to be built by the 
year 2018 (OFEN and ARE, 2001).  According to the same source, the consumption is also 
predicted to rise at a rate of around 1.5% per year.  The ongoing liberalization in Europe will 
modify the power flow patterns, especially between countries. The combined effects of power 
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system adaptations to increased consumption with the possible augmentation in extreme 
weather events could increase or change the zones of vulnerability.  
 
4.2 Scenarios of extreme thunderstorm event 
 
The scenarios of extreme thunderstorms events are a particular instance of scenarios of 
extreme weather event  (SEWE) as defined in Chapter 3.4.  The most hazardous feature of 
thunderstorms for transmission overhead power lines are lightning strikes.  Other features 
such as wind or hail are usually not intense enough to provoke damages.  Thunderstorms 
exhibit a very large range of space-time behaviors.  A thunderstorm event can consist of a 
single cell to meso-scale convective systems of several cells (Schmid et al., 1997).  Their 
direction, speed and striking rate vary significantly among events and within the same event.  
Thunderstorms are good candidates to illustrate the methodology of vulnerability assessment 
because of their complex space-time behaviors.  To study the effect of this variability, two 
scenarios of thunderstorm events are proposed.  The first scenario is based on the simulation 
of two groups of cells passing over Switzerland.  The second is the more intense past events 
recorded by lightning sensors in Switzerland over the past ten years.  These scenarios are 
based on cloud to ground lightning strikes, which are either collected by a lightning locating 
system or generated by computer simulations.  
 
Table 5: Cloud to ground lightning parameters 
Lightning strike n ܵ௡ ൌ ሼݔ௡, ݕ௡, ݐ௡ሽ 
Coordinate x of the strike n ݔ௡ 
Coordinate y of the strike n ݕ௡ 
Time at impact of the strike n ݐ௡ 
 
Each lightning strike is stored as a triplet of ground impact coordinates and time at impact.  
The coordinate reference system must be the same as for the geographic model of Chapter 
4.3.2.  The data is stored in a geodatabase of a GIS software (ArcInfo), which allows 
processing and visualization. These lightning strikes are used to evaluate the exposure of the 
transmission line segments defined in Chapter 3.4.  The general methodology of this chapter 
is adapted to the case of thunderstorm events.  
Lightning strikes are the results of spatiotemporal non-stationary processes driven by 
complex physical laws.  Thunderstorm cells continuously move in space while their shape 
changes and their lightning rate evolves with time.  It is not possible to fully reconstitute these 
processes from the sole resulting strikes.  However, it can be reasonably assumed that the 
lightning strikes are the outcome of the homogenous Poisson process for a given surface and a 
small duration.  This process generates a sequence of independent and identically distributed 
strikes in time and space (Box et al., 2008).  It corresponds to the case of a thunderstorm cell 
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moving relatively slowly and much larger than the location under investigation.  In these 
conditions, it is possible to approximate locally the ground flash density, which is the average 
number of strikes per unit of time and surface. This flash density is a pertinent measure of 
exposure influencing the failure process of transmission line segments. 
Practically, the exposure ܧ୪,௦(t) at exposure points is measured by the ground flash density 
derived from the lightning impacts.  This density is used by the reliability model to derived 
the rates of failure of segments of transmission line.  Formally, the ground flash density is the 
number of lightning strikes ܰΥ ൌ ܿܽݎ݀(Υ), counted at a distance closer than  ݀ா of the exposure 
point ݏ of transmission line ݈ of coordinates ൫ݔ௟,௦, ݕ௟,௦൯, divided by the surface defined by the 
circle of radius ݀ா.  
The lightning strike n belongs to the set ߓ if it fulfills the conditions ܥଵ and ܥଶ. 
Where the conditions ܥଵ(݊) and ܥଶ(݊) are true if these inequalities are satisfied: 
The first condition implies that lightning strikes belonging to ߓ must be at a maximum at  
Euclidian distance ݀ா of the exposure point ݏ.  The second condition imposes that lightning 
strikes belonging to Υ must occur during the time window ܶா centered in ݐ.  Therefore, the 
estimate of exposure in terms of ground flash density is a moving average of the number of 
lightning strikes occurring during ܶா.  The radius ݀ா and the duration ܶா have to be 
appropriately set to properly sample the underlying Poisson process.  If they are too short, no 
strikes will be counted, while the opposite will invalidate the assumption of a local Poisson 
process.  
The figure hereunder illustrates the calculation of exposure ܧ୪,௦(t) for a specific scenario 
defined in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3.  The exposure is calculated for the segment ݏ ൌ 11 of the line 
lൌ 81, namely SMUEHL2A-SWATTE2A-1 (blue), of the Swiss transmission network 2018. 
ܧ୪,௦(t) ൌ ܰ
஌
ߨ. ݀ாଶ
 
(4.1)
ߓ ൌ ሼ݊ א ߓ| ܥଵ(݊) ൌ ܥଶ(݊) ൌ 1ሽ (4.2)
ඥ(x୬ െ ݔ௟,௦)ଶ + (y୬ െ ݕ௟,௦)ଶ ൑ ݀ா  (4.3)
|ݐ௡ െ ݐ| ൑ ܶ
ா
2  (4.4)
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Figure 13: Illustration of segment exposure to lightning strikes 
 
The black circle of radius ݀ா ൌ 2.5 ݇݉ is centered on the exposure point of the segment 11 
(green point).  The red arrows represent lightning strikes during ܶா ൌ 7.5 ݉݅݊ centered in 
t ൌ 213 min.  These parameters are equal to those used for the application, see Table 11. 
According to the figure, eight lightning strikes respect the condition (4.2).  The calculation of 
exposure is therefore straightforward. 
 
4.2.1 Simulated event of an extreme thunderstorm 
 
This first scenario of an extreme thunderstorm event (SEWE 1) is based on one of the 
strongest and largest types of thunderstorm which can occur in Switzerland, namely 
mesoscale convective systems.  They are usually comprised of several cells moving from the 
West-South to the East-North. They last a few hours and have strong lightning activity as 
mentioned in (Schiesser et al., 1996). The most intense of these convective systems can be 
considered as extreme events.  
SEWE 1 has been simulated taking into account the important properties of mesoscale 
convective systems.  This scenario is far from reproducing all the complexity of real events, 
but the simulation aims at showing the possibility to use SEWE that are not based on past 
data.  It allows the assessment of vulnerability stemming from plausible weather events that 
could have occurred, which can be useful in case of events that have not been recorded 
ܧ଼ଵ,ଵଵ(t ൌ 213) ൌ 8ߨ (2.5)ଶ
ൌ 0.40 ൤ݏݐݎ݅݇݁ݏ݇݉ଶ ൨ (4.5)
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because they are rare or due to climate change.  
The simulated SEWE 1 parameters are reported in Table 6.  They are assumed plausible 
and extreme. The Schiesser et al. (1995) article contains precious information about 
mesoscale convective systems in Switzerland, and this article greatly inspired the parameters 
of SEWE 1.  
Table 6: Definition of SEWE 1 parameters 
Group 1 Group 2 
  Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4 Cell 1 Cell 2 
Initial position X [km] 516.153 529.857 462.3
5
464.888 680.099 715.629
Initial position Y [km] 106.137 73.145 86.34
2
23.403 92.94 80.759
Direction [°] 50 50 50 50 73 73
Speed [km/h] 60 60 60 60 40 40
Radius [km] 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Shape circle circle circle circle circle circle
Duration [h] 6 6 6 6 2 2
Flash rate [#/min] 14 14 14 14 14 14
 
The SEWE1 is composed of two groups of respectively four and two convective cells.  
Each of the groups has a vectorial speed, initial location and duration.   
Figure 14: Illustration of SEWE 1 
All the convective cells also have the same constant clouds-to-ground lightning rate.  
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Lightning strikes have been randomly generated in each cell taking into account their time-
dependent path.  The next map illustrates SEWE 1.  The lightning impacts are colored 
according to their striking time within a range of one hour. 
The number of lightning strikes reaches 23,603 after six hours.  Among those, 5,652 were 
at less than 2.5 kilometers from an overhead power line of the electrical scenario of the 
plausible scenario 2018 (PS 2018) defined in Chapter 4.3.  Appendix 9.4 exhibits more details 
of the SEWE 1.  In particular, the lightning strikes at less than 2.5 km and the time-dependent 
number of strikes around the transmission lines of the PS 2018. 
It is visually obvious that the SEWE 1 does not have all space-time correlations as in a real 
thunderstorm event.  However, the SEWE 1 shares some properties real events, which 
occurred or could occur in the future.  Zones of vulnerability which are still unknown could 
be disclosed by this simulated SEWE.     
 
4.2.2 Real past thunderstorms event 
 
SEWE 2 was recorded by a lightning detection system starting at 10 a.m. on June 27th, 
2001.  This event is the most intense found lightning strike database covering 10 years.  The 
detection system is owned and managed by the company Meteorage providing georeferenced 
data of lightning strikes in Switzerland and other European countries (Finke and Kreyer, 
2002).  SEWE 2 lasted 24 hours with several peaks of activity (see Appendix 9.4).  The 
sensors have sufficient average detection rate of 85% and an accuracy of 800 meters.  The 
detection rate in the mountainous regions is certainly lower than 85%.  These characteristics 
are largely sufficient for this application.  The next map illustrates SEWE 2.  The lightning 
impacts are colored according to their striking time within a range of four hours. 
 
Figure 15: Illustration of SEWE 2
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During the event, 14,067 lightning strikes were recorded and 5,354 were at less than 2.5 
kilometers of the transmission line of the PS 2018.  SEWE 2 is as intense in terms of strike 
number when compared to the simulated scenario SEWE 1, but lasted one day instead of six 
hours.  SEWE 2 shows complex space-time correlations.  The majority of the strikes are 
located in the southern part of Switzerland and in some limited zones in the northern part.  
The map of Appendix 9.4 shows lightning strikes at less than 2.5 km of power lines of the 
electrical scenario 2018. 
 
4.3 Scenarios of the Swiss electric power system  
 
Two plausible scenarios of the Swiss electric power system are crafted for 2018.  At this 
date, most of the transmission infrastructures mentioned in (OFEN and ARE, 2001) and new 
projects of hydro pumped-storage power plants stated by several Swiss electric utilities are 
expected to be operational.  These two plausible scenarios (PSs 2018) are for the summer 
peak and off-peak periods.  It is clear that the state of the system in 2018 will be different than 
those modeled in PSs 2018. The objective is not to predict the complete and true electric 
system, but rather plausible models are searched for this application. 
The PSs 2018 are models of the system as described in Chapter 3.3 by the scenarios of the 
power transmission system (SPTS).  It contains an electric, a geographic and a reliability 
model.  The PSs 2018 are crafted from modified data of the system of 2006.  Two SPTS in 
2006, named reference scenarios (RSs 2006) have been built to serve as a basis for the PSs 
2018.  The latter are the central part of the vulnerability investigation.  Nevertheless, the RSs 
2006 are also investigated in order to draw some comparisons between 2006 and 2018.  Care 
must be taken when comparing two different scenarios.  Indeed, the set of probable common 
mode contingencies (CMCs) are not the same due to changes in the transmission 
infrastructures.  Zones and levels of vulnerability are sensible based on the choices of these 
sets.  The evolution of vulnerability between 2006 and 2018 could stem from either intrinsic 
changes in scenarios or from the differences between CMC sets. The interpretation of the 
vulnerability analyses must take this fact into consideration. 
In the following subchapters, the RS 2006 and PS 2018 are described. They comprise two 
different electric and geographic models as well as a common reliability model.  
 
4.3.1 Electric model for RS 2006 and PS 2018 
 
The Electric Model is fully described in the methodology from Chapter 3.3, which is the 
central point of the severity assessment of the plausible CMC set.  This model is compatible 
with the AC power flow model and contingency analysis calculations.  The electric model is 
implemented for the Swiss transmission network connected to the continental European 
transmission network supplying around 450 million people . The Swiss transmission network 
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is without a doubt not an island, but rather imports, exports and transits of power flows 
through the Swiss borders are daily business (UCTE, 2008).  The interconnection requires the 
inclusion of  neighboring countries in the electric model.  Therefore, it requires important 
resources to be built from scratch.  Fortunately, this work has already been done and ready to 
use models are available at the TSOs.  They consist of instantaneous pictures or “snapshots” 
of the state of the system at a given time in the format of a text file.  The Swiss TSO 
Swissgrid has even provided a summer peak and off-peak snapshot of 2006.  This data is 
confidential and cannot be disclosed. In the remainder of this research, a careful selection of 
information has been prepared to ensure there are no infringements regarding confidentiality 
clauses.  Here is the list of data included in the snapshot. 
• Time and date of the snapshot 
• Buses name and their nominal voltage 
• Active and reactive power injection from generators and loads 
• Type of generators, i.e. PQ, PV, SB (including range of reactive power for PV) 
• Resistance, reactance, capacitance and conductance of transmission lines 
• Transformers and their electrical characteristics 
• Power line and transformer current ratings 
• Incident matrix connecting buses, power lines and transformers 
 
The two RSs 2006 are based on the summer peak and off-peak snapshots.  These two 
snapshots have been taken at 10:30h and 3:30h CET on July 19th, 2006.  Snapshots represent 
particular cases of the system including power line maintenances, which are numerous during 
summertime.  The transmission lines in maintenance changes from week to week if not day to 
day.  A vulnerability analysis performed on these particular states would give particular 
vulnerability results.  To have a better estimation of the intrinsic vulnerability, normative 
scenarios are considered.  This means that all infrastructure overhauls are not taken into 
account and active elements are fully operational.  Here is a summary of the modifications of 
the snapshots. 
• All power lines under maintenance are reconnected 
• All the hydro Swiss power plants are set to their maximum active power for the peak 
period 
• Swiss hydro power plants are turned off and pumps are turned on at their maximum active 
power for the off-peak period 
Transit flows at the Swiss borders also have to be adjusted to values close to what could be 
considered as plausible.  Past transit flows are available from the website  of the European 
network transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E, 2010).  Based on this 
information, it is assumed that Italy imports approximately 3 GW.  This value is considered as 
fixed in all the scenarios.  The transit flows have been adapted to satisfy the 3 GW export to 
Italy while ensuring plausible flows import or export to neighboring countries.  These 
adjustments are performed by modifying the power generation of four nodes in France, 
Germany, Austria and Italy.  These nodes are located near major areas of production and 
consumption.  
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In addition, a contingency analysis is performed on every element of the Swiss power 
system and the interconnection power lines to ensure that the RSs 2006 meet the N-1 
criterion.  In case of non-respect, minor changes of the power generation of critical power 
plants are carried out.  The table hereafter summarizes the main characteristics of the RSs 
2006 in terms of production, consumption, imports and border transits.  These values have 
been confirmed plausible by experts from several Swiss electric utilities. 
 
Table 7: Production, consumption and transit flows of RS 2006 for Switzerland 
Period Name Import Prod. Cons. CH->DE CH->FR CH->IT CH->AT
Summer peak RS SP 2006 -3097 8983 5887 213 267 2942 -325
Summer off-peak RS SOP 2006 774 3158 3933 -1132 -2026 2954 -570
  
The power unit of the table is given in megawatts.  Some relevant characteristics of the two 
2006 are reported in Appendix 9.5.1. 
The Plausible Scenarios (PSs) for 2018 integrate the new transmission and production 
infrastructures planned by 2018 for peak and off-peak periods.  It is a modified version of the 
RSs 2006 taking into account 57 network modifications, and 7 new or upgraded power plants 
for additional power of 3.6 GW.  The network modifications are mainly taken from the report 
of the transmission lines and supply security workgroup (OFEN and ARE, 2001).  Parameters 
regarding the new power lines and transformers have been gathered from scenarios provided 
by two Swiss electric utilities, BKW-FMB and Alpiq as well as direct contacts with their 
collaborators.  The loads are assumed to increase uniformly by 20% until 2018, which 
corresponds to a yearly rate of 1.5% (AES-VSE, 2006).  The rest of the continental Europe 
transmission network has been kept as in the RS 2006.  The PSs 2018 are only two plausible 
alternatives of the Swiss electric power system in 2018.  This scenario includes the 
infrastructures, which have a possibility to be operational at this date.  Details about this 
scenario are found in tables of Appendix 9.5.1.  An electric schema of the PS 2018 is 
presented in Appendix 9.5.2, and it includes comments about changes made to turn the RS 
2006 into the PS 2018.   
During peak periods, all hydro power plants are at their full capacity.  During off-peak, 
hydro power plants are off and the pumps are at their full capacity.  This explains the high 
consumption and imports during the night.  The N-1 criterion is met for both of the scenarios. 
Some productions have been lowered (-180MW) to satisfy this criterion.  The export to Italy 
in 2018 is not yet known.  However, the value of 3 GW assumed for 2006 is also plausible for 
2018 despite the new transmission and generation capacities.  Indeed, few new infrastructures 
are planned to increase capacity between Switzerland and Italy.  During off-peaks, power is 
mainly imported from Germany and France to cover the national consumption including 
pumped-storage power plants.  Indeed, the two countries dispose of extra generation capacity 
during off-peak hours, such as nuclear and coal-fired power plants.  During peak hours, the 
Swiss surplus of production is distributed into 3 GW to Italy and the rest to Germany and 
France.  It is worth mentioning that these border flows are physical and are not commercial 
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agreements.  For example, power generated in France can flow through the German border. 
The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the PSs 2018 in terms of 
production, consumption, imports and border transits. 
 
Table 8: Production, consumption and transit flows of PS 2018 
Period Name Import Prod. Cons. CH->DE CH->FR CH->IT CH->AT
Summer peak PS SP 2018 -5671 12711 7040 1412 958 2949 353
Summer off-peak PS SOP 2018 2877 5478 6674 -2275 -2423 2940 -1119
  
Swiss off-peak consumption is almost as high as the peak.  This is due to the construction 
of around 2.2 GW of pump-storage power plants.  They store the affordable off-peak energy 
to produce high value peak energy. Therefore, their justification seems more economic 
instead of being related to security of supply.  They require large off-peak imports, which 
could create congestion zones and thus vulnerable zones.  This encourages the investigation 
and identification of off-peak periods, which are usually not critical in the summertime.  
New power lines and network topology modifications are driven by new means of 
production, elimination of bottlenecks, adoption of new power flow patterns, rise in 
consumption, and better interconnectivity to neighboring countries.  Uncertainties regarding 
the evolution of these drivers and the investments they require are significant.  Therefore, the 
PSs 2018 are only possibilities, not predictions.  Therefore, the PSs 2018 serve as an 
illustration of the vulnerability assessment methodology and should not be considered as 
actual forecasts of the future Swiss transmission network.  
 
4.3.2 Geographic model of RS 2006 and PS 2018 
 
The geographic model contains the paths of the overhead power lines of the electrical 
model as defined in Chapter 3.3.2.  The geographic data was provided by two Swiss electrical 
utilities (BKW-FMB and Alpiq) for the western part of Switzerland.  The rest of the data was 
provided by the Federal Office of Topography by its model Vector 25 (Swisstopo, 2010).  
The reference coordinate system is the CH1903, which is the standard for official cadastral 
surveying, GIS applications and cartography in Switzerland.  The peak and off-peak RS 2006 
share the same geographic model.  The paths of the overhead power lines pass approximately 
by the middle point of the pylons.  The vulnerability assessment methodology does not 
require the same precision as in cartography (i.e. a few / ten meters away from the real 
position would not have significant consequences on the vulnerability). The following 
flowchart shows the construction process of the geographic model (GM) for the RS 2006. 
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Figure 16: Building of the geographic model of the RSs 2006 
 
The geographic model 2006 is quite easily built because all power lines of the electric 
model had at least one equivalent in the geographic data collected.  Only the lower voltages 
networks had to be erased as well as cables.  High voltage cables can be safely deleted 
because they are quasi invulnerable to extreme weather events and their total length is 
negligible compared to overhead lines.  
 
Figure 18: Zoom in the geographic model 2006
Collecting geographic data 
from various sources 
Erase <220 kV overhead power lines 
and cables. Remove duplicates 
Break lines into segments find their 
middle point or exposure point 
Name lines according to the EM and 
add attributes 
Add exposure point attributes 
Merging data into a single layer 
GM of the RSs 2006 
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Here above, a map illustrates a zone of the geographic model 2006 by zooming in the 
region of Bussigny in the canton of Vaud.  Power lines of 220 kV and 380 kV are shown as 
well as exposure points represented by red points evenly spaced at ݀௦ ൌ 2.5 ݇݉.  This map 
was generated by ArcInfo.  This software was used to build the GMs. 
The geographic model for the PSs 2018 is more difficult.  According to electric model 
(EM), new lines must be added or modified.  However, their path is not yet exactly known in 
totality.  Information about paths are scattered in diverse documents and can change year after 
year.  It is believed that the best has been done to find paths which are plausible considering 
available information. The following schema summarizes the crafting process of the 
geographic model 2018. 
 
 
Figure 17: Building of the geographic model of the PSs 2018 
 
Full maps of the geographic model 2006 and 2018 are detailed in Appendix 9.5.3 along 
with statistics of the geographic model and samples of lines and exposure points attributes. 
 
4.3.3 Hazard function of the reliability model 
 
The reliability model and the hazard function are formally described in Chapter 3.3.3. The 
hazard function ݄ transforms the exposure ܧ௟,௦(ݐ) of an exposure points ݏ into the rate of 
failure ߣ௟,௦(ݐ) according to some resistance parametersܴ௟,௦.  By definition, the rate of failure is 
the probability  ௙ܲ௟,௦ per unit of time ݀ݐ. 
Is it a new or modified 
compared to GM 2006 
Select line l of EM  2018 
 
No 
Create or change path according 
to available information 
GM of the RSs 2006 
Break lines into segments find their 
middle point or exposure point 
Rename lines according to the EM 
2018 and append attributes 
Store in the GM 2018 Append exposure point attributes 
 
Yes 
l=
l+
1 
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ߣ௟,௦(ݐ) ൌ ݄൫ܴ௟,௦, ܧ௟,௦(ݐ)൯ ൌ ܲݎ(ݐ ൑ ܶ ൏ ݐ + ݀ݐ | ܶ ൒ ݐ )݀ݐ ൌ
௙ܲ
௟,௦(ݐ)
݀ݐ ൎ
௙ܲ
௟,௦(ݐ, ∆t)
∆ݐ  
(4.6)
Where ܶ is a continuous random variable denoting the time to failure of the segment 
represented by the exposure point ݏ of the power line ݈.   ௙ܲ௟,௦ is the probability of the segment 
to fail between ݐ and ݐ + ݀ݐ knowing it was operational until ݐ. 
The evaluation of ௙ܲ
௟,௦(ݐ) in function of the exposure ܧ௟,௦(ݐ) and the resistance factor ܴ௟,௦ is 
derived from the next equation proposed by the handbook for improving overhead 
transmission line lightning performance (Phillips, 2004). The number of flashover FO(ݐ, ∆ݐ) of 
a segment of transmission line is the product of the ground flash density by a lightning 
performance factor. 
ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) ൌ ܩܨܦ(ݐ, ∆ݐ). ܮܲܨ  (4.7)
Where ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) is the average number of flashover during ∆ݐ around ݐ, ܩܨܦ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) is the 
average ground flash density during ∆t around ݐ, and ܮܲܨ is the lightning performance factor 
equivalent to the resistance factor ܴ௟,௦. It is constitutive to the design of the segment including 
pylons, conductors, isolators and shield wires. 
Flashovers designate short circuits between at least one phase conductor to the ground.  
They are due to direct lightning strikes on conductors or shield wires.  Every flashover entails 
the disconnection of the line until reconnection by automatic reclosing breakers or manually 
by operators. De Conti et al. (2006) shed the light on the mechanism underlying flashovers 
due to lightning strikes. 
According to Bessis (2007), if the number of occurrences of an event is very small, this 
number of occurrences is approximately equal to the probability of the event.  Therefore, if 
the number of flashovers respects (4.9), it is approximately equal to the probability of failure .  
ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) ൎ ௙ܲ௟,௦(ݐ, ∆ݐ) (4.8)
If         ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) ا 1 (4.9)
The condition (4.9) must also be respected for another reason. Indeed, ௙ܲ௟,௦(ݐ) is defined for 
non-repairable items while the probability of failures, derived from the number of 
flashover ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆t), is related to “repairable” items. According to Ascher and Feingold (1984), 
these two different types of probabilities are approximately equal when (4.9) is true.  
The ܩܨܦ is the number of lightning strikes ܵ(ݐ, ∆ݐ) during ∆ݐ in an area ܣ around the 
segment.  Therefore, ܩܨܦ is equal to the exposure ܧ௟,௦(ݐ, ܶா) as implemented in equation 
(4.1). 
ܩܨܦ(ݐ, ∆t) ൌ ܵ(ݐ, ∆t)ܣ ൌ ܧ
௟,௦(ݐ, ܶா) (4.10)
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with ܶா ൌ ∆ݐ (4.11)
Equation (4.7) combined with (4.8) and (4.10) yields to: 
௙ܲ
௟,௦(ݐ, ∆ݐ) ൎ ܧ௟,௦(ݐ, ∆ݐ). ܴ௟,௦ (4.12)
Therefore, the rate of failure (4.6) is approximated by: 
ߣ௟,௦(ݐ) ൎ ߣሚ௟,௦(ݐ) ൌ ܧ
௟,௦(ݐ, ܶா). ܴ௟,௦
ܶா  
(4.13)
 
The rate of failure of segments is function of their exposure, their resistance factor, and the 
time window ܶா of the sampling process of lightning impacts.  Methods for evaluating the 
resistance factor ܴ௟,௦ are has been thoroughly studied over the past 40 years. These methods 
requiring numerous parameters of transmission lines and time consuming simulations 
(Alberto Nucci, 2010). These methods are not well-suited at the time of resistance estimation 
of all segments of a large transmission network.  Therefore, some simplifications are required 
and in this case, it is assumed all the segments of transmission lines of the same nominal 
voltage, i.e. 220 kV and 380 kV, have the same resistance factor per unit of length.  These 
two voltages are considered separately because they significantly influence this factor.  
ܴ௟,௦ ൌ ݀௟,௦. ܴଵ  if ݈ is a 220 kV line (4.14)
ܴ௟,௦ ൌ ݀௟,௦. ܴଶ  if ݈ is a 380 kV line 
 
(4.15)
According to (4.7), the resistance factor can be evaluated knowing the number of 
flashovers and the number of lightning strikes counted during ∆ݐ around ݐ within a surface ܣ 
around the segment.  
ܴଵ݋ݎ ܴଶ ൌ ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ)ܩܨܦ(ݐ, ∆t) ൌ
ܨܱ(ݐ, ∆ݐ). ܣ
ܵ(ݐ, ∆t)  (4.16)
The two resistance factors have been estimated for the year 2005. It is assumed they will 
not significantly change until the year 2018. The terms of equations (4.16) are calculated for 
an average segment of 1km for the 220 kV and 380 kV networks.  
The number of lightning strikes ܵ௡௘௧ is estimated in a buffer zone of 2.5 km on each side of 
the transmission lines of the geographic model 2006. Then, this number is divided by the 
length of their respective network ܮ௡௘௧ in order to compute the number of strikes ܵ for the 
average segment. Practically, the number of lightning strikes has been evaluated by ArcInfo 
and the Meteorage database for 2005 which includes the geo-referenced cloud to ground 
lightning over Switzerland (Meteorage, 2010). 
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The number of flashover per kilometer is extracted from the annual statistics for 2005 of 
the Swiss transmission network (AES-VSE, 2005). The calculations of the resistance factors 
ܴଵ and  ܴଶare detailed in the table hereunder. 
 
Table 9: Calculation of the resistance factors scaled to two reference segments 
Unit 220 kV lines 380 kV lines Source
ܵ௡௘௧ # 14356 7730 ArcInfo analysis 
ܮ௡௘௧ km 4406 1919 ArcInfo analysis 
ܵ #/km 3.25 4.02 ܵ௡௘௧/ܮ௡௘௧ 
A km 5 5 Buffer width 
ܩܨܦ #/km2 0.65 0.8 ܵ/ܣ 
 ܨܱ #/km 1.6 כ 10ିଶ 5.6 כ 10ିଷ AES statistics 
ܴଵ, ܴଶ km ૛. ૝ כ ૚૙ି૛ ૠ. ૙ כ ૚૙ି૜ ܨܱ/ܩܨܦ 
 
Finally, the resistance factors of 220 kV and 380 kV segments per unit of length are: 
ܴଵ ൌ 2.4 כ 10ିଶ    and ܴଶ ൌ 7.0 כ 10ିଷ 
 
(4.17)
These resistance factors are rough estimates of the true value of the actual segments, 
because available statistics about flashovers are aggregated at the network level.  However, 
the order of magnitude of these values is sufficient to identify major zones of vulnerability.  
 
Figure 19: Evaluation of number of lightning strikes with ArcInfo 
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The transmission line length and exposure to extreme weather events are more contributing 
than resistance factors to the probability of CMCs.  As new data becomes available, these 
factors can be more precisely estimated. 
 
4.3.4 Reconnection rate of the reliability model 
 
The reconnection process puts transmission lines back in service after flashovers.  This 
process aggregates the actions of auto-recloser breakers, operator’s maneuvers or physical 
repair. As mentioned in Chapter 3.3.3, this process is modeled by a constant rate of 
reconnection.  In addition, it is assumed that the rate is equal for all power lines. 
ߤ௟(ݐ) ൌ ߤ௟ ൌ ߤ (4.18)
A unique and constant rate of reconnection is a harsh simplification.  In reality, automatic 
security systems are much faster at reconnecting lines than fixing teams.  A variable and 
distinct rate of reconnection would increase the complexity of the model and would stumble 
on the limited available outages data.  Indeed, they are generally not detailed enough to infer 
different rates of reconnection for each power line.  In addition, a more detailed modeling 
would not necessarily lead to different conclusions about the existence of major zones of 
vulnerability. 
The estimation of the rate of reconnection stems from statistical outage data.  If they are 
sufficiently detailed, a mathematic model of the reconnection process could be fitted by a 
linear regression or other methods as described in (Gross, 2003).  Unfortunately, the available 
statistics are too aggregated to perform the methods mentioned herein.  Indeed, the annual 
statistics of the Swiss electric network only contain the initial number of disconnected 
transmission lines by lightning strikes and the number of lines still disconnected after three 
minutes (AES-VSE, 2005).  However, it is sufficient to carry out an estimate of the 
reconnection rate since it is assumed constant in time.  
A process with a constant rate of reconnection follows an exponential distribution (see 
Appendix 9.2. The probability of reconnection after ݐ is given by: 
ܷ(ݐ) ൌ Pr(ܶ ൒ ݐ) ൌ ݁ିఓ.௧ 
 
(4.19)
Where ܶ is the random variable of time to reconnection of a transmission line.  Applying 
the logarithm function on both sides of the equation yields to: 
ܻ(ݐ) ൌ ܮ݋݃൫ܷ(ݐ)൯ ൌ െߤ. ݐ 
 
(4.20)
Therefore, the reconnection rate ߤ is the slope of ܻ(ݐ).  This model can be fitted to actual 
data by a linear regression to estimate ߤ.  If only two values are available, the regression is 
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transformed in simple slope estimation. 
̂ߤ ൌ െ ෠ܻ(ݐ
ଵ) െ ෠ܻ(ݐ଴)
ݐଵ െ ݐ଴  
 
(4.21)
Posing ܰ(ݐ), the number of lines still disconnected after ݐ from statistical data.  Assuming 
the ergodic hypothesis, the natural estimator of the probability of reconnection after time ݐ is 
(UCTE, 2008, Brémaud, 2001a): 
෡ܷ(ݐ) ൌ ܰ(ݐ)ܰ(0) 
 
(4.22)
According to these reports for the years 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, 594 disconnections 
caused by thunderstorms have been reported, and 92 of them lasted more than three minutes.  
 
Table 10: Number of outages caused by thunderstorms during four years 
࢚ ሾ࢙ሿ ࡺ(࢚) ࢁ෡(࢚) ࢅ෡(࢚) 
0 594 100% 0 
 180 92 15% -1.87
 
The estimate ̂ߤ of the rate of reconnection is straightforward applying (4.21) with the data 
from Table 10. 
̂ߤ ൌ െ െ1.87 െ 0180 െ 0 ൌ 0.010 
 
(4.23)
Two assumptions are made for the reconnection rate.  First, it is constant in time.  It 
requires that there is no discrimination between fast automatic security systems and slow 
manual operations.  The dynamics of the reconnection process are lumped into a single 
constant behavior.  Second, each power line has the same rate of reconnection.  It requires that 
short and long lines or aged and recent lines are reconnected at the same rate.  These 
assumptions could have an impact on the results of the vulnerability assessment.  However, 
simplifications are unavoidable to limit the complexity of the model.  In addition, data is rare 
at this level of detail and confidential if existent.  However, it is believed that the level of 
simplification is appropriate to this concrete case illustration.  
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5 Vulnerability assessment of the Swiss electric 
power system 
 
 
The vulnerability assessment is carried out for the scenarios of transmission systems 
impacted by the two extreme thunderstorm events defined in Chapter 4.  The main objective of 
this chapter is the identification of major zones of vulnerability. First, the probability of 
plausible sets of common mode contingencies is evaluated by space-time simulations. Then, 
the severity of the most probable contingencies is assessed by contingency analyses.  The 
vulnerability of the plausible scenario 20018 impacted by the simulated extreme thunderstorm 
event is fully analyzed with regards to temporal and aggregated vulnerability indexes in 
addition to the identification of major zones of vulnerability. Finally, zones of vulnerability 
are identified for the other combination of scenarios to allow the proposal of countermeasures 
in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Performing the simulations 
 
5.1.1 Main stages of the vulnerability assessment  
 
To carry out the numerical simulations of the vulnerability assessment described in 
Chapter 3, four major stages are required.  Stage A, the geographic models and the electric 
models of the scenarios of the power transmission system (SPTS) as well as the scenarios of 
the extreme weather event (SEWE) are crafted and implemented in databases as described in 
Chapter 4.  The parameters of the reliability model are appended to the geographic models.  In 
Stage B, the temporal unavailability of each transmission line is calculated by a numerical 
solving method.  The most probable power lines to fail are combined amongst themselves to 
generate the set ߁௠ of common mode contingencies (CMCs).  Then, their temporal 
unavailability is computed according to Chapter 3.5.  In Stage C, the severity of the most 
probable CMCs is evaluated by a contingency analysis presented in Chapter 3.6.   In Stage D, 
the vulnerability indexes and matrixes are computed and major zones of vulnerability (MZV) 
are identified according to Chapters 3.7. The following schema shows in which programs the 
four stages are implemented.   
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The GIS software ArcInfo allows the processing, visualization and storing of the 
geographic models and scenarios of extreme thunderstorm events.  Unfortunately, GISs are 
not made to conveniently handle time dependent problems.  Consequently, the temporal 
unavailability is performed under Matlab, which can handle with great ease any numerical 
problems regardless of their dimensions.  Matlab has a GIS toolbox allowing the loading of 
ArcInfo data and performance of basic functions.  Matlab has enough GIS capabilities to 
carry out the required calculations of transmission line unavailability.  In addition, Matlab 
assures the flow of data with the two other programs.  Nevertheless, all the functions 
implemented in Matlab scripts could have been programmed in ArcInfo or in another GIS 
environment.  This would require only some specific skills by the programmer.  On the 
contrary, the construction of electric model and the contingency analyses could not have been 
performed elsewhere, except for in a fully dedicated software of power system analysis such 
as Neplan.  Its advanced functions of editing and analyses are the results of years of 
development.  Real electric networks require professional software for their modeling and 
analysis because of their complexity and size.   
 
 
 
Figure 20: Stages of the simulations implemented in three software 
 
A.1 Construction of the geographic model of the SPTS 
A.2 Construction and storage of the SEWE  
A.3 Append reliability model attributes to the                      
geographic models 
 
ArcInfo Matlab Neplan 
A.4 Construction of EM of the two SPTS 
 
B.1 Computation of the unavailability of lines 
B.2 Identification of the set ߁௠ of probable CMCs 
B.3 Calculation of CMCs probability 
 
C.1 Contingency analysis to assess severity 
 
D.1 Calculation of vulnerability indexes and MZV  
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5.1.2 Parameters of the simulations 
 
A few parameters related to discretization processes have to be set before carrying out the 
simulation.  For example, computer-based simulations and SEWE require appropriate steps of 
discretization, which is often a trade-off between accuracy and calculation speed (Bossel, 
1994).  When steps are small, more details can be taken into account.  However, steps of 
discretization cannot be too small for two main reasons.  First small steps imply more 
memory and more calculations, which require higher computing resources.  Second, there 
exists a lower limit where smaller steps do not imply a significant discretization error.  
The geographical model from Chapter 3.3.2 is composed of lines divided into segments of 
length ݀௟,௦ represented by exposure points.  The length cannot be too small because it would 
significantly augment the number of segments and thus the duration of the simulation.  On the 
other hand, the length cannot be too large because the local variations of extreme weather 
events could not be taken into account.  Since most thunderstorm cells are larger than 10 km, 
a segment length of 2.5 km is assumed to be a reasonable compromise.  There is almost no 
risk that significant thunderstorms could pass between two exposure points of segments 
without being detected.  On the other hand, a shorter distance would not be likely to grasp 
more information about the space-time correlation of thunderstorms, which have a finite 
spatial resolution. 
In the calculation of the exposure as defined in Chapter 4.3.3, the influence distance ݀ா and 
size of the moving average window ܶா has to be defined.  Both of these parameters cannot be 
too small, otherwise too few lightning strikes would be detected and the evaluation of the 
exposure would not be representative of the actual thunderstorm.  If these parameters are too 
large, the local space-time patterns of thunderstorms would be averaged.  Again, the exposure 
would not be representative of the actual thunderstorm.  To get a good representation, the 
length and duration should be smaller than the space-time scale of a thunderstorm cell.  Most 
of the cells are larger than 10 km and they do not move faster 80 km/h or 1.3 km/min (Schmid 
et al., 1997).  The influence distance ݀ா is set at 2.5 km, which is a fraction of a standard cell 
size. On the other hand, a 10 km wide cell with a speed of 1.3 km/min takes 7.5 min to 
entirely pass over a given point.  It is proposed here to set the ܶா at 7.5 min.  If ܶா was set 
radically below 7.5 min, the number of strikes detected could be too low to be representative.  
The exposure would peak at each lightning strike and be zero otherwise.  If ܶா was set 
drastically above this value, the space-time dynamic of thunderstorms would be averaged and 
thus lost. The estimate of the exposure from scenarios based on lightning strikes limits the 
space-time dynamic.  Lightning strikes do not contain enough information to derive a smooth 
and complete exposure.  However, it is often the only appropriate data available in the case of 
thunderstorms.  
The differential equation (3.6) describing the temporal unavailability of transmission lines 
and the probability of CMCs of equation (3.31) are numerically solved under Matlab and its 
simulating platform Simulink. It allows the graphical modeling of systems and their 
constitutive equations. It provides a user-friendly environment to model complex systems in a 
natural way. The unavailability leading to the probability of CMCs is modeled by the 
following block diagram.  
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This system of equations is numerically solved using a variable stepsize Dormand-Prince 
method which is an adaptation of the fourth-order Runge-Kutta method presented in Chapter 
3.3.3. The stepsize ݄௡ାଵ, where n is the time, is controlled by the maximum local error ߜ 
(Dormand and Prince, 1980).  
h୬ାଵ ൌ 0.9 כ h୬ ൬
ߜ
߳௡ାଵ൰
ଵ ହൗ
 
 
(5.1)
Where ߳௡ାଵ is the estimated error caused by the discretization. The error ߜ has to be set to 
an appropriate value which is a trade-off between simulation speed and accuracy. After few 
numerical simulations, the temporal unavailability do not significantly change for ߜ ൌ 1ܧିଵଵ 
which is retained for the rest of the vulnerability assessment.  
Regarding the severity assessment from Chapter 3.6, three parameters must be set, i.e. the 
maximum current ܫ௠௔௫௟ , the maximum admissible voltage deviation ௔ܸௗ௠௜  and the maximum 
voltage deviation ௠ܸ௔௫௜ .  Chapter 2.3 of Knight (2001) helps to set credible limits for these 
parameters.  First, the maximum current is the current entailing the disconnection of the three-
phase circuit after several minutes. This maximum current is variable, but 140% of the rating 
current is credible.  From the same reference, a deviation of 5% of the nominal voltage could 
already entail equipment disconnection at the bus, while 10% is certainly fatal for most of the 
equipment. It is worth mentioning that the designation of transmission lines as 220 kV and 
380 kV lines is misleading since they are operated at 230 kV and 400 kV. Therefore, the 
voltage severity index is based in ௡ܸ௢௠௜ ൌ 230 or 400 kV .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Numerical simulations of the unavailability under Simulink 
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Here is a summary of the main parameters set above.  
Table 11: Definition of the main parameters of the simulation 
Segment length ݀௦ ൌ 2.5 ݇݉ 
Influence distance of the exposure ݀ா ൌ 2.5 ݇݉ 
Size of the moving average window ܶா ൌ 7.5 ݉݅݊ 
Maximum local error ߳௡ାଵ ൌ 1ܧିଵଵ 
Maximum current ܫ௠௔௫௟ ൌ 140% כ ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  
Actual nominal voltages ௡ܸ௢௠௜ ൌ 230 or 400 ܸ݇ 
Admissible voltage deviation ௔ܸௗ௠௜ ൌ 5% 
Maximum voltage deviation ௠ܸ௔௫௜ ൌ 10% 
 
5.1.3 Simulations 
 
The vulnerability assessment is performed on the reference scenarios 2006 (RS 2006) and 
plausible scenarios 2018 (PS 2018)  impacted by the simulated and past extreme thunderstorm 
events.  Some key figures of the four stages of simulations presented in Chapter 5.1.1 have to 
be shown before the results of the simulations.  
Stage B involves the calculation of probability of CMCs of the set ߁௠.  The number of 
CMCs is limited by the random access memory of the computer used.  Only the most 
plausible CMCs are investigated according to a screening process.  Indeed, the number of 
CMCs is rapidly growing with multiplicity ݉.  For a given ݉ ൒ 3, the number of possible 
combinations exceeds the memory of recent desktop computers.  Fortunately, as the 
multiplicity increases, the probability of CMCs becomes negligible.  For this application to 
thunderstorms, the multiplicity ݉ ൑ 3 has been considered credible. The number of CMCs 
investigated for peak and off-peak scenarios are similar. 
Table 12: Maximum number of CMCs vs. investigated CMCs 
 
    #CMCs maximum #CMCs investigated 
SEWE SEPS m=1 m=2 m=3 m=1 m=2 m=3 
SEWE 1 RS 2006 216 23220 1.7E+06 216 23220 43680
PS 2018 252 31626 2.6E+06 252 31626 43680
SEWE 2 RS 2006 216 23220 1.7E+06 216 23220 43680
PS 2018 252 31626 2.6E+06 252 31626 43680
                
    # investigated/# maximum       
SEWE SEPS m=1 m=2 m=3     
SEWE 1 RS 2006 100% 100% 2.6%       
PS 2018 100% 100% 1.7%       
SEWE 2 RS 2006 100% 100% 2.6%       
PS 2018 100% 100% 1.7%       
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For the multiplicity ݉ ൌ 1 and ݉ ൌ 2, all possible CMCs can be investigated.  On the 
contrary, only a fraction of the possible CMCs of multiplicity ݉ ൌ 3 can be analyzed.  
Nevertheless, the large majority of uninvestigated high multiplicity CMCs is very unlikely.  
The CMCs investigated are among the most probable even if some could have been 
discarded.  
The temporal unavailability of all investigated CMCs has been calculated and stored for 
further analysis.  This simulation takes at most a few hours on a modern desktop computer, 
and the duration is reasonable when taking into account the number of CMCs.  The number of 
investigated CMCs and the simulation duration could certainly be lower with improvements 
to the calculation algorithms. 
Stage C involves the severity assessment by contingency analyses.  Only the most probable 
CMCs of the set ߁௠  undergo the contingency analysis based on an AC power flow model. 
The screening is performed according to the cumulative sum criterion with ߙ ൌ 80% as 
described in Chapter 3.5.  The following table shows the ratio between the number of CMCs 
causing violations of security limits and the number of CMCs investigated.  
Table 13: Selected results of the contingency analyses 
  
    # CMCs on investigation # CMCs severe 
SEWE SEPS m=1 m=2 m=3 m=1 m=2 m=3 
SEWE 1 RS 2006 74 1760 2113 0 24 149
PS 2018 87 2212 2999 0 24 331
SEWE 2 RS 2006 55 970 1459 0 8 10
PS 2018 62 1260 1781 0 16 59
            
    # severe/# investigated     
SEWE SEPS m=1 m=2 m=3   
SEWE 1 RS 2006 0% 1.4% 7.1%     
PS 2018 0% 1.1% 11.0%     
SEWE 2 RS 2006 0% 0.8% 0.7%     
PS 2018 0% 1.3% 3.3%     
 
 
Only the peak period of the RS 2006 and PS 2018 suffers from violations of security 
limits.  The off-peak period apparently has sufficient margins to undergo CMCs without a 
problem.   This is certainly due to the lower night consumption.  As expected, single 
contingencies do not cause violation of security limits because of the N-1 criterion.  
Unsurprisingly, as the multiplicity increases, the ratio also increases.  However, most of the 
investigated CMCs by the contingency analysis do not cause violation of security limits.  
Only current overloads have been caused by these CMCs, and no voltage deviation outside 
the limits has been identified.  This is probably the consequence of PV generators 
constraining some buses voltage, the relatively low summer consumption and a fully 
operational network without overhauled transmission line.  
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Stage D is the core of the simulations as it relates to the vulnerability assessment (i.e. the 
indexes and matrixes of vulnerability as defined in Chapter 3.7).  The calculations involved in 
this stage are quite straightforward and do not engage a significant amount of computing 
resources. These calculations have been carried out by Matlab scripts. The results of Stage D 
are presented in the next chapter.  
 
5.1.4 Sensitivity analyses 
 
Sensitivity analyses have been performed on the main parameters or calculation methods 
liable to influence the simulation results.  First, AC power flow model has been replaced by 
its linear counterpart named DC power flow model (see Appendix 9.1.2).  The DC model is at 
least five times faster to the detriment of accuracy. The index of vulnerability is 
systematically lowered by 10% to 20% compared to the AC model.  This diminution stems 
from few CMCs whose severity is incorrectly evaluated.  Although the loss of accuracy is 
tolerable on average, some severe CMCs could be neglected leading to inappropriate 
conclusions.  Therefore, the DC model should only be used for screening the potential severe 
CMCs whereas the AC model numerically evaluates the level of severity.  
For the maximum current, the admissible and maximum voltage deviation of Table 11, 
they have a moderate influence on the level of vulnerability.  For example, a doubling of the 
maximum current lowered the vulnerability level by approximately 50%.  On the other hand, 
the location and relative vulnerability of MZVs is not sensitive to these parameters as long 
they are uniformly revised among power lines and buses. It implies that comparison of levels 
of vulnerability among different transmission system scenarios has to be performed with the 
same set of those parameters.  
The segment lengths have little influence on the simulation results as long as they are kept 
smaller than the space-time scale of thunderstorm cells.  In this condition, smaller segment 
lengths only augment the number of exposure points, and thus, the computing time. 
Consequently, segment lengths should be just smaller than the space-time scale to ensure a 
fair trade-off between simulation time and accuracy.  The influence distance of the exposure 
points and size of the moving average window are strongly linked with the space-time scale 
of thunderstorm cells. Their ratio should not be higher than the minimum space-time scale 
contained in the SEWE.  Otherwise, overlapping zones of influence among exposure points 
would average spatiotemporal information.  
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5.2 Vulnerability assessment of the PS 2018 impacted by the 
SEWE 1 
 
This chapter aims to identify major zones of vulnerability according to the metrics 
presented in Chapter 3.7.  First, the aggregated index and matrix of vulnerability are presented 
to locate the MZV of the PS 2018 hit by the SEWE 1.  Then, the temporal vulnerability index 
and matrixes are presented to get an idea of the vulnerability dynamic.  
 
5.2.1 Identification of vulnerable zones 
 
At this stage, the probability and severity of the all CMCs have been computed.  The 
aggregated vulnerability index ܸ , as defined by (3.46), is the sum over all CMCs and 
multiplicity of the product of the CMCs probability and severity.  The table hereunder shows 
the intermediate vulnerability index for the different multiplicity of CMCs. 
Table 14: Vulnerability index for the PS 2018 and the SEWE 1 
 
࢓ ൌ ૚ ࢓ ൌ ૛ ࢓ ൌ ૜ ࢂ 
0 2.0E-06 1.0E-06 3.0E-06 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the vulnerability is zero when m ൌ 1 since the N-1 criterion guaranties no 
overload in case of single failures.  On the contrary, CMCs of multiplicity 2 and 3 exhibit the 
same order of magnitude in vulnerability.  Triple contingencies tested entail less vulnerability 
than double ones.  This can be explained by the fact that only the most probable, but not all 
triple contingencies have been taken into account. On the other hand, their lower probability 
may compensate for their increased severity.  The absolute value of the vulnerability index 
has a limited interest since it is hardly interpretable.  Nevertheless, it is the foundation of the 
matrix of vulnerability and zonal vulnerability ratio (Chapters 3.7.2 and 3.7.3).  
The matrix of vulnerability of the PS 2018 can be found in Table 15.  Briefly stated, this 
matrix is the projection of the ܸ on two dimensions.  The first dimension (row) includes the 
transmission lines that are contained in CMCs.  This dimension can be seen as the cause of 
violation of security limits.  The sum of the columns is the vulnerability caused by each 
transmission line involved in CMCs.  Since no voltage deviations have been noted, violation 
of security limits are only current overloads.  The second dimension (column) includes the 
transmission lines that undergo overloads. This dimension can be interpreted as the 
consequences of the CMCs.  The sum of the rows is the vulnerability consequent to each 
transmission line with violation of security limits.  The map hereunder illustrates the 
projection of vulnerability to the transmission lines respectively involved in the CMCs and 
with violations of security.   
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Figure 22: Map of the vulnerable areas of the PS 2018 
 
 
The vulnerability seems visually concentrated into two geographic areas, and they are 
identified by the transmission lines inside their perimeter, which are contributing to the 
vulnerability.  These areas are both situated in mountainous regions with high hydro 
production and a relatively low consumption.  The area of vulnerability A stretches along the 
Rhône valley where more than 2 GW of hydro power plants are located.  On the other hand, 
the area B lies in the canton of Tessin constituted by steep and narrow valleys scattered with 
multiple power plants of several hundred megawatts.  
From the visual interpretation of Figure 22, the number of MZV is ܰऊ ൌ 2 because the two 
areas of vulnerability seem independent.  Therefore, they are good MZV candidates.  In order 
to formally identify these MZV, the method described in Chapter 3.7.3 has been applied to 
this concrete case.  The process of distributing transmission lines in the MZV has been 
performed manually. Indeed, the maximization of the intra-zonal overall vulnerability is 
obvious in this situation.  The following matrix of vulnerability is formatted to present the 
transmission lines belonging to the set ࣴ୮ ൌ ࣝ୮ ൈ ࣦ୮  of the MZV 1 and 2.  The transmission 
lines index is replaced with their name to facilitate understanding.   
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Table 15: Matrix of vulnerability and MZV 1 and 2 
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SBATIA1A-SCHAVA1A-1 3E-07 1E-07 1E-07 6E-07 
  
ࣝଵ 
SCHAVA1A-SROMAN1A-1 3E-07 1E-07 9E-08 5E-07 
SS.TRI2B-SVEYTA2A-1 2E-08 6E-10 2E-08 
SROMAN2A-SVEYTA2A-1 2E-07 3E-08 1E-07 3E-07 
SVALLO2A-FPRE.A2A-1   2E-07 2E-07 
SS.TRI2A-FCOR.S2A-1 6E-09 1E-08   2E-08 
SROMAN2A-SS.TRI2A-1   1E-08 1E-08 
SBICKI1A-SCHIPP1A-1 1E-07 7E-10 2E-08 1E-07 
SBICKI2A-SCHIPP2A-1 5E-08 8E-10 1E-09 6E-08 
SGSTAA2A-SMUEHL2A-1 1E-08 6E-11 2E-09 1E-08 
SCHAMO2A-SMUEHL2A-1 7E-10 3E-10 6E-08 7E-08 
SRIDDE2B-FCOR.R2A-1 2E-07 1E-07 1E-07 4E-07 
SRIDDE2B-SS.TRI2B-1 1E-07 8E-09 4E-08 2E-07 
SBATIA2A-SS.TRI2A-1   4E-07 4E-07 
SBATIA2A-SVALLO2A-2   2E-08 2E-08 
SBIASC2A-SLAVOR2A-1   2E-08 0E+00 
  
ࣝଶ 
SLAVOR1A-IMUSM11A-1 5E-09 3E-09 2E-10 9E-09 
SIRAGN2A-SSOAZZ2A-1 6E-09 4E-09 1E-09 2E-08 1E-08 
SMAGAD2A-SSOAZZ2A-1 7E-09 6E-09 2E-09 1E-08 
SGORDU2A-IMESM12A-0 5E-09 4E-09 1E-09 1E-08 
SAVEGN2A-SGORDU2A-1 3E-09 3E-09 7E-10 7E-09 
Sum rows 1E-06 9E-07 8E-07 5E-08 ∑ ൌ  3E-06
  ࣦଵ  ࣦଶ 3E-06  
 
 
The first MZV ࣴଵ is constituted by 15 transmission lines in ࣝଵ  (CMCs) and 3 lines in ࣦଵ, 
while the second ࣴଶ is composed of 6 lines in the set ࣝଶand 1 in the  ࣦଶ.  The sets ࣜ௣ are 
empty since no overvoltage has been detected by the contingency analysis.  The element of 
the matrix can be interpreted as the intensity of the link between lines included in CMCs and 
lines suffering from violations of security limits.  The sum of the columns and rows allows 
the identification of the transmission lines most responsible for the violation of security limits 
and those most frequently undergoing violation of security limits, respectively.  As 
demonstrated in Appendix 9.3, the sum of the matrix elements is equal to the aggregated 
vulnerability index of Table 14. 
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In general, the existence of MZV can be explained by two properties of weather and 
transmission systems.  First, the limited range in space-time correlations of EWEs preferably 
causes failures of nearby transmission lines.  Second, CMCs located in the same area are 
likely to provoke violations of security limits not far from this area due to the small electric 
distance.  Therefore, CMCs triggered by thunderstorms are likely to be grouped in the same 
vulnerable area which entails an augmented probability of violation of security limits 
compared to independent contingencies. Discarding space-time correlations leads to an 
underestimation of vulnerability.  
The zonal vulnerability ratio measures the aggregated link between transmission lines in  
ࣝ௣ and in ࣦ௤ as a percentage of the aggregated vulnerability index as defined by (3.68). 
Table 16: Zonal vulnerability ratio
 
  ࣦଵ ࣦଶ 
ࣝଵ 97% - 
ࣝଶ 1% 2% 
 
 
MZV 1 accounts for 97% of the vulnerability, while MZV 2 accounts for only 2%.  
Therefore, countermeasures should have priority in MZV 1.  The clustering process into two 
zones is optimal or near optimal since the inter-zonal overall vulnerability stems from  
ࣝଶ to ࣦଵ at only 1%.  This is the result of CMCs of multiplicity three taking place in the two 
MZV and causing violations of security limits only in MZV 1.  This situation is the 
consequence of the rule underlying the vulnerability projection used in matrixes of 
vulnerability.   It states that each transmission line in a CMC is equally responsible for the 
violation of security limits.  This allocation could be improved by taking into account the 
actual effects of each single failure. 
In a nutshell, the vulnerability of the PS 2018 impacted by SEwE 1 is mainly located in the 
MZVs 1 and secondly in MZV 2.  Countermeasures should be proposed in priority to the 
most vulnerable Zone 1. In general, vulnerable areas refer to fixed geographic region, while 
MZV are related to transmission infrastructures and are scenario dependent. In the present 
case, the two MZV coincide by construction with the mountainous areas A and B. It is not 
surprising that the MZV are in this type of terrain since it fosters high hydro production, low 
consumption, and does not facilitate the development of the transmission network.  Moreover, 
mountainous regions are prone to intense weather activity.  The results presented here show 
the ability of the methodology to quantify the vulnerability and identify its sources.  
 
5.2.2 Temporal analysis of the vulnerability 
 
In the previous subchapter, the aggregated vulnerability index is used to identify the 
vulnerability of the PS 2018 hit by the SEWE 1.  This index is timeless since it aggregates the 
maximum probability of each CMC.  On the contrary, the temporal vulnerability index gives 
an image of the vulnerability ܸ(t) at a given time as described by (3.45).  It shows that 
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vulnerability is a temporal function of the dynamic of the SEWE, the paths of the 
transmission networks and the power flows.  The temporal contribution of each CMC to the 
vulnerability comes from its time-dependent probability, defined by (3.32), since its severity 
derives from a unique SPTS.  Therefore, the evolution of the vulnerability is linked to the sum 
of probability ஼ܲெ஼ (t) of having double and triple CMCs, which are potentially severe CMCs. 
஼ܲெ஼ (t) ൌ ෍ ෍ തܲ௠௖  (t)
ே೘
௖ୀଵ
ଷ
௠ୀଶ
 
(5.2)
As shown in the following figure, ஼ܲெ஼ (ݐ) is fluctuating over time.  Peaks correspond to 
storms cells hitting larger portions of the network.  The process of reconnection is clearly 
apparent.  It limits the probability of CMCs and ensures a fully operable network once the 
SEWE 1 has passed.  
Figure 23: Temporal evolution of the vulnerability 
 
The temporal unavailability of three lines from different regions is also represented in 
order to associate the temporal vulnerability with the regions exposure.  The line Romanel to 
St-Triphon is located in Area A and its unavailability is denoted URomTri.  The line Lavorgo-
Musignano (ULavMus) is in Area B whereas the line Laufenburg-Lindenholz (ULauLin) is 
situated in the northern part of Switzerland.  
Two peaks of vulnerability are detected centered at ݐ ൌ 60 and ݐ ൌ 150 . The highest is 
caused by cells G1_C1, G1_C2 impacting the Area A and cells G2_C1 and G2_C2 hitting 
Area B (see Figure 22).  The second lower peak corresponds to the contact of cells G1_C4 
with Area A.  The vulnerability sunk close to zero when none of the two vulnerable areas are 
impacted.  At  ݐ ൌ 200, a peak in ஼ܲெ஼ is caused by thunderstorm cells passing through the 
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north of Switzerland, which has a dense transmission network.  However, this peak does not 
coincide with a surge of vulnerability since this part of the network is resilient to CMCs. 
The cause of the first vulnerability peak is corroborated by the temporal matrix of 
vulnerability and the two MZV as detailed in the following table. 
 
Table 17: Temporal matrix of vulnerability at 60 minutes 
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SBATIA1A-SCHAVA1A-1 8E-08 2E-07 2E-09 3E-09  3E-07 
  
ࣝଵ 
SCHAMO2A-SMUEHL2A-1 1E-08 2E-09    1E-08 
SRIDDE2B-FCOR.R2A-1 1E-08 2E-07 2E-09 2E-09  2E-07 
SRIDDE2B-SS.TRI2B-1 7E-09 7E-09 2E-09 8E-10  2E-08 
SBATIA2A-SS.TRI2A-1 1E-07     1E-07 
SBIASC2A-SLAVOR2A-1 8E-09 2E-09   3E-08 4E-08 
ࣝଶ  SLAVOR1A-IMUSM11A-1 8E-10 2E-10    1E-09 
SIRAGN2A-SSOAZZ2A-1      4E-08 4E-08 
Sum rows 2E-07 5E-07 5E-09 5E-09 7E-08 ∑ ൌ  8E-7  
  ࣦଵ  ࣦଶ   8E-7   
 
 
 
MZVs 1 and 2 at t=60 are not composed of exactly the same transmission lines as those detected in 
Chapter 5.2.1.  However, they are also situated in the same Areas A and B.  It is not surprising since 
temporal vulnerability is a subset of aggregated vulnerability at a given time.  The time dimension 
brings more information about the vulnerability.  It is variable and some particular times are prone to 
severe CMCs endangering the security of the electricity supply.  
 
Table 18: Zonal vulnerability ratio at 60 minutes 
 
ࣦଵ ࣦଶ 
ࣝଵ 89% 0% 
ࣝଶ 1% 10% 
 
The zonal vulnerability ratio for the two MZV indicates that MZV 1 is responsible for the 
majority of the vulnerability at t=60.  Despite the simultaneity of the thunderstorms in the two 
areas, CMCs of ࣝଶ contributes insignificantly to the vulnerability of  MZV 1.  Therefore, 
these two zones can be considered as electrically distinct when it comes to the effects of 
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contingencies.   
This example shows that vulnerability induced by an extreme weather event exhibits strong 
space-time correlations.  Therefore, it is important to take these correlations into account 
when assessing vulnerability to propose effective countermeasures.  The focus can be 
restricted to the fraction of the network showing signs of vulnerability. 
These results are close to those obtained by the timeless analysis.  The concept of time 
dependent vulnerability allows the modeler to have a better idea of the interaction between a 
SPTS and a SEWE as well as the capacity of the methodology.  However, a timeless analysis 
presents aggregated values that are readily interpretable in order to propose countermeasures 
for the whole period of the SEWE and not just for a given time.  
 
5.3 Vulnerability assessment of other scenarios 
 
The search of vulnerable zones is more robust if they are not only based on one pair of 
electric and weather scenarios.  Although, a quasi infinity of plausible cases exists, it is 
valuable to evaluate the sensitivity of the vulnerable zones to few other scenarios .  Two other 
SPTS are investigated in this section in the same way as in Chapter 5.2.1.  First, the RS 2006 
is a plausible scenario of the 2006 summer peak period.  This scenario aims at evaluating 
whether the two vulnerable Areas A and B of the PS 2018 are also present in the RS 2006.  
Second, the PS 2018 T is similar to the PS 2018, but the transit from Switzerland to Italy is 
lowered by 1500 MW.  In this case, most of the electricity exported from Switzerland heads 
to its northern border, which includes France and Germany.  This explores the effects of 
larger imports to northern Europe, which could take place when adverse weather conditions 
lower the production of large wind farms (EWIS, 2007).  The SEWE 2 defined in Chapter 
4.2.2 is mingled with the PS 2018 and RS 2006 to assess the vulnerability with a real past 
weather event.  The PS 2018 T is only combined with SEWE 1 to inspect the vulnerability 
changes induced by the new transit flows.  
In order to allow non-biased comparison of vulnerability levels for different scenarios, the 
vulnerability comparison indexes ܸ௖ have been computed based on the RS 2006 during 
normal weather conditions as described in Chapter 3.7.1. This scenario is based on three years 
of power line unavailability statistics for the Swiss transmission lines (AES-VSE, 2001-2003-
2004). It is assumed that all transmission lines have the same average unavailability. More 
details about the data and calculations are found in Appendix  9.6. 
The next table summarizes the simulations in terms of vulnerability indexes and zonal 
vulnerability ratio for the two MZV identified. They are located in the two vulnerable Areas 
A and B of Figure 22 related to the PS 2018 impacted by the SEWE 1. MZV and areas 
coincide for all combination of scenarios. Therefore, these terms are here rather 
interchangeable, even if MZV contain different sets of transmission line. The zonal 
vulnerability ratio ௥ܸ௔௧௜௢
ଵ,ଵ   and ௥ܸ௔௧௜௢ଶ,ଶ  indicate the percentage of vulnerability attributable to, 
respectively, Areas A and B.  The next column is the inter-area vulnerability ratio.   
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Table 19: Zonal vulnerability ratio focused on Areas A and B 
 
    ࢂࢉ ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚,૚  ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૛,૛  ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚,૛ + ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૛,૚  
SEWE 1 PS 2018 3.9 97% 2% 1% 
PS 2018 T 3.9 100% 0% 0% 
RS 2006 4.2 95% 4% 1% 
SEWE 2 PS 2018 3.4 72% 27% 1% 
RS 2006 2.8 0% 100% 0% 
 
 
A first observation is that the vulnerability comparison index ܸ௖ of the SEWE 2 are lower 
than SEWE 1.  This can be explained by the smaller number of lightning strikes of SEWE 2 
in the vicinity of transmission lines leading to less probable CMCs. Second, all combinations 
of scenarios are several orders of magnitude more vulnerable than the RS 2006 submitted to 
normal weather. It shows the capacity of extreme weather events to endanger the security of 
supply.   
It is worth mentioning that the probability of the two SEWE is assumed equal to one. It allows 
comparing scenarios regardless of their probability.  However, it is sensible to consider these 
SEWE as having low probabilities of occurrence during a single year. In this case, the 
vulnerability comparison index would considerably be lowered. For example, a time of 
recurrence of 100 years leads to a probability of 0.01, which diminishes the vulnerability 
comparison index by 2 orders of magnitude. The vulnerability of investigated scenarios would 
still be several order of magnitude higher than the RS 2006, subject to normal weather 
conditions.   
The PS 2018 T clearly has only one major MZV.  Compared to the PS 2018, there is a 
transfer of vulnerability from Area B to A.  It is not surprising since the transit to Italy, which 
passes mainly by Area B, is lowered to the detriment of the northern borders.  The non-
negligible power produced in Area A heads to the north instead of the south, which loading 
more transmission lines which are already vulnerable.  This also explains the change of rate 
from 97% to 100% in Area A in addition to an augmentation of ܸ.  From this example, Area 
B seems sensitive to transit flow to the south, while Area A is sensitive to power flows to the 
north.  
The PS 2018 impacted by the SEWE 2 has the same two vulnerable Areas A and B. 
Around one third of the vulnerability is located in Area B because the SEWE 2 is more 
intense in the southern part of Switzerland.  The Area A still accounts for most of the 
vulnerability. 
The past configuration of the network of RS 2006 also exhibits the two vulnerable Areas A 
and B.  However, the results are very dependent on the SEWE.  The most vulnerable area 
passes respectively from A to B for SEWE 1 to SEWE 2.  These two weather scenarios do not 
reveal the vulnerability of the RS 2006 in the same way as the PS 2018.  However, the two 
Areas A and B already existed in 2006. 
To conclude, vulnerable Areas A and B account for the totality of the vulnerability in all 
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combinations of scenarios.  These areas can be also considered as independent as 
demonstrated by the low value of the inter-areas vulnerability ration.  The modifications of 
the network between 2006 and 2018 do not change the areas of vulnerability.  The new 
transmission capacities are certainly balanced by the new pumped-storage power plants.  The 
two areas are both located in mountainous regions, and they are good locations to erect dams 
and hydro power plants.  At the same time, the population is limited by available land, which 
entails a relatively low consumption of electricity.  Large amounts of power have to flow out 
of these regions to the main center of consumption through a limited number of power lines.  
Transmission lines have to follow natural paths such as valleys and passes.  Apparently, these 
natural barriers contribute to vulnerability.  It is harder to devise a resilient transmission 
network capable of withstanding CMCs.  In these conditions, it is a challenge to find 
countermeasures capable of reducing the vulnerability at acceptable costs while respecting 
environmental regulations.  
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
The probability and severity of sets of plausible CMCs of five scenarios of the Swiss 
electric power system have been computed to assess vulnerability.  The probability is 
evaluated by space-time simulations of two SEWE impacting several SPTS.  These 
simulations take advantage of the adequate environment offered by Matlab and its GIS 
functionalities.  The severity is assessed by contingency analyses under Neplan for the most 
probable CMCs.  In the end, a fraction of the most probable CMCs generate current overloads 
whereas no overvoltages were detected.  Therefore, the methodology is able to screen the 
most relevant CMCs regarding vulnerability under extreme weather conditions. 
Two major zones of vulnerability have been identified based on the index and matrix of 
vulnerability developed in Chapter 3.7.  These zones of vulnerability exist in the scenarios of 
2006 and 2018, which suggests that there is an exogenous underlying cause of vulnerability 
such as topography.  Indeed, these zones are both situated in mountainous regions prone to 
thunderstorms combining high hydro production and limited natural paths for transmission 
lines.  Despite the new transmission infrastructure in the PS 2018, the vulnerable areas do not 
disappear, undoubtedly because of the increased hydro production. Nevertheless, 
countermeasures can be envisaged to reduce vulnerability of these two major areas of 
vulnerability.   
This application demonstrates that simulations of space-time correlations in extreme 
weather events combined with electric models of transmission systems leads to distinct and 
identifiable major zones of vulnerability.  The vulnerability is thus located in space and also 
in time.  The proposed methodology is able to reduce the complexity of system interactions to 
target countermeasures. The scenario-based methodology allows simulating any imaginable 
past or future situations, and this application is only an illustration of the methodology.  It is 
applied to plausible scenarios of the Swiss power system, which are not predictions.  
However, it is believed that some results can be generalized and are able to shed light on 
vulnerable areas of the Swiss electric power system.  
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6 Proposal of countermeasures to reduce 
vulnerability 
 
This chapter aims at searching for countermeasures to reduce the vulnerability of PS 2018. 
First, the context in which countermeasures take place is clarified as well as the constraints 
applying to them.  Second, the most hazardous major zones of vulnerability and its main 
underlying cause of vulnerability are identified to propose appropriate countermeasures.  
Finally, the reduction of vulnerability is assessed to judge the efficacy of the proposed 
countermeasures.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 5.2, two vulnerable areas were identified for the plausible scenario 2018 (PS 
2018). They also exist in the reference scenario 2006 (RS 2006) which suggest that these 
areas are constant over the years. The modifications to the transmission network brought to 
the PS 2018 do not reduce the vulnerability of these areas in case of thunderstorms. These 
changes aim at achieving different objectives leading to billions francs in investment within 
the next years. They are related to the connection of new hydro pump-storage power plants, 
while others permit a better interconnection to neighboring countries, the respect of the N-1 
criterion or the mitigation of congestions. Some of these new infrastructures will not be 
operational in 2018 whereas other alternatives will be adopted. Knowing the important efforts 
already planned in upgrading the system raises the question of whether it is be appropriate to 
reduce the vulnerability during rare extreme weather events.   
In order to get more insight, a seminar was organized with experts from two Swiss 
electrical utilities (Alpiq and BKW) and the Swiss TSO (Swissgrid). The details of the 
discussion are confidential, but general outcomes can be disclosed without breaking 
confidentiality clauses. In a nutshell, it was acknowledged that the risk of disturbances during 
extreme weather events (EWEs) is moderate and the cost of countermeasures should be 
economically justified by a significant reduction in vulnerability. It requires that 
countermeasures to assure the security of supply during EWEs are at the lower end of the list 
of priorities. This point can be further developed.   
First, security of supply during extreme weather conditions is only one dimension 
requiring investments in transmission networks. The rise in consumption and transit flows, the 
new intermittent sources of energy or aging infrastructures require urgent upgrades of the 
system. Resources including time, money and workforce are limited and they should be 
engaged in priority to urgent upgrades.  
Second, the Swiss transmission network has been built, operated and maintained during 
more than 60 years without large blackouts due to extreme weather conditions. Standards of 
construction, planning and operation standards are the results of year of experience of a 
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mature industry. Little can be done without expensive countermeasures, which are difficult to 
justify if only aim is to squeeze out a residual risk of disturbances.  
Nevertheless, vulnerability during extreme weather events could be lowered by a careful 
planning of the coming infrastructures. Their original purpose is to adapt the system to new 
conditions ensuring the security of supply during normal weather conditions. At the planning 
stage, several alternatives of development exist and those which lessen the vulnerability have 
an advantage. The electric system growth should also integrate the reduction of vulnerability 
during EWEs as a criterion. In this case, countermeasures should be considered as part of the 
normal development of the network.  
Summing up, the purpose of planning the evolution of mature power systems is to adapt 
the existing infrastructure to its new changing environment. This resource consuming task is 
the main priority. Years of experience and practice already assure a high level of security of 
supply during extreme weather conditions. Nevertheless, the residual vulnerability can be 
reduced by a careful planning of the future network structure. One key point is that 
countermeasures must be useful during extreme and normal weather conditions. 
Countermeasures are integrated in development plans under a relevant set of constraints. 
Among acceptable expansion alternatives, the most resilient in case of extreme weather events 
should be selected to guaranty the security of electric supply.  
 
6.2 Proposal of a more resilient alternative to the PS 2018 
 
The search of suitable countermeasures for vulnerable areas follows the method presented 
in chapter 3.8. First, the common mode contingencies (CMCs) of major zones of vulnerability 
(MZVs) 1 and 2 are categorized as low or high threats. CMCs are considered as low threats if 
they do not cause further equipment tripping such as transmission lines, transformers or 
power plants. On the contrary, high threats CMCs have the capacity of triggering further 
disturbances. This method screens the severe CMCs in function of their capacity of 
endangering the security of supply. In order to differentiate CMCs, a worst case approach is 
used consisting of a succession of contingency analysis disconnecting at each time the most 
overloaded transmission lines. If the disconnections lead to appearance of new overloads, the 
CMC is deemed as a high threat.   
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Figure 24: Categorization of CMCs potentiality to threat the security of supply 
 
Other methods take into account dynamical phenomena of equipment disconnection and 
the actions of operators and automatic security systems (Hardiman et al., 2004). However, the 
objective here is to focus on the few highly threatening CMCs to facilitate the understanding 
of the source of vulnerability. On the other hand, MZV with a significant proportion of highly 
threatening CMCs have the priority at the time of vulnerability reduction. This screening has 
been applied to the PS 2018 and its two MZVs induced by the SEWE 1 and 2.  
Table 20: CMCs as low and high threats 
 
    # total # low threat # high threat #high/#total 
SEWE 1 
MZV 1 303 251 52 17% 
MZV 2 52 52 0 0% 
SEWE 2 
MZV 1 46 42 4 9% 
MZV 2 28 28 0 0% 
 
 
The MZV 1 comprises 17% of high threat CMCs. This indicates that this zone should be 
considered as potentially threatening the security of supply in case of thunderstorms.  On the 
contrary, the MZV 2 shows no high threat CMCs. If overloaded lines trip off, it entails no 
further disturbances. Even if this zone is vulnerable, it is deemed as a low threat to the 
security of supply.  Moreover, the first zone concentrates most of the vulnerability, see Table 
19.  Therefore, the search of countermeasures should to be located in priority in the MZV 1.  
The main cause of the vulnerability of the MZV 1 is certainly the high hydro production 
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with negligible local consumption which forces long distance transfer of the production. The 
augmented network capacity of this zone is balanced by supplementary generations in 
Chamoson and Vallorcine. The Figure 30 of Appendix 9.5.2 helps to locate these places. It is 
worth mentioning that transmission line maintenance has not been taken into account. It 
usually takes place in summertime when thunderstorms are likely. Maintenances are certainly 
a factor amplifying the vulnerability.  
A first strategy could be the strengthening of capacity of the overloaded transmission lines 
in ࣦଵ of Table 15. This entails the change of 68 km of three-phase circuits to allow more 
current to flow. The implementation of this strategy in the PS 2018 is rather simple. The 
capacity of the three lines of the MZV 1 is increased at least to the maximum current caused 
by the CMCs. The advantages are that no supplementary overhead power lines or circuits are 
built. However, the augmentation of capacity requires lengthy and burdensome administrative 
procedures. Besides, these costly alterations would not be particularly useful during normal 
weather conditions where CMCs are not likely. Therefore, this strategy does not seem a 
credible alternative to the PS 2018.  
A more appealing strategy is the creation of supplementary paths of high capacity diffusing 
the hydro production to large centers of consumption. The objective is to drain out several 
hundred of megawatts, which can be adequately achieved by a 380 kV transmission line. In 
order to stick as close as possible to the guidelines of Chapter 3.8, the utilization of existing 
paths should be preferred. Two possible options could be an additional 380 kV circuit from 
Vallorcine to Cornier in France (SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A) to the existing 220 kV line or a 
line between Riddes and Rondissone in Italy. The second option is less appropriate since it 
requires at least the upgrading of a 220 kV line to 380 kV for more than 150 km while the 
first require an additional circuit on an existing path for less than 60 km. Furthermore, the 
shortest option directly connects the pumped-storage power plant of 600 MW in Vallorcine. 
An article published on the Alpiq website reports that a study is ongoing to evaluate the 
possibility to increase the installed capacity to 900 MW (ALPIQ, 2009). This augmentation of 
production capacity advocates in favor of the first option.  
A plausible alternative scenario of development, namely PSA 2018, is implemented 
including the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line. Few electric parameters of this line are required 
to assess the reduction of vulnerability. This new 380 kV circuit is assumed to be mounted in 
parallel with the existing 220 kV line. From the geographic model, the length of this line is 
about 58 km. According to (Aguet and Ianoz, 2004), a plausible resistance and reactance for a 
380 kV overhead line is respectively 0.02 and 0.3 Ohm/km. The maximum rated current is 
assumed as 1800 amperes, which corresponds to other transmission lines in the PS 2018. 
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Figure 25: Additional 380 kV line to reduce the vulnerability of the area A 
 
 
In this schema, 220 kV transmission lines are blue and the 380 kV are purple. The new 
380  kV (dotted) line is a new link between Switzerland and France. This line closes the loop 
around the Lake Geneva with the already existing 380 kV line from Bâtiaz to Bois-Tollot. 
The substation of Cornier is connected to a major 380 kV north to south axe in France and 
also near interconnection lines between France and Italy. The SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A is a 
new link between the hydro production of Valais and some major consumption centers. 
According to load flow calculation, this line carries 550 MW to Cornier by locally diverting 
power flows. The parallel 220 kV line is unloaded of 150 MW while the line Bâtiaz to Bois-
Tollot undergoes a reduction of 100 MW. The remainder of the power flows is mainly due to 
the increase by approximately 200 MW from Switzerland to France the power flow whereas 
the flows to Italy decrease of by approximately the same amount.  
The SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line is entirely located on the French territory. The 
proximity of the area A to the French or Italian borders raises the likelihood of binational 
measures which can seriously complicate their realization. The institution responsible of 
developing the transmission network in France is the transmission system operator RTE. Its 
agreement is necessary to envisage the installation of this transnational link. According to 
(OFEN, 2010), RTE considered negatively the construction of this line because they did not 
see its necessity. This opinion could change considering the augmentation of the installed 
capacity in zone A and the possible positive effect on vulnerability of the SVALLO1A-
FCORNI1A line. 
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6.2.1 Reduction in vulnerability 
 
The vulnerability of the PSCM 2018 is assessed in terms of aggregated vulnerability index  
ܸ and the zonal vulnerability ܸ௣ for the two MZV 1 and 2. The inter and extra zonal 
vulnerability is grouped in ܸூா.  The same sets of CMCs of the PS 2018 are used in the PSCM 
2018.  
Table 21: Reduction of vulnerability by the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line 
 
 Absolut Relative 
ࢂࢉ ࢂ ࢂ૚ ࢂ૛ ࢂࡵࡱ ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚  ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕૛  ࢂ࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕ࡵࡱ
SE
W
E 
1 PS 2018 3.9 3.0E-06 2.9E-06 5.9E-08 2.7E-08 97% 2% 1% 
PSCM 2018 -0.1 3.4E-10 0 3.4E-10 2.2E-13 0% 100% 0% 
SE
W
E 
2 PS 2018 3.4 4.9E-07 3.5E-07 1.3E-07 5.8E-09 72% 27% 1% 
PSCM 2018 1.6 9.2E-09 0 9.2E-09 0.0E+00 0% 100% 0% 
 
 
The supplementation of the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line reduces the vulnerability by 
several orders of magnitude.  For the SEWE 1, This line reduces the vulnerability by a factor 
of approximately 10’000. The vulnerability is comparable with the RS 2006 subject to normal 
weather conditions. The vulnerability of the MZV 1 vanishes while the one of the MZV 2 is 
drastically lowered. The inter and extra zone vulnerability also vanish. The vulnerability only 
stems from the hydro power plants in Biasca in Area B which is connected by three 220 kV 
lines. When two of the three lines trip off because of lightning, the remaining line is 
overloaded at 0.4% which can be considered negligible. The PSCM 2018 is nearly immune to 
the SEWE 1. The additional line located in Area A also diminishes the vulnerability of Area 
B by rerouting power flows. For the SEWE 2, the vulnerability is lowered by almost two 
orders of magnitude. The vulnerability of the MZV 1 is zero whereas the one of the zone 2 is 
only lowered. The inter and extra zone vulnerability is negligible. For both of the SEWE, the 
vulnerability of the areas A and B diminishes because of the additional line.  
The rerouting of approximately 550 MW by the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line drains 
power flows out of the vulnerable areas. Around 100 MW do not flow from the Areas A to B 
which diminishes its vulnerability. Approximately 200 MW is withdrawn from the 220 kV 
network in Area A leading to more resilience. The additional line free margins in many other 
lines of the region. It is possible that congestion could appear in the French network. But 
network changes of 2018 outside Switzerland have not been taken into account. 
For both of the thunderstorm scenarios, the vulnerability decreased by the addition of the 
SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line. Obviously, its effect on the Area B is lower than the Area A in 
which the countermeasure is located. However, this unique additional line is able to make the 
network more resilient in the two distant areas.  It is worth mentioning that this 
countermeasure proposal is an illustrative case of a limited number of plausible scenarios. 
This alternative scenario for 2018 aims primarily to illustrate the methodology by showing its 
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capacity to discover vulnerable areas, and searching for a way of alleviating them.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the CMCs suggests that Areas A is a bigger threat to the security of supply 
than Area B. Indeed, transmission line overloads of A could potentially lead to line and power 
plant disconnections. This is also compatible with the zonal vulnerability ratio which 
indicates the most of the vulnerability is located within Area A.  The vulnerability seems to be 
the consequence of the relative inadequacy between high local productions and transmission 
capacity. Both relate to the topography fostering dams and hydro power plants while 
hampering the construction of power lines. Although the PS 2018 is not completely immune 
to plausible CMCs, its level of vulnerability could be deemed acceptable. Indeed, complete 
immunity is not an achievable objective by reason of its inordinate cost. But if the 
vulnerability is deemed excessive, countermeasures can be proposed to reduce it. Because of 
the complex nature of the problem, the proposed alternatives of development should be 
considered as an illustration of the methodology and not as official recommendations. 
In the particular case of the PS 2018 subject to the SEWE 1 and 2, the construction of an 
overhead transmission line lowers the level of vulnerability of several orders of magnitude. 
The addition of the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line to the network vanishes the vulnerability in 
Area A and reduces greatly the one in Area B. Minor changes regarding the whole network 
can improve considerably resilience leading to better security of supply. The augmented 
network resilience could also benefit other scenarios not simulated here. For example, normal 
weather conditions coupled with transmission lines maintenances, as well as other extreme 
weather conditions such as winter storms.  
Even though the PSCM 2018 is a less vulnerable alternative than the PS 2018, the 
SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line has in all cases a lower priority compared to strategic network 
modifications included in the PS 2018. These changes are necessary to connect the coming 
pumped-storage power plants. Besides, these transformations assure a good level of security 
of supply during normal weather conditions. Nevertheless, the proposed alternative is a 
possible way of developing a more resilient transmission network.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the research. It starts with an overview and then 
the main findings are highlighted. After that, the main contributions and limitations are 
summarized.  Finally, possible future works are outlined. 
 
7.1 Overview of the research  
 
The objective of this research is the assessment of the vulnerability of transmission 
networks subject to extreme weather conditions. They provoke common mode contingencies 
of overhead transmission lines impeding the transfer of electricity from the production sites to 
distribution networks. These simultaneous failures endanger the security of supply because 
transmission networks are usually devised and operated according to the N-1 criterion, that is 
to say, to only withstand single outages. Therefore, common mode contingencies can cause 
exceeding security limits possibly leading to further disconnections of transmission 
infrastructures and large disturbances. The planning of network structure taking into account 
plausible and severe coincident outages assists in the reduction of vulnerability.  
In this research, the vulnerability is measured in terms of probability and severity of 
common mode contingencies aggregated into an index quantifying the overall level of 
vulnerability. The probability is a complex function of the space-time evolution of extreme 
weather events, the geographic distribution of transmission lines and the physical resistance 
the sometimes raging natural environment. Since the number of possible common mode 
contingencies is tremendous for real network, only the most probable are taking into account 
in the vulnerability assessment. The severity is evaluated by a contingency analysis based on 
an AC power flow model of the electric power system. This model calculates branch current 
through transmission lines and voltage at buses. It gives a static image of the network state 
since it assumes that all transients have vanished. The severity is an aggregated index 
composed by the combination of current overloads and unsafe voltage deviations.  
The vulnerability index is projected into two dimensions in order to identify weak zones of 
the network. This projection ends in the matrix of vulnerability. The first dimension consists 
of the transmission lines included in the most probable and severe common mode 
contingencies. The second contains the transmission lines and buses undergoing violation of 
security limits. The matrix of vulnerability allows simple linking of the infrastructures 
suffering from weather related outages to those which exhibit overcharges. Then, the 
transmission infrastructures of both dimensions are aggregated in major zones of 
vulnerability. They are independent regions of the network responsible of most of the 
vulnerability.  
Consequently, the causes of vulnerability of these zones are inferred to identify appropriate 
countermeasures for reducing vulnerability. They are possible actions to be taken if the 
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overall vulnerability is deemed excessive. For mature electric power systems, the risk of 
major disturbances is low because of past adverse experiences leading to reinforcement 
measures. In this case, countermeasures are likely to not be justified if they only are useful 
during rare extreme weather events. Therefore, countermeasures should be considered as 
alternatives to development plans of the system, and thus, also profitable during normal 
weather conditions. 
The approach used to model electric power systems and extreme weather events is based 
on scenarios. They allow the construction of a simplified but truthful replica of complex 
systems under uncertainty. Two types of scenarios are required to assess vulnerability. First, 
scenarios of extreme weather event store the space-time evolution of particular past or 
simulated weather events. The primary hazardous features threatening the physical integrity 
of transmission lines such as wind speed or lightning impacts compose these scenarios. They 
can be seen as a movie of the extreme weather event sweeping across the transmission 
network. The second type of scenario represents specific states of the electric power system 
under investigation. These scenarios are subdivided into three models. The electric model 
stores all the relevant electric characteristics of the power systems. It is based on an AC 
power flow model used in contingency analysis to obtain an evaluation of the severity of 
common mode contingencies. The geographic model locates each of the transmission line of 
the electric model over the territory. This model and the scenarios of extreme weather event 
are superimposed to estimate the transmission line exposure. Finally, the reliability model 
links the scenarios of extreme weather event with those of electric power system to estimate 
the probability of common mode contingencies. This model is composed by two opposed 
processes. First, the disconnection process mimics the behavior of transmission lines subject 
to weather in terms of rate of failure. On the other hand, the reconnection process simulates, 
in terms of reconnection rate, the automatic security systems or operators turning back on 
failed lines. The two rates are used to evaluate the temporal probability of each transmission 
line or any combinations of them of being unavailable.  
The methodology is applied to the Swiss transmission network in 2006 and 2018 impacted 
by two extreme thunderstorm events. Thunderstorms have been chosen because of their 
relative high frequency of occurrence and their complex space-time correlations. The Swiss 
electric power system will undergo major modifications within the next years and its 
transmission network will adapt to the rise in consumption, increasing transit power flows and 
new pumped-storage hydro power plants. These adjustments are an opportunity to assess the 
change in vulnerability between 2006 and 2018 to possibly propose alternatives to the current 
development plans. One has to insist that the objective of this application is not to draw final 
conclusions about the vulnerability of the Swiss transmission network. Rather, this 
application should be considered as an illustration of the methodology taking into account the 
most relevant characteristics of the Swiss network. 
Two major zones of vulnerability are found in the scenarios under investigation at peak 
demand. The existence of these zones in 2006 and 2018 suggests the main cause of 
vulnerability is not tackled by the modifications proposed by the scenario of 2018. It seems 
that the topography plays a key role in the vulnerability of these zones. Indeed, these two 
mountain areas are prone to the establishment of large hydro power plants and a low 
consumption whereas transmission lines are difficult to build a variety of reasons. It is worth 
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mentioning that the vulnerability of these regions is not so severe that they would require 
radical transformations. As a result, only one countermeasure has been proposed consisting of 
the addition of a 380 kV line mounted in parallel to an existent one. In this case, the 
vulnerability of both regions decreases by several orders of magnitude even in the remote one. 
This demonstrates that vulnerability can be reduced by minimal changes in the network 
structure.   
 
7.2 Main findings of the research 
 
The main findings of this research are summarized as follow: 
1) Most of the probable and severe common mode contingencies are composed by line 
close to each other. The limited range in the space-time correlations of weather events favors 
proximate lines failing simultaneously. Moreover, these lines are more likely to induce 
overloads when tripping off because of the electric proximity. These observations are valid to 
a certain extent for all type of extreme weather conditions and transmission networks. 
Therefore, the N-1 criterion could be broadened to an N-2 criterion for overhead transmission 
lines ending at the same substation, mounted on the same pylons or whose paths are closely 
parallel.   
2) Some areas regroup the majority of the probable and severe common mode 
contingencies and their hazardous consequences. These major zones of vulnerability are 
vulnerable areas in the electric power systems that have priority at the time of vulnerability 
diminution. A reduce number of network modifications are able to augment the resilience of 
several vulnerable areas. This is the case of the SVALLO1A-FCORNI1A line of the case 
study. This line alleviates the main cause of vulnerability by draining an important amount of 
power from loaded lines from two major zones of vulnerability. It is not guaranteed that such 
a relieving procedure can always be found in general, but it will likely be more beneficial on 
the long run than small local actions.     
3) A methodology based on scenarios is able to cope with the inherent complexity and 
uncertainty of interacting systems similar to those under examination. One of the key 
advantages of the scenario-based approach is that the modeler learns how the systems work at 
the time of building the cases. Scenarios are easily updated when new pieces of information 
are available, which is important the full range of information is rarely accessible from the 
initiation of research. Finally, all imaginable scenarios can be created.  This property allows 
prospective vulnerability assessments of electric power systems, even for extreme weather 
events which have not actually occurred in the past. 
4) GIS is of great help when building geographic models and calculating the exposure of 
segments. Without the use of the current GIS software, these tasks would have been 
extremely burdensome or even impossible. More generally, GIS could improve and facilitate 
the planning and operation of transmission networks. Although it is currently employed in 
electric utilities, its capabilities have certainly not been fully used.  Bridges between 
geographical sciences and electrical engineering could foster innovative solutions tackling 
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future needs of the industry. 
5) The methodology is implemented with standard GIS and power flow analysis software 
which are widely used in the industry and academics. Unfortunately, these two programs are 
not made to work together and problems of data integrity and coherence among models arose 
during the creation of scenarios and simulations. These problems were solved by investing in 
a remarkable programming and debugging effort. However, most of the resources should be 
invested in the development of representative and plausible scenarios as well as interpretation 
of results. As the application has shown, integrated and reliable software of vulnerability 
analysis could be readily developed to facilitate vulnerability assessments during extreme 
weather conditions.  
  
7.3 Main contributions and limitations 
 
The first main contribution consists of the evaluation of the subjective probability of 
common mode contingencies taking into account to the following characteristics: 
• Space-time correlations of extreme weather events 
• Geographic distribution of transmission lines 
• Time-dependent disconnection and reconnection processes of transmission lines 
These characteristics have never previously been associated in vulnerability assessments of 
large transmission network impacted by extreme weather events. The recourse to GIS as a 
basis for dynamic simulations is also quite a novel approach since it was mainly developed 
for static analyses such as cartography. The mixing of these three points allows a 
spatiotemporal evaluation of the unavailability of any transmission lines or any combinations 
of them. This is very important in case of extreme weather conditions since failures in 
common modes are likely and represents threats to the security of supply. Vulnerability 
assessments are enhanced by taking space-time dimensions into consideration.  
This leads to the second main contribution regarding the concept of major zone of 
vulnerability. First, the overall vulnerability is defined by the sum of partial vulnerability 
induced by common mode contingencies. Therefore, vulnerability is considered as an 
extensive property of transmission networks. It is defined as the product of the probability by 
the severity of a given power line contingency. Both of these vulnerability components are 
strongly related to space and time as shown above for the probability. In the case of severity, 
the space-time dimensions pertain to the location of production and consumption centers 
combined with the topology and capacity of the network. The association of the space-time 
dimensions of probability and severity leads to major zones of vulnerability. In this research, 
this intuitive concept has been openly defined in the methodological part and validated in the 
application. Major zones of vulnerability aggregate numerous outcomes of simulation in a 
unique fashion that facilitates the understanding of the causes of vulnerability and the search 
for countermeasures. 
One limitation pertains to the plausibility and relevance of the scenarios, exact states of the 
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Swiss and European electric power systems are not known exactly since they are dependent 
on multiple decisions made by numerous actors during the coming years. Equally important, 
extreme weather events are not predictable regarding the details required by the scenarios. 
The inherent uncertainty about complex systems and the difficulty to model them deter any 
predictions of vulnerability. However, the objective is much more reasonable since aims at 
assessing the vulnerability of plausible scenarios. This approach enhances the comprehension 
of the underlying mechanisms of the vulnerability and this knowledge is valuable at the time 
of devising strategic electricity infrastructures. 
Another limitation is the measure of vulnerability derived only on violation of security 
limits. The contingency analysis based on an AC power flow model gives a static picture of 
the state just after simultaneous contingencies. The vulnerability analysis is limited at the 
transmission network level. On the other hand, a thorough analysis should take into account 
the negative externalities for the society. It would require an evaluation of the consequences 
of contingencies which entails dynamic simulations.  
In contrast to some risk analyses, this vulnerability analysis is not able to evaluate the 
balance between costs of countermeasure and reduction of cost due to more resilient 
networks. Justification of countermeasures has to take place in a supplementary analysis 
considering the inherent uncertainties of the problem. However, the methodology provides 
guidelines fostering reasonable countermeasures.  
 
7.4 Future works 
 
The methodology presented in this thesis can be further improved in a number of ways. 
First, the disconnection process could take into account several mechanisms of failure acting 
at the same time, such as fugitive failures from short circuits or permanent failures due to 
mechanical damages. The reconnection process could also consider different mechanisms for 
fixing such automatic circuit recloser or actions of repair teams. The former is important 
when mechanical damages are likely as in during a hurricane. The second possible 
improvement concerns the subjective probability. Another possible candidate could be the 
fuzzy set theory, which properly deals with incomplete or imprecise information. Finally, the 
severity could be expressed in term of energy not served by evaluating the consequences of 
contingencies at the consumer level. 
Winter storms are possible threats to the Swiss transmission network. New major zones of 
vulnerability are likely to be discovered with this new extreme weather condition. Indeed, 
their space-time correlations and the winter power flows are markedly different than those 
studied in this research. It is also worth mentioning that global warming could radically 
change the climate for which the electric power system has been designed. Distribution 
networks should not be neglected since they are especially sensitive to environmental 
dangers.  
The methodology proposes a vulnerability assessment for planning purposes. It could be 
adapted to real-time or day ahead assessments. In these cases, the uncertainty about network 
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states and weather conditions would be reduced, and plausible contingencies could be taken 
into account to prepare and implement short term countermeasures.   
In the long run, electric power systems will change due to environmental constraints and 
new technologies. In a few decades, greener and smarter will describe the best of these 
systems. It is imaginable that intermittent and local sources of energy could partially supply 
consumers while the rest would be remotely provided via large center of production such as 
wind or solar farms. Information technology would connect and coordinate the different parts 
of the system to assure its safety and efficiency. This futuristic system would also be subject 
to new forms of vulnerability not yet known, and new tools will be required to design resilient 
hybrid systems combining information and energy. In these conditions, the use of dynamic 
simulations combining geographic and electric models would be appropriate to challenge the 
complexity of future vulnerability issues. 
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9  Appendix 
 
9.1   Power system analysis 
 
9.1.1  AC power flow model 
 
The derivation of the power flow equations starts with the bus admittance matrix of the 
network ௕ܻ௨௦. It is an n x n symmetric matrix describing a power system with n buses. It 
represents the nodal admittance of the buses in a power system. In a real network, it is quite 
sparse. The admittance ܻ௜,௝ between the bus ݅ and ݆ is derived from the single-line diagram of 
the network represented by their nominal ߨ equivalent circuit in the per-unit system. Fuchs 
presents a method to build this equivalent circuit and the admittance matrix from the 
parameters of Table 3, see Chapter 7 of (Fuchs and Masoum, 2008). Since transmission 
networks are normally operated with balanced three-phase circuits, the calculation of only one 
phase is necessary. Indeed, the other phases just lag or lead with a phase of ±120°.  
In order to derive the power flow equations, the admittance is defined as: 
ܻ௜,௝ ൌ  ܩ௜,௝ + ݆ܤ௜,௝ (9.1)
Where ܩ௜,௝, ܤ݅,݆  are respectively the conductance and susceptance between bus ݅ and ݆. The 
voltage V୧ at bus ݅ is typically in polar coordinates. 
V୧ ൌ  หV୧ห. ൫ܿ݋ݏ൫ߠ௜൯ + ݆ ݏ݅݊ (ߠ௜) ൯ (9.2)
Where ߠ௜ is the angle of voltage at bus i. According to the Kirchhoff’s current-node law, 
At any bus ݅ of an electrical network, the sum of currents flowing into that bus is equal to the 
sum of currents flowing out of that node. 
ܫ௜ ൌ  ܻ௜,ଵ. Vଵ + ܻ௜,ଶ. Vଵ + ڮ + ܻ௜,ே. VN ൌ ෍ ܻ௜,௡. V୬
ே
௡ୀଵ
 
(9.3)
The net real ܲ௜and reactive ܳ௜ power entering the network at the bus is found by 
multiplying (9.3) by the complex voltage V୧כ, where * denotes the complex conjugate. 
ܲ௜ െ ݆ܳ௜ ൌ  ෍ V୧כܻ௜,௝V୨
ே
௝ୀଵ
 (9.4)
Substituting (9.1) in (9.4) and equating the real and reactive parts gives the equation of the 
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AC power flow model. Steps of calculation can be found in the appendix C of  (Wenyuan, 
2005).  
ܲீ௜ െ  ௅ܲ௜ ൌ  ෍หV୧ห. หV୨ห
ே
௝ୀଵ
. ൫ܩ௜,௝ ܿ݋ݏ൫ߠ௜,௝൯ + ܤ௜,௝ ݏ݅݊ (ߠ௜,௝) ൯ ൌ ݂௜ (9.5)
ܳ௜ீ െ  ܳ௅௜ ൌ  ෍หV୧ห. หV୨ห
ே
௝ୀଵ
. ൫ܩ௜,௝ ݏ݅݊൫ߠ௜,௝൯ െ ܤ௜,௝ ܿ݋ݏ (ߠ௜,௝) ൯ ൌ ݃௜ (9.6)
Where ߠ௜,௝ ൌ ߠ௜ െ ߠ௝ (9.7)
Subscripts ܩ and ܮ denote respectively generator and load.  
A system of nonlinear equations is built with these two equations for the ݊ buses. The two 
equations of the slack bus SB (݅ ൌ 1) are omitted because its voltage and angle are known by 
definition. For PQ bus, the active and reactive powers are known contrary to the bus voltage 
and phase angle. For the ݉ PV buses, the active power and voltage magnitude is known. In 
this case, the reactive power equation is omitted.  
ە
ۖۖ
ۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۖ
ۓܲ
ଶ ൌ ݂ଶ(|Vଶ|, … , |V୬|, ߠଶ, … , ߠ௡)
 ڭ
ܲ௡ ൌ ݂௡(|Vଶ|, … , |V୬|, ߠଶ, … , ߠ௡)
ܳ௠ାଶ ൌ ݃௠ାଶ(|V௠ାଶ|, … , |V୬|, ߠ௠ାଶ, … , ߠ௡) 
 ڭ
ܳ௡ ൌ   ݃௡(|V௠ାଶ|, … , |V୬|, ߠ௠ାଶ, … , ߠ௡) 
 
 
(9.8)
This system 2݊ െ ݉ െ 2 equations for 2݊ െ ݉ െ 2 unknown quantities can be solved with 
the Newton-Raphson methods which are fully described in Chapter 9 of (Grainger and 
Stevenson, 1994). Once the voltages and their angles are known, the transit from ݅ to j of 
power in the transmission line is given by 
ܲ௜,௝ ൌ  െܲ௜,௝ ൌ  หV
୧ห . หV୨ห
ܺ௜,௝ . ݏ݅݊ (ߠ
௜,௝) (9.9)
ܳ௜,௝ ൌ  ܥ௜. ቚV୧ଶቚ െ
ቚV୧ଶቚ
ܺ௜,௝ +
ቚV୧ଶቚ . ቚV୨ଶቚ
ܺ௜,௝ . ܿ݋ݏ (ߠ
௜,௝) (9.10)
Where ܥ௜ is the shunt capacitance and ܺ௜,௝ the branch reactance 
The derivation of these two equations are made in the Chapter 6.11 of (Sakis Meliopoulos, 
1988). They are valid for short and medium length transmission lines where the branch 
resistance is neglected. In the same reference, the generalized equations for (9.9) and (9.10) 
are also provided. The current flow from ݅ to ݆ is simply derived from the bus voltages and the 
 115 
 
line admittance by 
ܫ௜ ൌ  ܻ௜,௝. ൫V୧ െ V୨൯ (9.11)
9.1.2  DC power flow model 
 
A simplified linear model, the DC power flow model, allows faster calculations at the price 
of imprecision. This model can be used for fast screening of severe CMCs prior to a more 
time consumer AC power flow model. The DC power-flow is based on the following 
assumptions 
1) The voltage difference between two buses is small 
ݏ݅݊൫ߠ௜,௝൯ ൌ ߠ௜ െ ߠ௝ 
 
ܿ݋ݏ൫ߠ௜,௝൯ ൌ 0 
(9.12)
 
2) All voltages are assumed to be 1.0 p.u.  
Under these assumptions, (9.9) can be further simplified 
ܲ௜,௝ ൌ  െܲ௜,௝ ൌ ߠ
௜ െ ߠ௝
ܺ௜,௝  
(9.13)
ܳ௜,௝ ൌ 0 (9.14)
Since the power injected at a bus is equal to the power leaving the bus 
ܲ௜ ൌ  ෍ ܲ௜,௝
௝
ൌ ෍ ߠ
௜,௝
ܺ௜,௝௝
  (9.15)
Knowing the real power injection ܲ௜ and the branch inductance ܺ௜,௝, the angles difference 
ߠ௜,݆ are found by solving the linear system. The power transit from ݅ to ݆ in the transmission 
line is easily carried out by injecting the ߠ௜,݆ in (9.13). 
 
9.1.3  Contingency analysis  
 
Contingency analysis aims at assessing the static security of electric power systems when 
one or several of their elements trip off such as three-phase circuits, transformers, generators, 
loads or busbars. Thereafter, it is assumed that only power lines (three-phase circuit) can be 
disconnected due to extreme weather events. Several different methods of contingency 
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analysis have been reported in the literature. Many of them implement the network 
contribution factor method (Hongbiao and Kezunovic, 2005), which is fast but not accurate 
for high-order contingencies. Since this type of contingency is prevalent in this research, a 
contingency analysis based on an AC power flow analysis is retained. No approximation is 
made since a full power flow analysis is performed for each CMC. The method consists of the 
following steps: 
• Determine the parameters of the electric model (Chapter 3.3.1) 
• Identify the set ߁௠ of plausible CMCs (Chapter 3.5) 
• Perform a power flow analysis for each plausible CMC by disconnecting the 
correspondent power lines (Chapter 9.1.1) 
• Identify the resultant violation of security limits 
Two types of static security limits are considered for each CMC. First, the branch current 
must be below the maximum current ܫ௥௔௧௜௡௚௟  transiting in line ݈. Secondly, the bus voltage ܸ௜ 
must not deviate more than the admissible voltage deviation  ௔ܸௗ௠௜  around the nominal bus 
voltage ௡ܸ௢௠௜ . The following figure shows the process of the contingency analysis used for the 
CMC severity assessment of Chapter 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Process of the contingency analysis 
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9.2  Concepts from reliability theory 
 
Definitions 
Here is a description of the most important definitions of concept of reliability theory. 
Birolini gives an introduction of reliability theory which inspired this chapter (Birolini, 2007) 
The reliability or survival function is the probability that an item will perform its required 
function later than the specified time ܶ.  
 
ܴ(ݐ) ൌ Pr (ܶ ൐ ݐ) (9.16)
 
Where ܶ is a continuous random variable denoting the time to failure. The complement of 
ܴ(ݐ) noted F(ݐ) is the probability that an item will not perform its function later than ܶ. The 
reliability function and its complement are cumulative distribution functions. The probability 
density function ݂(ݐ) is the derivative of F(ݐ). 
 
݂(ݐ) ൌ ݀ܨ(ݐ)݀ݐ ൌ
݀ 
݀ݐ (1 െ ܴ(ݐ)) ൌ െ
ܴ݀(ݐ)
݀ݐ  (9.17)
 
The hazard function ݄(ݐ) is the probability that an item fails during ݀ݐ at time ݐ knowing it 
was functioning until ݐ. The hazard function is denoted by ߣ(ݐ) in the Chapter 3.3.3, also 
mentioned as the rate of failure. 
 
݄(ݐ) ൌ ܲݎ(ݐ ൑ ܶ ൏ ݐ + ݀ݐ | ܶ ൒ ݐ )݀ݐ ൌ
݂(ݐ)
ܴ(ݐ) 
 
(9.18)
The relation between the hazard function and the reliability function is given by 
ܴ(ݐ) ൌ ݁ି ׬ ௛(௨)ௗ௨೟బ  
 
(9.19)
Exponential model 
The exponential model is used in reliability engineering to model the process of failure or 
reconnection with a constant failure rate. This process is memoryless, namely items do not 
wear out with time. The probability of failure has the following formulation.  
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Probability density function: 
݂(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ ܲݎ (ݐ ൌ ܶ) ൌ ൜ߣ. ݁ିఒ௧ ݐ ൒ 00       ݐ ൏ 0  (9.20)
 
Cumulative distribution function: 
ܴ(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ ܲݎ (ܶ ൐ ݐ) ൌ ൜݁ିఒ.௧ ݐ ൒ 00     ݐ ൏ 0 (9.21)
 
Where ܶ is a continuous random variable denoting the time to failure of an item. 
Hazard rate function: 
݄(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ ݂(ݐ, ߣ)ܴ(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ ߣ (9.22)
On interesting property of the exponential model arises for a series of n items with 
constant failure rate. The resultant reliability function is the product of the item’s reliability. 
Independency among items is assumed. 
ܴௌ(ݐ) ൌ ෑ ܴ௜(ݐ)
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ෑ exp (െߣ௜. ݐ)
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ exp (t. ෍ ߣ௜
୬
୧ୀଵ
) (9.23)
Combining (9.18) with (9.23) yields to 
݄ௌ(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ
ܴ݀௦(ݐ)
݀ݐ
ܴௌ(ݐ) ൌ ෍ ߣ
௜௡
௜ୀଵ
 
(9.24)
The rate of failure of a system composed by items in a series with constant failure rates 
equals the sum of those constant failure rates. This property is very important when modeling 
systems of subsystems in series like in Chapter 3.3.3 when developing the reliability model. A 
similar approach can be used in the general case of a non constant hazard function or rate of 
failure. In this case, the reliability function is given by (9.19):  
ܴௌ(ݐ) ൌ ෑ ܴ௜(ݐ)
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ෑ ݁ݔ݌ ቆെ න ݄௜(ݑ)݀ݑ
௧
଴
ቇ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ൭െ න ෍ ݄௜(ݑ)
௡
௜ୀ଴
௧
଴
݀ݑ൱ (9.25)
By identification to (9.19), the hazard function of a system is 
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݄ௌ(ݐ, ߣ) ൌ ෍ ݄௜(ݑ)
௡
௜ୀ଴
 
(9.26)
 
Therefore, hazard function of a system composed by ݊ independent components in series is 
the sum of the component’s hazard functions. 
 
9.3  Equivalence between the index and the matrix of 
vulnerability  
 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the equality between the sum of the element of 
the matrix of vulnerability and the aggregated index of vulnerability: 
෍ ෍ ෍ ݒ௞,௟,௜
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
ൌ ܸ 
 
First, the element of the matrix are expressed as the sum of probability and severity for all 
CMCs of the set ߁௠. 
෍ ෍ ෍ ݒ௞,௟,௜
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
ൌ ෍ ෍ ෍ ෍ ෍ ෡ܷ௠௖  . ሚܵ௠௖
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
. γ(k, m, c)
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
 
(9.27)
The permutation of the sums yields to: 
ൌ ෍ ෍ ෡ܷ௠௖  . ෍ ෍ ሚܵ௠௖
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
. ෍ γ(k, m, c)
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
 
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 
(9.28)
According to (3.44) 
෍ ෍ ሚܵ௠௖
ேࣶ
௜ୀଵ
ேℓ
௟ୀଵ
ൌ ܵ௠௖  (9.29)
Therefore (9.28) can be further simplified: 
ൌ ෍ ෍ ෡ܷ௠௖ . ܵ௠௖ . ෍ γ(k, m, c)
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 
(9.30)
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By definition of γ, for any couple (݉, ܿ): 
෍ γ(k, m, c)
ேℓ
௞ୀଵ
ൌ 1 (9.31)
Thanks to (9.31), equation (9.30) can be further simplified: 
ൌ ෍ ෍ ෡ܷ௠௖ . ܵ௠௖ ൌ
ே೎೘೎೘
௖ୀଵ
ேࣾ
௠ୀଵ
 ܸ (9.32)
The equality between the sum of the element of the matrix of vulnerability and the 
aggregated index of vulnerability is demonstrated. 
 
9.4  Scenarios of extreme thunderstorm event 
 
The following map shows the lightning impact of SEWE 1 (blue) and 2 (green) at less than 
2.5 kilometers from the transmission network of the PS 2018. 
 
Figure 27: Map of lightning strikes close to transmission lines for SEWE 1 and 2 
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The two following graphs describe the evolution of the number of lightning impacts every 20 
minutes at less than 2.5 kilometers from the transmission network of the PS 2018.  
 
 
Figure 28: Lightning impacts at 2.5 km from transmission lines for SEWE 1  
 
 
 
Figure 29: Lightning impacts at 2.5 km from transmission lines for SEWE 2 
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9.5 Scenarios of power transmission system 
 
9.5.1 Characteristics of the electric models 
 
Here are some relevant characteristics of the RS 2006 and PS 2018. Table 22 shows the 
number of different components of the AC power flow model of the European transmission 
network of the RS 2006 and PS 2018. Table 23 presents the generator of the Swiss 
transmission system for the RS 2006 and PS 2018 according to their type and installed 
capacity. The generator name referred to the name of the bus where they are connected, see 
electric schema of Chapter 9.5.2. Highlighted generators are located in Areas A (light grey) or  
B (darker grey) of the schema.  
 
Table 22: Number of elements of the AC flow model 
  European network RS 2006 PS 2018
Coupler 611 19 19
Line 7753 211 248
Load 3426 61 75
Generators 946 39 52
Transformer 1368 16 25
Bus 6591 176 183
 
 
Table 23: Installed capacity in Switzerland (> 100 MW) 
Location Type RS 2006 PS 2018
Installed gen. 
capacity [MW] 
Installed pump
capacity [MW]
Avegno Hydro X X 120 0
Bâtiaz Hydro X X 180 0
Bavona Hydro X X 172 0
Beznau 1 Nuclear X X 391 0
Beznau 2 Nuclear X X 391 0
Biasca Hydro X X 424 0
Bitsch Hydro X X 330 0
Cavergno Hydro X X 108 0
Chamoson Hydro X 1200 0
Fionnay GD Hydro X X 312 0
Nendaz Hydro X X 384 0
Chandoline Pumped-storage X 140 -70
Gösgen Nuclear X X 1000 0
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Grimsel Pumped-storage X 800 -780
Handeck Pumped-storage X X 340 -50
Innertkirchen Pumped-storage X X 350 -10
Leibstadt Nuclear X X 1171 0
Limmern Pumped-storage X 1000 -1000
Mapragg Pumped-storage X X 300 -162
Mühleberg Nuclear X X 368 0
Pradella Pumped-storage X X 360 -360
Riddes Hydro X X 285 0
Fionnay FMM Hydro X X 150 0
Robiei Pumped-storage X X 160 -150
Stalden Pumped-storage X X 300 -165
Tierfehd Pumped-storage X X 400 -140
Vallorcine Hydro X X 186 0
Vallorcine Pumped-storage X 600 -600
Veytaux Pumped-storage X X 240 -240
 
 
9.5.2  Electric schemas 
 
The three following pages are dedicated to the electric schema divided in the west, central 
and east parts.  The schema is presented as a geographic map to help the localization of the 
infrastructures.  The 220 kV and 380 kV overhead power lines and buses are respectively 
green and red. Solid lines and buses of a single color are infrastructures directly captured from 
the RS 2006. Dotted lines and bicolor buses are new infrastructures of the PS 2018. Yellow 
generators symbol are new or upgraded hydro power plants. Table 24 gives an indication 
about the nature of the modifications between the RS 2006 and the PS 2018. 
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Figure 30: Electric schema of the PS 2018 
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Figure 31: Zoom in area A
 
 
 
Figure 32: Zoom in area B
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Table 24: Comments on the electric schemas of the PS 2018 
Label Description of the main modifications 
1 New substation at Crans. The 220 kV line Foretaille - Romanel is divided in two segments. 
2 
The 380 kV line Bois-Tollot - Chamoson is divided in four segments connecting three new 
buses at Chavalon, Bâtiaz and Romanel. 
3 
Construction of the 380 kV line from Romanel to Bassecourt via Mühleberg. New 220 kV line 
from Mathod to Mühleberg via Galmiz and and a new substation at Schiffenen. 
4 New 220 kV substation at Cornaux and Planchamps connected to Mathod and Galmiz. 
5 
New 380 kV line Chamoson - Chippis. Connection of the Bieudron hydro power plant of 1200 
MW at Chamoson. 
6 New 380 kV line connecting a 600 MW hydro power plant of Nant de Drance to Bâtiaz. 
7 Operation of one of the line Bickigen - Chippis at 380 kV. 
8 New 380 kV line from Chippis to Airolo. 
9 Multiple modifications of the 220 kV lines between Chippis to Ulrichen. 
10 Construction of a substation at Ulrichen inducing topology changes. 
11 
Extension of three hydro power plant in Innertkirchen, Grimsel and Handeck for a total of 800 
MW inducing topology modifications. 
12 Operation of one of the line Mettlen - Airolo at 380 kV. 
13 New 380 kV interconnection line between Airolo and Mese. 
14 New 380 kV line between Ova Spin and Pradella. 
15 Construction of a substation at Rüthi inducing topology changes. 
16 
Construction of the Limmern hydro power plant of 1 GW inducing modification of the 380 kV 
line between Breit and Tavanasa. 
17 New substations at Waldegg and Thalwil entailing the construction of six 220 kV power lines. 
18 New 220 kV power line between Flumenthal and Froloo. 
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9.5.3  Geographical models 
 
  
Figure 33: Map of the geographic model of the RS 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Map of the geographic model of the PS 2018 
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Table 25: Statistics of the geographic models 
2006 2018 Increase Total increase
# of 220 kV lines 157 185 28 
# of 380 kV lines 54 63 9 37
Length of 220 kV lines [km] 4406 4889 483 
Length of 380 kV lines [km] 2246 2620 374 857
# of exposure points 220 kV 1919 2141 222 
# of exposure points 380 kV 953 1111 158 380
 
Table 26: Attributes of fifth first lines of the geographic model 2006 
ID Voltage Length Summer peak name Summer off-peak name # Segments
1 220 8897 SFROLO2A-SLACHM2A-1 SFROLO2A-SLACHM2A-1 4
2 380 33795 SASPHA1B-FSIERE1C-1 SASPHA1A-FSIERE1C-1 15
3 220 26713 SFROLO2A-SORMAL2A-1 SFROLO2A-SORMAL2A-1 12
4 220 7553 SBIRR 2A-SNIEDE2B-1 SBIRR 2A-SNIEDE2B-1 4
5 220 12732 SBIRR 2A-SRUPPE2A-1 SBIRR 2A-SRUPPE2A-1 6
 
Table 27: Attributes of six first segments in the geographic model 2006 
ID segment ID Line Coordinate X Coordinate Y ࡾ૚ or ࡾ૛ Length [m]
1 1 610417 261515 2.4E-02 2500
2 1 612266 262852 2.4E-02 2500
3 1 615272 262066 2.4E-02 2500
4 1 617538 263246 2.4E-02 2500
5 2 623920 266043 7.0E-03 2500
6 2 624353 267847 7.0E-03 2500
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9.6 Data of the reference scenario 
 
 
Table 28: Estimation of the average unavailability 
 2001 2003 2004 Sources 
A Unavailability [h] 221 685 407 AES-VSE statistics
B Number of line 211 211 211 AES-VSE statistics
C Unavailability per line [h] 1.0 3.2 1.9 A/B 
D Hours per year 8760 8760 8760 - 
E Unavailability  1.2E-04 3.7E-04 2.2E-04 ܷ௟ ൌC/D 
F Average unavailability  2.4E-04 ഥܷ௟ ൌMean(E) 
 
 
Table 29: Normalized vulnerability of the reference scenario 
 ࢓ ൌ ૛ ࢓ ൌ ૜ Sources 
G Sum severity 0.06 0.16 Contingency analysis
H Unavailability 5.6E-08 1.3E-11 Fm 
I Vulnerability 3.2E-09 2.2E-12 G*H 
J Number CMC 20000 40000 Choice 
K Vulnerability  1.6E-13 ܸ௥௘௙ ൌI1/J1+I2/J2 
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